Sovereignty, jurisdiction, and property in outer space: space resources, the outer space treaty, and national legislation by Cheney, Thomas Eric Leslie
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Cheney, Thomas Eric Leslie (2020) Sovereignty, jurisdiction, and property in outer space: 
space  resources,  the  outer  space  treaty,  and  national  legislation.  Doctoral  thesis,  Nothumbria 
University. 
This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/42999/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online:  
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
                        
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Property in 
Outer Space: Space Resources, the Outer 
Space Treaty, and National Legislation 
 
 
 
 
T EL Cheney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD 
 
2020 
  
Page 1 of 342 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Property in 
Outer Space: Space Resources, the Outer 
Space Treaty, and National Legislation 
 
 
 
 
Thomas Eric Leslie Cheney 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Research undertaken in the Faculty of 
Business and Law 
 
 
 
January 2020 
  
Page 2 of 342 
Abstract 
 
Space resources and space property rights have long been popular topics. This interest 
has increased recently. The development of an embryotic space resources industry, 
and national legislation intended to foster it, has turned what had previously been a 
somewhat academic discussion about the true scope of the ‘freedom’ to use outer space 
and the limitations of the ‘non-appropriation principle’ into one of significance not 
just for outer space but the international order more broadly. There is an ambiguity at 
the heart of the Outer Space Treaty, it places the ‘freedom of use’ of outer space in the 
first article, its preamble talks of opening outer space for the human future, yet the 
non-appropriation principle potentially prevents all of that. In order for there to be a 
human future in outer space humanity needs to be able to make use of the resources in 
outer space, but if they cannot be ‘appropriated’ then that cannot happen. This thesis 
seeks to understand that contradiction and identify solutions.  
 
It examines the Outer Space Treaty as the foundational and fundamental core of the 
space governance regime but also seeks to place it and the concept of property rights 
in a wider context. Utilizing, treaties, laws, negotiating records, and secondary sources 
from a range of disciplines, this thesis will examine the seeming contradiction between 
being free to use something but not to appropriate it. It will find that it is possible to 
construct a property rights regime for space resources within the framework of the 
Outer Space Treaty. However, in order for that regime to be practically useful, it will 
require international cooperation and coordination. It will require positive action to 
achieve. The alternative is anarchy, the likes of which Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty was intended to avoid.   
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study: 
The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate the governance framework of outer 
space in order to establish whether mining (space resource activities) in outer space is 
permitted and, if it is, what will the legal regime look like. The reason behind the 
ambiguity regarding the mining of space resources (water and other minerals) in outer 
space lays within the foundational treaty of space law; the Outer Space Treaty [Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies1], which, in Article II, prohibits 
“national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use, or occupation, or by 
any other means.” The question is, therefore, to what extent is mining an act of 
appropriation. The non-appropriation principle, laid out in Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty, is one of the core fundamental principles of space governance. Yet space 
resources are the key to unlocking a human future in outer space. If they are 
‘inaccessible’ by virtue of the Outer Space Treaty then either humanity’s future in 
space is going to be limited, or more likely, the Outer Space Treaty will be discarded. 
Neither of these outcomes are desirable.  
Furthermore, States are taking action. During the course of this study, two countries 
have produced national legislation on space resources and there have been many hours 
of discussion (sometimes heated) at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNCOPUOS), the primary international forum on space governance. As a 
result, fragmentation is a growing concern. Three blocks of States are presently 
 
1Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 
10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty/OST)  
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emerging: those led by the United States and Luxembourg who are content with 
individual States developing national legislation on space resources; those led by 
Russia who object to the ‘unilateral’ nature of such national legislation; and the Moon 
Agreement [Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies]2 States who view the solution as lying within Article 11 of the Moon 
Agreement. The Outer Space Treaty and the space governance regime emanating from 
it is not perfect, and certainly has its issues, however it has facilitated peaceful 
cooperation in outer space and virtually exponential growth of activity in outer space 
for over 50 years, this is threatened by fragmentation of the regime. Despite its flaws 
that regime is preferable to a fragmented governance structure, and certainly 
preferable to none at all. Therefore, these questions need answering and solutions need 
illuminating. That is the intention of this study. 
Having considered the background of the study it is important to look forward and 
consider both the impact that such a discussion can have and those stakeholders which 
may be potential beneficiaries of this work. The biggest potential impact is to 
underscore the practical need for an international framework on space resources. The 
international community is currently in the process of debating this through 
UNCOPUOS and this study could influence minds, particularly as The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group (The Hague Working 
Group) has proposed just such a framework. Indeed, as this author has been a member 
of that Working Group the work undertaken in service of this study has already had 
an impact on the debate. The Hague Working Group is an independent international 
forum comprised of academics, governments, and other stakeholders. They have 
 
2Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3 (Moon Agreement/MA)  
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produced a set of building blocks for the development of an international framework 
on space resource activities.3 The Hague Working Group’s Building Blocks have been 
presented to UNCOPUOS, where they have generally, but not universally, been 
positively received.  
An additional potential impact of this study is regarding the question of defining 
‘celestial bodies.’ There have been, and are, proposals to create ‘categories’ of celestial 
bodies and potentially even exclude certain size bodies from the ‘non-appropriation 
principle’ altogether, this work takes an in-depth look at the definition of celestial 
bodies as used in the Outer Space Treaty, and should warn against such notions. The 
Outer Space Treaty does not contain a definition of this term, which has not received 
as much attention as the definition of ‘outer space.’ Indeed, beyond this work, only 
Fasan4 and Pop5 have examined the term in any great detail. 
As for potential stakeholders, ‘industry’ is a key stakeholder however, owing to 
difficulties due to funding, or more accurately lack thereof, the pool has shrunk 
considerably. That said, there are still companies exploring space resources and likely 
to be future entrants to the industry, particularly as the on-orbit servicing industry 
matures and plans for returns to the Moon and beyond take shape creating a market 
for space resources. Furthermore, governments are still considering space resources, 
not just the United States and Luxembourg, others are considering new national 
legislation on space resources, including the United Kingdom.6 Additionally, many 
 
3‘The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group’ (International Institute of 
Air and Space Law) <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-
law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-space-resources-governance-working-group> 
accessed 9 January 2020 
4Ernst Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies – Some Legal Differences’ (1998) 26 J. Space L. 
33  
5Virgiliu Pop, 'A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...' 52nd IAF Congress (2001) 
<http://www.spacefuture.com/pr/archive/a_celestial_body_is_a_celestial_body_is_a_celestia
l_body.shtml> accessed 10 June 2015; Virgiliu Pop, Who Owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial 
Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership (Springer 2009)  
6Based on personal communications with relevant government employees 
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states are active in the ongoing discussions regarding space resources at the Legal 
Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS, they will find this work useful. 
This is not the first work on space property rights or space resources. The leading 
preceding work is Virgiliu Pop’s Who Owns the Moon?7 but works by Thomas 
Gangale8, Fabio Tronchetti9 and Ricky J. Lee10 have also been produced. The 
International Academy of Astronautics have also produced a study on space mineral 
resources11 which included an assessment of legal issues and Ram Jakhu, Joseph 
Pelton and Yaw Out Mankata Nyampong produced Space Mining and Its Regulation 
in 2017.12 Pop and Gangale had the objective of refuting claims of people like Dennis 
Hope that they had ownership of land on the Moon or ‘owned’ asteroids. Pop, Gangale, 
Tronchetti, and Lee all produced their monographs before the US space resources law, 
and neither the IAA [International Academy of Astronautics] study nor Space Mining 
and Its Regulation have their focus on the question of property rights but rather address 
it as part of a larger work on issues relating to space resources. None take into account 
the developments as a result of the ongoing discussions by States at the UN on the 
topic of space resources. Nor do any of them take the detailed examination of the 
nature of property that is undertaken in this study. While Pop does address the question 
of the definition of a ‘celestial body’ as is argued in this work his conclusions are 
flawed. This work builds on those works, particularly of Pop, Gangale, Tronchetti and 
 
7Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5) 
8Thomas Gangale, The Development of Outer Space: Sovereignty and Property Rights in 
International Space Law (Praeger 2009)  
9Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: A 
Proposal for a Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009)  
10Ricky J. Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space (Springer 
2012)  
11Arthur M. Dula and Zhang Zheniun (eds) Space Mineral Resources: A Global Assessment of the 
Challenges and Opportunities (International Academy of Astronautics 2015)  
12Ram S Jakhu, Joseph N. Pelton, Yaw Otu Mankata Nyampong, Space Mining and its Regulation 
(Springer 2017)   
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Lee, and seeks to answer the questions that they necessarily left unanswered and deal 
with the developments that have occurred since 2015. 
1.2 Background: 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits “national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”13 This is viewed 
as a fundamental,14 cardinal principle15 of space law, and has been described as a 
cornerstone of the space law regime.16 It is one of the most universally recognized 
principles of space law17 and it is generally regarded as having achieved the status of 
a customary norm of international law18. A few scholars have even gone so far as to 
argue that the non-appropriation principle, expressed in Article II, has achieved the 
status of a jus cogens norm. Though they do not make a case for this they merely assert 
it,19 which is fairly common for claims about jus cogens.20 While, the non-
appropriation principle is clearly a fundamental principle of space governance it is a 
stretch to place it on such a pedestal. 
That Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the appropriation of the Moon or 
any celestial body, in whole or in part is clear, unambiguous and universally accepted. 
 
13Outer Space Treaty (n 1), Article II 
14Pop, ‘A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...’ (n 5); Ricky J. Lee, ‘Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, Private Property Rights or Both?’ 
(2004) 11 Aust. Int’l L. J. 128, 128; Steven Freeland and Ram Jakhu, ‘Article II’ in Stephan 
Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl (eds), Cologne Commentary on Space 
Law, vol 1 (1st edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009), 45, 48, 63 
15I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor and V. Kopal, An Introduction to Space Law (3rd edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2008), 26 
16Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization’ in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio 
Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 778 
17Lee, ‘Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’ (n 14), 128; Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial 
Mining (n 10),  166 
18Paul B. Larsen, ‘Asteroid Legal Regime: Time for a Change?’ (2014) 39 J. Space L. 275, 289; 
Freeland and Jakhu ‘Article II’ (n 14), 55, 63; Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen Space Law: 
A Treatise (Ashgate 2009), 180; Lee, ‘Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’ (n 14), 134-135 
19Steven Freeland and Ram Jakhu ‘Article II’ (n 14), 55, 63 Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial 
Mining (n 10), 125-126 
20Matthew Saul, “Identifying Jus Cogens Norms: The Interaction of Scholars and International 
Judges’ (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 26, 41 
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However, the status of resources is less clear. Only the Moon Agreement discusses 
resources specifically.21 The Moon Agreement declares that “the Moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind”22 and that States “undertake to 
establish an international regime…to govern the exploitation of the natural resources 
of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible.”23 The Moon Agreement 
is generally regarded as being a failed treaty. While it received enough support to enter 
into force, fewer than two dozen States signed up to it and none of the ‘major players’ 
in space are parties to the treaty.24 The Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) 
principle in Article 11 of the Moon Agreement was the main reason for its widespread 
rejection as it was interpreted as being a requirement to share revenue and 
technology.25  
State Practice can help with the interpretation of treaty provisions as it demonstrates 
what States feels they are legally permitted or prohibited from doing something.26 In 
space law, state practice is frequently limited, however this has not hampered the 
development of customary norms, as was in evidence in the rapid crystallization of 
customary international law in the wake of Sputnik.27 Practice supports the notion that 
states can appropriate extracted samples and/or resources, at least provided the 
purpose behind such activity is for scientific purposes. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union conducted lunar sample return missions that elicited no objections from 
 
21Moon Agreement (n 2) 
22ibid, Art 11(1) 
23ibid, Art 11(5) 
24UNCOPUOS ‘Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 
January 2019’ (1 April 2019) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 
25Frans von der Dunk, ‘Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft 
Law’ in the Context of Space Activities’ in Irmgard Marboe (eds), Soft Law in Outer Space: 
The Function of Non-binding Norms in International Space Law (Boehlau Verlag 2012), 40 
26Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn OUP 2017), 254-255 
27Maxwell Cohen ‘Introduction: Law and Politics in Space’ in Maxwell Cohen, (eds) Law and 
Politics in Space: Specific and Urgent Problems in the Law of Outer Space (Leicester 
University Press 1964), 11-20, 18  
Page 18 of 342 
the international community. Additionally, neither the comet and asteroid sample 
return missions of Stardust nor Hayabusa provoked objection.28 The United States 
Government has maintained that the Apollo Moon rocks belong to the US 
Government29 or the governments they were gifted to.30 The Russian Federation, has 
gone a step further, and sold a portion of the Luna 20 sample at auction in 1993, again 
without eliciting objection from the international community.31 Some have suggested 
that this establishes at least a customary precedent for the sale of extracted samples or 
resources32, although how much of a role the initial scientific purpose of the extraction 
plays is unclear. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty makes States responsible for the actions of their 
nationals in space. Therefore the actions of a private corporation like Deep Space 
Industries or Planetary Resources could give rise to a violation of Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty.33 Private individuals and corporations are under the same 
prohibition on owning ‘outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies’ as states. 
Jenks has said that “states bear international responsibility for national activities in 
space; it follows that what is forbidden to a state is not permitted to a chartered 
company created by a state or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer.”34 
Fabio Tronchetti has written that “the prohibition to extend state sovereignty in the 
 
28Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 135-136 
29Matthew J. Kleiman The Little Book of Space Law (American Bar Association 2012), 156 
30US v One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material 252 F.Supp.2d 1367 (S.D.Fla 2003); Virgiliu Pop, 
Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 140-141 
31Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 140-141; Brian Harvey, Soviet and Russian Lunar Exploration 
(Springer-Praxis 2007), 246 
32Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 141  
33Diederiks-Verschoor and Kopal, An Introduction to Space Law (n 15), 28-29; Lyall and Larsen, 
Space Law (n 18), 66, 470, 566; Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 64 
34C. Wilfred Jenks, Space Law (Stevens and Sons 1965), 201 
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space environment generates an implicit and automatic ban to acquire titles of 
property, both public and private in outer space.”35 
The main line of reasoning supporting this position is that private property needs a 
state in order to exist, therefore any private property in ‘outer space, the moon and 
other celestial bodies’ would be national appropriation and therefore in violation of 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Kevin Gray has argued that the state is critical to 
the very existence of ‘property.’36 Pop has argued that private appropriation cannot 
exist independently from state appropriation and that property rights need a state to 
enforce them in order for them to exist.37 This is also supported by Francis Lyall and 
Paul B. Larsen who have written that “only states can have sovereignty and thereby 
invest others with property rights.”38 Pop has pointed out that while de facto 
appropriation and possession can occur without the legal infrastructure of a state, 
property rights themselves do not exist without that infrastructure.39 
However, there are those who argue that property rights do not need sovereignty to 
exist and that instead of property rights emanating from government, governments 
simply provide recognition of property rights which does not constitute appropriation 
as defined by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty40 Regarding this debate Margaret 
Davies has written that “in the present context resources in outer space may... at some 
stage constitute a new frontier for the expansion of tangible property rights.”41 
 
35Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (n 9), 
199 
36Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge L.J. 252, 299, 304 
37Pop, Who Owns the Moon?, 62-66 
38Lyall and Larsen, Space Law (n 18), 184 
39Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 66 
40Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, ‘Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could 
a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate it needs to Survive?’ (2008) 73 J. of Air L. 
& Com. 37, 48-50 
41Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (Routledge-Cavendish 2007), 65 
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Both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement use the phrase “outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies.” However, there is no clear definition 
as to what actually constitutes a celestial body. It is not even clear whether asteroids 
are celestial bodies. As the term ‘celestial bodies’ is not a clearly defined legal concept 
it may be possible to circumvent the non-appropriation principle by exploiting the 
term’s ambiguity, at least with regards to asteroids.42 
There are several kinds of celestial body: galaxies, stars, planets, moons, asteroids, 
comets and even specks of dust could be considered celestial bodies.43 A number of 
authors have raised the notion that asteroids and comets should not be considered 
celestial bodies, at least in the legal sense. Some have raised the notion of a minimum 
size of a natural object in order for it to be considered a celestial body.44 Ernst Fasan 
feels that the drafters of the treaties had “substantial natural objects in mind” when 
they used the phrase ‘celestial bodies.’45 Of course, Dr Fasan does not elaborate on 
what constitutes ‘substantial.’ 
Virgiliu Pop has argued that it could be interpreted from the text of the Outer Space 
Treaty that a celestial body needs to be big enough to land on. He also argued that 
taking an approach to the question he called the ‘control approach’ would mean that 
an object that can be moved by human action is therefore ‘movable’ and is thus not a 
celestial body and would in fact become available for appropriation. Change of the 
asteroids status and creation of ownership might occur at the moment it was moved 
by artificial means.46 
 
42Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 58 
43Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies…’ (n 4), 34-36 
44Ibid, 36-38 
45Ibid, 40 
46Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 44-55 
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Which could mean that asteroids which are small enough to be moved from their orbits 
by artificial means are not celestial bodies, however this definition runs into the 
problem that as technology develops it could be possible to move bigger and bigger 
asteroids. It is theoretically possible to move a 500-ton asteroid to high lunar orbit 
using currently available technology, as demonstrated in a recent study produced for 
NASA by the Keck Institute for Space Studies at the California Institute of 
Technology’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory.47 
The passage of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act48 has once 
again brought the issue of space property rights, particularly regarding asteroid 
mining, into the media spotlight. The new law is intended “to facilitate a pro-growth 
environment for the developing commercial space industry by encouraging private 
sector investment and creating more stable and predictable regulatory conditions, and 
for other purposes.”49 Title IV or the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act 
of 2015 is specifically intended to create a property rights framework for the 
extraterrestrial mining industry, at least for US based companies. 
The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 (as Title IV of the 
CSLCA is known) has provoked considerable controversy as it seemingly conflicts 
with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. As under the Act the US grants itself the 
right to grant property rights over asteroid resources to US companies the Act could 
be seen as US trying to claim property rights over space resources (which it would 
presumably have to do in order to grant them to others) which would violate Article II 
 
47John Brophy, Fred Culick, Louis Friedman, et al, Asteroid Retrieval Feasibility Study (2012) 
<http://www.kiss.caltech.edu/study/asteroid/asteroid_final_report.pdf> accessed 06 February 
2016 
48US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Public Law 114-90, 114th Congress, 25 
November 2015, 51 U.S.C. (CSLCA) 
49Ibid, preamble 
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of the Outer Space Treaty.50 The Act does require this to be done in “accordance with 
the international obligations of the United States”51 and makes the disclaimer that “the 
United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or 
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”52 However, the practical 
effect of this is still unclear. 
The law relating to space resources has been a sizeable ‘gap’ in the Corpus Juris 
Spatialis. Despite the promulgation of two national laws relating to space mining it 
remains so.  The main studies on property rights in outer space have focused on the 
Moon or Earth orbit. Considering that there are companies proposing to mine the 
asteroid belt and the potential contribution to the future of humanity the industry could 
make, it is a topic well worth researching.  
Entrepreneurs and businesses want and need a favourable legal framework,53 if for no 
other reason than “to be assured that the security of the return on investment afforded 
by ‘terrestrial property law’ will be available for investments in space.”54 The Space 
Resource and Exploration Act is intended to provide this security, however as it is a 
unilateral action taken by the United States without the consultation of any other state 
it may in fact generate more uncertainty and conflict than had custom been allowed to 
develop. It may lead to a land rush in space which is exactly what the drafters of the 
Outer Space Treaty intended to avoid.55 
Space resource activities are likely to happen, when remains an open question however 
if humanity is to extend its reach into space it needs to happen because, as Jim Benson 
 
50Fabio Tronchetti, ‘The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move Forward or a Step 
Back?’ (2015) 34 Space Policy 6, 8 
51CSLCA (n 48), § 51302(a)(2), § 51302 (a)(3) 
52Ibid § 403 
53Gennady M. Danilenko, ‘Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process’ (1989) 4 Berkley 
Tech. L.J. 217, 218 
54Lyall and Larsen, Space Law (n 18), 567 
55Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Johns 
Hopkins University Press 1997), 187 
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used to say, ‘in order to go to space to stay, we have to make space pay.’56 The current 
space law regime is not perfect but it does a lot to prevent conflict in space and its 
preservation is important. If the space law regime is seen as obstructing space resource 
utilization then it is likely to be discarded, which could be disastrous. 
It is also worth noting a few definitions, as used throughout this work. The definition 
of space resource is seemingly now agreed upon. The US Title IV, the Luxembourg 
Space Resources law and the Hague Building Blocks all use some variation of “an 
extractable abiotic resource in situ in outer space.” This is a new definition for space 
law as it does not appear in any of the five space treaties, not even the Moon 
Agreement. However, it is similar to the definition of ‘resources’ found in UNCLOS57 
and this definition brooked little opposition at the several sessions of UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee since the enactment of the US Title IV. When discussing space 
resources in this work, this is the definition that should be referred to. 
Additionally, the term ‘ore’ is also utilized in several sections of this work, it is not 
used in the geological sense but the economic and mining industry sense of a 
concentration of resources which are economically viable to extract and market for 
profit.58 What constitutes an ‘ore bearing’ deposit obviosity fluctuates with the varying 
cost of extraction and transport as well as the market price, so what today is not an 
‘ore bearing’ asteroid may become one tomorrow and vice versa. 
 
 
 
56Mark Alpert, ‘Making Money in Space’ (1999) 10 Scientific American Presents 92; Rex Ridenoure, 
‘NEAP: 15 years later’ (The Space Review, 17 June 2013) 
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2315/1> accessed 10 June 2015 
57United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS), Article 133(a); Yoshifumi Tanaka The 
International Law of the Sea (2nd edn. CUP 2015), 180 
58Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite eds. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (12th edn. OUP 2011), 
1008 
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1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis: 
These research questions focus on the core issues relating to the ‘legality’ of space 
resource activities. Property rights are important, they provide security and a necessary 
degree of certainty. Entrepreneurs and businesses want and need a favourable legal 
framework,59 if for no other reason than “to be assured that the security of the return 
on investment afforded by ‘terrestrial property law’ will be available for investments 
in space.”60 However, there has been a general presumption that the non-appropriation 
principle articulated in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prevents States from 
granting property rights to their nationals (and even from nationals ‘obtaining’ 
property rights without State intervention). Whether this applies to resources has been 
the big unanswered question, even from the existing scholarly work. The United States 
and Luxembourg assert that resources are appropriable once extracted from celestial 
bodies and that their national legislation conforms with the requirements of the Outer 
Space Treaty. The overarching research question of this work could be simplified as 
asking whether that is true? However, there is of course more to it than that, hence the 
research questions listed below. 
1.3.1 Does a national space resources property rights regime constitute 
national appropriation by means of sovereignty or any other means as 
found in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty? 
 
The first research question that needs to be addressed is whether the national or 
‘unilateral’ approach being undertaken by the United States and Luxembourg 
constitutes national appropriation. While, of course, part of this will involve looking 
at the contents of the United States and Luxembourg space resources law, it has to be 
a broader question. Particularly in the case of the United States it is clear that the law 
 
59Danilenko, ‘Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process’ (n 53), 218 
60Lyall and Larsen, Space Law (n 18), 567 
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passed in 2015 is a first step and therefore it is premature to overly fixate on the 
specifics of the initial legislation. However, there is also the fact that other States are 
and may consider national legislation of their own and in order for the result of this 
enquiry to be relevant to them it needs to be more general, this enquiry is not 
specifically about the US legislation but rather the use of such national legislation to 
‘govern’ space resource activities, of which the US legislation is the pioneer. Further, 
the nature of property needs to be understood in order to properly assess whether the 
‘granting’ or ‘recognizing’ of property rights is inherently a sovereign act of 
appropriation in violation of the non-appropriation principle. Of course, this also, 
inherently, involves producing a clearer understanding of what the Outer Space Treaty 
means by ‘national appropriation’.  
1.3.2 What is the legal definition of a celestial body and are asteroids celestial 
bodies 
 
The second research question is a subquestion regarding the scope of application of 
the non-appropriation principle. The non-appropriation principle applies to outer space 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies. However the Outer Space Treaty does 
not provide a definition of ‘celestial bodies’ (nor for that matter outer space, but that 
is outside the scope of this enquiry as ‘resources’ are taken to be things like minerals 
or water in line with the Hague Group definition61, sunlight and orbits are construable 
as resources but owing to fundamentally different natures they are not included within 
the conception of ‘resources’ as explored by this work) and Pop has suggested that 
certain asteroids might not be ‘celestial bodies’ and therefore could be appropriable.62 
 
61The Hague Working Group Building Blocks on Space Resource Activities 2019 
<https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-
publiekrecht/lucht--en-ruimterecht/space-resources/bb-thissrwg--cover.pdf> accessed 9 
January 2020, Building Block 2.1 (see also footnote 2 on page 1)  
62Pop, 'A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...' (n 5); Pop, Who Owns the Moon? 
(n 5), 58  
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Further with regards to this question is whether a resource continues to be ‘part of’ the 
celestial body once it has been extracted, if it does then it may not be possible to take 
ownership of extracted resources, given Article II OST. 
1.3.3 Does the distinction between personal and territorial 
jurisdiction/sovereignty allow for the development of a legal regime to 
govern space resource activities? 
 
The exercise of jurisdiction in the modern international system is inherently territorial 
in nature. However, States are able to exercise ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ over their 
nationals. Indeed, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty essentially requires it and 
Article VIII provides the mechanism for doing so. The third research question 
essentially asks whether this gives states sufficient authority to govern space resource 
activities. Is it important that national laws focus on authorising activities rather than 
granting property, priority, or mining rights over specific areas? This question also ties 
in with the first question regarding a national or international approach, as even if there 
is scope for states to authorise and regulate such activities there is still the question of 
what international measures that would be necessary in order to ensure cooperation 
and avoidance of harmful interference or even outright conflict, particularly if the 
number of viable ‘ore bearing’ celestial bodies proves limited. 
1.4 Research Methodology: 
The methodology of this work is predominantly a socio-legal approach. Socio-legal is 
meant in the sense of placing law within its broader context, not in the narrower 
‘sociological’ use, furthermore, it is an inherently interdisciplinary approach.63  In 
order to fully examine the institutions of property and sovereignty it is necessary to 
investigate them within their political, economic, philosophical and historical context. 
 
63Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney ‘Socio-legal studies: A Challenge to the doctrinal approach’ in 
Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law (2nd edn. Routledge 
2017), 42-43 
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This logic is enhanced with the additional considerations of international law which is 
often influenced as much, if not more, by politics than law. This however does not 
preclude an in-depth examination of relevant texts such as the Outer Space Treaty 
(Article II, in particular) and the US and Luxembourg legislation on space mining as 
well as the work of UNCOPUOS and The Hague Space Resources Governance 
Working Group. This work takes a positivist approach to the nature of law, which 
influences the assessment of the nature of so-called ‘gaps’ in international law. Quane 
argues that there are two approaches to take towards the sources of international law 
either they are a ‘snap shot’ at particular moment, or a ‘moving image’ that allows for 
evolving view. Quane argues that ‘moving image’ view is not only more useful but 
also probably more applicable, at least in international law.64 This work utilizes the 
‘moving image’ approach. This sits well with applying the evolutionary interpretation 
to the Outer Space Treaty. The evolutionary interpretation recognizes that the meaning 
of the terms of a treaty can change over time. Gardiner suggests there are three 
elements that indicate the evolutionary approach may be appropriate 1) the use of 
language in the treaty is adapted to evolve such as the use of ‘generic’ terms 2) the 
treaty has a long or indefinite duration and 3) there was a presumption or awareness 
of the parties that terms would evolve.65 The Outer Space Treaty meets all three of 
these ‘criteria’. Indeed, the drafters of the OST expressed an expectation that an 
evolutionary, developmental approach to space law would be taken, which is why they 
stick to general principles in the OST.66 
 
64Helen Quane, ‘Silence in International Law’ (2014) 84 BYBIL 240, 243 
65Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 467-471 
66UNCOPUOS 'Summary Record of the Sixty-First Meeting' (20 October 1966) UN DOC 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.61, 8; UNCOPUOS 'Summary Record of the Sixty-Third Meeting' (20 
October 1966) UN DOC A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63, 11; UNCOPUOS 'Summary Record of the 
Sixty Eight Meeting' (21 October 1966) UN DOC A/AC.105/C.2/SR.68, 10  
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Regarding scientific and engineering research the approach was to utilize work from 
leading figures in their respective fields, particularly those pieces which had been 
intended for a non-specialist audience. A broad approach to these fields was 
undertaken, recognizing that the primary value was to inform and contextualize a legal 
analysis rather than stand on its own as scientific or engineering scholarship. Heading 
Paul Roberts warnings about the potential dangers of interdisciplinary legal research.67 
As well as Jenks, reminder that while “scientific facts and evidence” are important for 
space law,  they “should not be regarded as independent sources of legal obligation… 
but as important, and in the case of the scientific facts vital, considerations within this 
accepted framework of legal obligation governing international relations generally.”68 
This research is primarily document focused and library-based research. The Outer 
Space Treaty forms the core focus upon which the enquiry is centred, though of, course 
other treaties, as well as General Assembly Resolutions, ICJ case law, national 
legislation, UN Documents and secondary legislation are utilized. A wealth of 
information is available via online data bases, with the United Nations archive, 
including verbatim transcripts of treaty negotiations, being available on the UN 
website. Interviews with stakeholders were eschewed for primarily two reasons, first, 
as has been demonstrated by the collapse of Deep Space Industries and Planetary 
Resources (and the Obama-Trump transition), while the categories of stakeholders 
will not change, the actual stakeholders themselves will undoubtably change. Second, 
interviews with stakeholders was likely to result in little, industry representatives made 
clear they considered legal opinions ‘proprietary’ and were unwilling to divulge much 
 
67Paul Roberts, 'Interdisciplinary in Legal Research' in Mike McConville, and Wing Hong (Eric) 
Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2017), 96-99 
68Jenks, Space Law (n 34), 183 
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detail even under Chatham House rule, and government representatives did not 
diverge from the documented record, at least not when willing to be used as a source.     
Alternate approaches were considered, given the centrality of property to this work a 
Marxist approach was considered, as was a post-colonial approach, particularly given 
the anti-colonial nature of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. However, both these 
would likely have resulted in more critical conclusions. Stakeholders and potential 
impact need to be considered. That is not to suggest shying away from controversy or 
critical conclusions but merely a recognition that adopting a methodological approach 
that would result in a significant proportion of this work’s stakeholders dismissing it 
out of hand necessarily limits the impact of the work. However, to quote Paul Roberts, 
This still does not imply automatic deference to prevailing orthodoxies 
or toadying to the powers that be. Some of the most incisive critics of 
liberal legality are card-carrying liberals, whose criticisms are all the 
more incisive precisely because they take liberal ideals seriously and 
know them, intimately and accurately, from an ‘appreciative’ insider 
perspective.69 
 
1.5 Intended Outcomes: 
The intended outcome of this work is to identify how a space resources property rights 
regime is possible given the non-appropriation provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Part of this involves understanding the nature of the freedom of use in Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty. In order to develop this understanding it is necessary for this work 
to involve the examination of what it means to ‘use’ outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, particularly whether this includes exploitation of resources 
found within those bodies specially if it is done for commercial purposes. In order to 
answer this, it necessary to understand freedom of use within the context of the 
prohibition on ‘national appropriation’ within Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
 
69Roberts, 'Interdisciplinary in Legal Research' (n 67), 96 
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However, it is not clear what that means. Resources are not specifically mentioned in 
the treaty itself and the formulation suggests that is meant to thwart activities or 
assertions as being the basis for any claim to rights rather than prevent the activities 
themselves. 
It is also important to discover whether such a regime is possible by the ‘sovereign’ or 
‘unilateral’ action of a State by virtue of national legislation or whether it needs to be 
an international or multilateral regime. Regarding an international approach there are 
two possibilities, one is that there is a legal requirement for an international regime, 
possibly by virtue of the res communis nature of outer space, the other is that it is a 
practical necessity in order to ensure cooperation, coordination, and mutual 
recognition.  
1.6 Overarching Summary: 
Chapter Two provides background and context on space resources. It will show that 
space resource activities (space mining) are a plausible industry which is in the process 
of being developed. Furthermore, States (such as the United States and Luxembourg) 
are taking this prospect seriously and have introduced legislation to regulate it. This 
provides an impetus to the international legal community to take the issues raised 
seriously. Furthermore, chapter one argues that it is necessary to take consideration of 
the actual, physical distribution of resources when devising a property rights regime 
or legal framework for space resources. This chapter provides a clear overview of 
space resources as a subject, laying a foundation for the rest of the enquiry.  
Chapter Three provides an overview of the relevant elements of Public International 
Law. This provides an overview of the framework within which which space law 
operates and an understanding of the basis for much of the work of this enquiry, 
particularly the understanding of treaty interpretation employed. It also argues that 
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while space law is indeed a ‘special regime’ it is part of international law, as indicated 
by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Furthermore, it addresses so-called ‘gaps’ in 
international law and how to view them. It argues that such ‘lack of provision’ should 
not be regarded as a ‘gap’, which assumes a natural ‘completeness’ and is not 
appropriate in a positivist framework but as a ‘silence.’   
The chapter also presents Customary International Law as an important piece of the 
puzzle which provides a process for the evolution of international law. While who 
qualifies as a ‘specially affected state’ might be unclear in the context of outer space 
(theoretically all states could be spacefaring, unlike landlocked states which cannot 
become costal states) that opinio juris, particularly when expressed at a forum like 
UNCOPUOS, can drive an accelerated development of new customary international 
law, particularly if there is State Practice to support it (such as national legislation) is 
reasonable given the framework of international law and its fundamental nature as a 
voluntary state led process. Opinio juris on space resources has not formed, however 
it is crystallising. Finally, the case is made that soft law provides a potentially useful 
avenue to creating a coordinating international framework which while not as robust 
as a ‘hard law’ approach would provide flexibility which given the embryotic nature 
of space resource activities is desirable. 
Chapter Four provides an overview of the relevant space law treaties. The focus is 
primarily on the Outer Space Treaty although as Article 11 of the Moon Agreement is 
relevant it is also discussed. The chapter does not examine all articles of the Outer 
Space Treaty but instead focuses on the most relevant ones, Article I and the definition 
of ‘use’ and Article II and the ‘non-appropriation principle being primary focuses. 
Both of which are critical to this enquiry. However, Article III which firmly plants 
space law within broader international law is also looked at, as is Article VI which is 
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key to brining non-governmental actors under the obligations of the Outer Space 
Treaty, albeit via the ‘responsible’ state. Article VII is also looked at as it provides the 
basis for the exercise of ‘jurisdiction and control’ over space objects and their 
personnel. 
Chapter Five delves into the question of what constitutes a celestial body as the term 
is used in the Outer Space Treaty. This is a crucial question as it speaks to the scope 
of application of the non-appropriation principle. If certain asteroids or other naturally 
occurring bodies could be considered not to be ‘celestial bodies’ then they would not 
be subject to the non-appropriation principle. The chapter looks at the treaties, and 
what space law scholars have said. It takes a look at the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of 
the term as well as the scientific understanding of the term. 
Chapter Six examines the history of the concept of property. John Locke looms large 
in property theory however as this chapter demonstrates his history is flawed. Property 
did not precede the state, indeed property, as a legal phenomenon, requires the state 
and the law in order to exist. The actual history of property also provides further 
support for the ‘bundle’ approach, as the ‘absolute’ model, to the extent that it ever 
existed, was a short lived, and a ‘recent’ development of the Early Modern era, as this 
chapter will demonstrate. Further, this chapter will argue that property does not and 
has not always been virtually synonymous with land, indeed in the early English 
common law it primarily referred to ‘movable’ goods which shaped thinking about it. 
Further, as this chapter will demonstrate, there are alternative models, particularly 
from the pre-Modern era which allow for multi and variable use of areas with or 
without ‘ownership’ or ‘appropriation’ of the territory which may prove useful for the 
future governance of activities in outer space.  
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Chapter Seven will address the theoretical and philosophical approaches to 
understanding property. The first section of the chapter will discuss the common 
notion that property is a ‘thing’ and that this view is mistaken, though popular. It will 
reframe the nature of property as about ‘rights’ and relations between individuals 
regarding ‘things.’ The next section will look at the natural school of property, as 
exemplified by the work of John Locke. It will dismiss this approach to property rights; 
however, it is vital to examine it given the influence of Locke in Anglo-American 
thinking and the ‘Lockean’ reasoning expressed in the US space resources legislation 
of 2015. The following section will focus on the ‘bundle of rights’ approach which is 
the dominant paradigm in modern legal scholarship. It will focus on the elements of 
‘exclusion’ and ‘use’ while questioning whether or not they are equal. The next section 
Will look more explicitly at the relationship between property and the state, 
particularly its nature as an institution for managing the distribution and use of 
resources and the societal context it has as a result. The following section will discuss 
the role of enforcement and the rule of law which is not only vital in order for property 
rights to have any practical or economic meaning but also one of the main potential 
hurdles regarding space resources. This, as mentioned, will help to reinforce the 
argument that it is necessary, practically if not legally speaking, for there to be an 
international space resources governance framework in order to effectively enforce 
property rights. Finally, alternatives to the mainstream approaches to property will be 
discussed, from Proudhon, who ‘famously’ declared that ‘property is theft’70 to Elinor 
Ostrom’s ‘common pool resources’, and the notion of stewardship. 
 
70Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Donald R. Kelly and Bonnie G. Smith (eds, trans) What is Property? (CUP 
2008), 13 
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Chapter Eight will examine the concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction and how they 
apply to outer space. Sovereignty underpins the international order and jurisdiction is 
how States exercise their power and determines over whom they can do so. Therefore, 
it is imperative than an examination of the concepts is undertaken.  
The first section of this chapter examines sovereignty in its modern form. It recognizes 
that at its core sovereignty is about the exercise of power. Furthermore, sovereignty is 
inherently territorial in nature, at least in the ‘post-Westphalian’ conception, which is 
why it is generally presumed to be banned from ‘outer space.’ The following section 
examines the nature of territory, which is the basis for territorial sovereignty, however 
it highlights that there are alternative variants of the exercise of sovereignty which are 
discussed in later sections of the chapter. Th next section discusses how sovereignty 
continues to evolve, particularly beyond the ‘Westphalian’ ‘territorial’ model. This 
has relevance because future developments may prove more amiable to the intentions 
of the Outer Space Treaty. The following section takes a step back and looks at the 
origins of sovereignty, highlighting that it is not a monolithic or static concept. As well 
as conceptions of sovereignty as being about rule over people rather than territory as 
was generally the case in the middle ages. A conception which would not conflict with 
Article II OST and indeed survives as one of the forms of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ 
in modern international law. The next section builds on the ‘origins of sovereignty 
section’ and examines developments primarily in the 17th century as European states 
began to extend their power beyond their European territorial domains. It focuses in 
particular of exercise of authority at sea which has direct analogy to outer space. The 
final section discusses jurisdiction itself with a specific focus on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as this is the version that can be exercised by states in outer space. 
Page 35 of 342 
However, it underlines that the key to jurisdiction beyond having the right to exercise 
authority is having the power to do so.  
Chapter Nine discusses the ongoing developments relating to space resources. It 
examines the legal and policy frameworks in the United States and Luxembourg, as 
well as the ongoing discussions at the UN and The Hague International Space 
Resources Governance Working Group. This is important, international law is not 
static. The actions and views of states push the development of international law, and 
as this chapter demonstrates, the views of states on the legal issues around space 
resources are in development. 
Finally, in the conclusion (Chapter 10) the research questions will be answered, 
solutions provided, scope for further work identified and a final summary of the work 
detailed. Having outlined the structure of this work, the discussion will initiate by 
addressing the first research question starting with background and context on space 
resources. 
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Chapter Two: 
Space Resource Activities 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2012 two US based companies, Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, 
announced their existence and their intention to mine asteroids.71 Predictions of the 
dawn of a ‘space gold rush’ and the launch of a trillion-dollar industry were 
abundant.72 The United States in the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 
of 2015’s Title IV73 enacted national legislation to lay the foundation for the 
‘authorising and supervising’ of space resource activities. Luxembourg followed suit 
with their own space resource activities legislation in 201774, and invested in space 
 
71Adam Mann, ‘Tech Billionaires Plan Audacious Mission to Mine Asteroids’ (Wired, 23 April 2012) 
<https://www.wired.com/2012/04/planetary-resources-asteroid-mining/> accessed 9 January 
2020; ‘Planetary Resources: The New Asteroid Mining Project Backed by James Cameron 
and the Google Execuitives’ (The Verge, 18 April 2012) 
<https://www.theverge.com/2012/4/24/2971461/planetary-resources-mining> accessed 9 
January 2020; Rod Pyle, ‘Deep Space Industries: A New Asteroid-Mining Company Is 
Born’ (Space.com, 28 January 2013) https://www.space.com/19462-asteroid-mining-deep-
space-industries-birth.html accessed 9 January 2020 
72Elizabeth Pearson 'Space Mining: the New Goldrush' (Science Focus, 11 December 2018) 
<https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush/> accessed 9 January 
2020; Andrew Wong, 'Space Mining Could Become a Real Thing - And It Could Be Worth 
Trillions' (CNBC, 15 May 2018) <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-asteroids-
could-be-worth-trillions-of-dollars.html> accessed 9 January 2020; Neel V. Patel, 'Asteroid 
Mining Could be a Multi-Trillion Dollar Buisness by 2020' (Inverse, 28 June 2017) 
<https://www.inverse.com/article/33556-asteroid-mining-multi-trillion-dollar-business-
asteroid-day-2017> accessed 9 January 2020; Calla Cofield, 'Extraterrestrial Gold Rush: 
What's Next for the Space Mining Industry' (Space.com, 21 November 2016) 
<https://www.space.com/34774-whats-next-for-space-mining.html> accessed 9 January 
2020; Morgon Saletta and Kevin Orrman-Rossiter 'All of Humanity Should Share in the 
Space Mining Boom' (The Conversation,17 April 2016) <http://theconversation.com/all-of-
humanity-should-share-in-the-space-mining-boom-57740> accessed 9 January 2020; Rob 
Davies, 'Asteroid Mining Could be Space's New Frontier: The Problem is Doing it Legally' 
(The Guardian, 6 February 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/06/asteroid-mining-space-minerals-legal-
issues> accessed 9 January 2020   
73CSLCA (n 48), Title IV  
74Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace - (Law of 20 July 
2017 on the exploration and use of space resources) Doc. parl. 7093; Sess. Ord. 2016-2017 - 
http://data.legilux.public.lu/file/eli-etat-leg-loi-2017-07-20-a674-jo-fr-pdf.pdf (Luxembourg) 
Unofficial English translation available at: - 
https://spaceresources.public.lu/content/dam/spaceresources/news/Translation%20Of%20Th
e%20Draft%20Law.pdf   
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resource ventures such as Planetary Resources.75 There was a considerable response 
from the international community (or at least the segment that pays attention to such 
things) and it has featured as a topic at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space’s (UNCOPUOS) Legal Subcommittee for the last several years76. 
It has also spawned at least one effort to draft a multilateral ‘framework’ on space 
resource activities, The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working 
Group77 (the author is a member of this working group). However, the space resources 
‘bubble’78 may already have burst, as both Deep Space Industries and Planetary 
Resources have been acquired by others79 and are effectively out of the ‘space mining’ 
‘game’ whatever their new owners’ long terms plans may be. There are other 
companies pursing space resource activities, but a lot of the wind does seem to have 
gone out of the sails of the industry. However, space resource activities continue to be 
discussed at UNCOPUOS and States are continuing to develop national legal 
frameworks on space resource activities.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of space resource activities; what 
is being proposed and some discussion of who has and still is proposing undertaking 
 
75Sarah Scoles 'Luxembourg's Bid to Become the Silicon Valley of Space Mining' Wired (Wired, 1 
October 2017) <https://www.wired.com/2017/01/luxembourg-setting-silicon-valley-space-
mining/> accessed 9 January 2020; David Z. Morris 'Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in 
Asteroid Mining' (Fortune, 5 June 2016) <http://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourg-
asteroid-mining/> accessed 9 January 2020  
76UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-seventh session, held in Vienna from 
9-20 April 2018’ (30 April 2018) UN Doc A/AC.105/1177; UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the 
Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 27 March to 7 April 
2017’ (18 April 2017) UN Doc A/AC.105/1122; UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal 
Subcommittee on its fifty-fifth session, held in Vienna from 4 to 15 April 2016’ (27 April 
2016), UN Doc A/AC.105/1113   
77‘The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group’ (n 3) 
78Jeff Foust, 'The Asteroid Mining Bubble has Burst' (The Space Review, 7 January 2019) 
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3633/1> accessed 8 January 2019 
79Jeff Foust, 'Deep Space Industries Acquired by Bradford Space' (SpaceNews, 2 January 2019) 
<https://spacenews.com/deep-space-industries-acquired-by-bradford-space/> accessed 3 
January 2019; Jeff Foust, 'Asteroid Mining Company Planetary Resources Acquired by 
Blockchain Firm' (SpaceNews, 31 October 2018) <https://spacenews.com/asteroid-mining-
company-planetary-resources-acquired-by-blockchain-firm/> accessed 1 November 2018 
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these activities. This provides a background understanding of what the legal discussion 
is about as well as evidence for why this exercise is necessary. This chapter also 
examines the ‘sustainability’ of space resources which has relevance for discussions 
of distribution and access, particularly important given the provisions of Article I of 
the Outer Space Treaty. This chapter will demonstrate that space resource activities 
have considerable potential value and are technically feasible. However, it will also 
show that whilst there is an overall abundance of resources in outer space their 
distribution and accessibility create potential for conflict. Further, given the finite 
nature of non-renewable resources there is a need for consideration of the sustainable 
use of resources in order to prevent their abrupt depletion even if that point may not 
be for several centuries. These aspects will be built upon in later chapters as part of an 
overarching argument for the necessity of a governance framework for space resource 
activities. 
The first section discusses space resources generally, the quantity of material and its 
high-level value as well as the potential uses for this material. This section also 
discusses the industry that is developing and some of its recent history. The second 
section discusses the distribution of these resources in more detail, relying on the work 
lead by planetary scientist Martin Elvis, who is a leading scientific figure and one of 
the few to have considered the questions of the ‘economic viability’ of asteroid 
mining, in this level of detail. As mentioned, the purpose of these sections, and this 
chapter, is provide a background for the further discussion of space resource activities 
in subsequent chapters. 
2.2 A ‘Gold Rush’ in Space? 
This section will discuss the basis upon which the case for space resource activities is 
made, that there is a huge quantity of material available in the solar system which will 
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facilitate future human activity in outer space. It will also discuss the companies that 
have and still are planning to conduct space resource activities. While the main focus 
of this thesis is the socio-legal questions relating to the governance and regulation of 
space resource activities it is vital to understand what those activities actually are, 
which is the focus of this chapter and this section specifically. This section will 
demonstrate that while predicting when or how space resource activities will be 
conducted is challenging, that they will occur at some point in the foreseeable future 
is a reasonable basis upon which to proceed.  
An initial survey of the resources of the solar system makes a compelling case for 
‘space mining,’, extraterrestrial resource utilization or space resource activities. It is 
clear that there are substantial quantities of precious, valuable, and useful metals in 
asteroids as well as abundant quantities of water, mostly in the form of ice, on 
asteroids, comets, planets, and moons. For example, it has been suggested that Amun, 
a fairly small Near-Earth Object (NEO) with a mass of approximately 30 billion tons, 
contains approximately $8,000 billion in iron and nickel, $6,000 billion in cobalt and 
$8,000 billion in platinum group metals. Similar estimates have projected that the 
asteroid belt also contains about four billion tons of uranium.80 Whilst the Moon and 
other planets may have even more lucrative resources, asteroids, and in particular 
NEOs, have the added lure of being “the most easily reachable bodies within the entire 
solar system.”81 There are estimated to be 20,000 NEOs larger than 100m diameter, 
all capable of being mined in the near future, given sufficient investment.82 
 
80John S. Lewis, Mining the Sky: Untold Riches from the Asteroids, Comets and Planets (Helix Books 
1997), 112, 193, 197 
81M. Di Martino, A. Carbognani, G. De Sanctis, V Zappala and R. Somma, The Asteroid Hazard: 
Evaluating and Avoiding the Threat of Asteroid Impacts (1st edn., European Space Agency 
2009), 195 
82Martin Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective 
Energy and Material Resources (Springer 2013), 81-129, 81 
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As well as their relative convenience and abundance of minerals, another aspect of 
asteroids and NEOs that makes them attractive propositions for resource activity 
ventures is the potential to utilize water which is present on such bodies.83 Water is a 
valuable commodity in space; it can be used for drinking, bathing and cleaning but it 
can also be used to make air and rocket fuel. As it costs $20,000 to put a typical 500ml 
bottle of water into orbit it would be vastly more efficient and cost effective to use a 
space-based source of water rather than rely on a supply from Earth.84 Asteroid mining 
for water ice is technologically feasible and would be achievable using established 
technology.85  
The production of fuel in space would be a gamechanger for the development of the 
solar system, reducing the cost of access to space dramatically. One industry, on-orbit 
servicing, is, much like the space resource activities sector, a developing and 
embryonic industry which would greatly benefit from a comparatively cheap source 
of fuel.86 Additionally, established space companies such as the United Launch 
Alliance (ULA) have indicated that they would be willing to pay $3,000 for a kilogram 
of propellent delivered to Low Earth Orbit.87 This projection fits well with the 
assessment made by Lewis, that delivery to Earth orbit for less than $10,000 per 
 
83John S. Lewis Asteroid Mining 101: Wealth for the New Space Economy (Deep Space Industries 
2015), 107-113; Michael K. Shepard Asteroids: Relics of Ancient Time (CUP 2015), 308-
309; Alpert, ‘Making Money in Space’ (n 56), 94-95; John S. Lewis, ‘Tapping the Waters of 
Space’ (1999) 10 Scientific American Presents 100, 100-103 
84Shepard Asteroids (n 83), 308-309 
85Lewis, ‘Tapping the Waters of Space’ (n 83), 103  
86Caleb Henry 'Airbus to Challenge SSL, Orbital ATK with New Space Tug Business' (SpaceNews, 
28 September 2017) <https://spacenews.com/airbus-to-challenge-ssl-orbital-atk-with-new-
space-tug-
business/?utm_content=buffer46444&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_
campaign=buffer> accessed 29 September 2020; Caleb Henry 'MDA Restarts Satellite 
Servicing Business with SES as first Customer' (SpaceNews, 29 June 2017) 
<https://spacenews.com/mda-restarts-satellite-service-business-with-ses-as-first-customer/> 
accessed 4 July 2017 
87Leonard David, 'Inside ULA's Plan to Have 1,000 People Working in Space by 2045' (Space.com, 
29 June 2016) <https://www.space.com/33297-satellite-refueling-business-proposal-
ula.html> accessed 9 January 2020 
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kilogram would be competitive with Earth launched material.88 In the future, it is not 
difficult to envisage the creation of a series of space-based ‘filling stations’ processing 
locally sourced water and facilitating travel into the solar system.  
The Moon is also attracting considerable attention. Moon Express and iSpace89 are 
both companies that exploring the development of technology capable of exploiting 
lunar resources. Despite talk of mining the Moon for Helium-3 the main focus, as with 
asteroids, is water ice. This is especially the case if the resources were in support of a 
manufacturing or servicing industry in low earth orbit, supporting lunar bases and/or 
a developing cis-lunar economy90. At present, such discussions may seem somewhat 
far-fetched, yet the proposals for a Moon village from ESA91 and commercial ‘space 
hotels’ from Bigelow Aerospace92 illustrate that such ideas could soon emerge as 
serious propositions. It is even now evident that Mars has “large quantities of nearly 
pure water ice at the surface of Mars that is concentrated in huge debris-covered 
glaciers”93 which would enable the support of surface operations and eventually 
settlement. 
It was this potential bonanza that prompted the formation of two companies Planetary 
Resources and Deep Space Industries. They announced their intentions to commence 
commercial asteroid resource activities within the near future in April 2012 and 
 
88Lewis Asteroid Mining 101 (n 83), 113  
89Chloe Cornish 'Interplanetary Players: A Who's Who of Space Mining' (Financial Times, 19 
October 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/fb420788-72d1-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9> 
accessed 19 October 2017  
90Leonard David 'Is Moon Mining Economically Feasible?' (Space.com, 7 January 2015) 
<https://www.space.com/28189-moon-mining-economic-feasibility.html> accessed 9 
January 2020 
91Jan Woerner 'Moon Village: A Vision for Global Cooperation and Space 4.0' ESA Ministerial 
Council 2016 <http://m.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2016/Moon_Village> 
92Dinah Eng 'Robert Bigelow is Building Hotels in Space (No, Really)' (Fortune 19 May 2016) 
<http://fortune.com/2016/05/19/robert-bigelow-hotels-space/> accessed 20 May 2016 
93Fabrizio Bernardini, Nathaniel Putzig, Eric Petersen, Angel Abbud-Madrid and Valentina Giacinti 
‘Implications for Resource Utilization on Mars - Recent Discoveries and Hypotheses’ (2018) 
71 JBIS 186, 188 
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January 2013, respectively.94 This kicked off the most recent  space mining ‘boom’,95 
however, this was not the first time plans to mine asteroids have been announced, nor 
is it the first time that it has been suggested that space resource activities are on the 
verge of becoming a reality. Jim Benson’s SpaceDev announced in the 1990s that it 
intended to begin commercial asteroid mining; however, nothing ultimately came of 
that endeavour.96 Additionally, Fabio Tronchetti asserts that one of the main 
motivations for the drafting of the Moon Agreement was the concern about the 
imminent prospect of lunar mining; suffice it to say no mining of the Moon has yet 
occurred.97  
While it is easy to claim that the same has happened again, as both Planetary Resources 
and Deep Space Industries have been acquired by others and have, at the very least, 
shelved plans for asteroid mining98 the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization 
Act of 2015 has changed the situation. It is no longer particularly relevant whether 
space resource activities are an imminently viable industry or on the cusp of initiating 
commercial resource activity operations. As there are now two States with national 
legislation addressing space resource activities, it is reasonable to expect others to 
follow. The US and Luxembourg laws are likely to serve as templates, in whole or in 
part, for other national legislation. Furthermore, there is potential for these laws to 
provoke the development of customary international law regarding space resource 
activities. Therefore, regardless of the actual viability of the embryonic space resource 
activities industry (which will be looked at in the next section) the legal regulation of 
 
94Mann, ‘Tech Billionaires Plan Audacious Mission to Mine Asteroids’ (n 71); ‘Planetary Resources’ 
(n 71); Pyle, ‘Deep Space Industries’ (n 71) 
95Pearson 'Space Mining: the New Goldrush' (n 72); Saletta and Orrman-Rossiter 'All of Humanity 
Should Share in the Space Mining Boom' (n 72) 
96Alpert, ‘Making Money in Space’ (n 56), 95; Tim Beardsley, ‘The Way to Go in Space’ (1999) 10 
Scientific American Presents 59, 60-61; Ridenoure, ‘NEAP’ (n 56) 
97Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (n 9), 
219 
98Foust, 'The Asteroid Mining Bubble has Burst' (n 78) 
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the industry does need to be discussed. Finally, iSpace,99 among others continue to 
actively pursue Lunar resource activities and there are, and may yet be more to come, 
new entrants to the market, such as UK based Asteroid Mining Corporation,100 who 
have the stepping stone of an embryonic legal framework which, at the very least, has 
provided a degree of legitimacy to the notion of ‘space mining’. While it is not yet a 
reality, it has moved, at least in part, out of the realm of science fiction.  
2.3 Considerations of Economic Viability and Equity 
This section examines the distribution of resources, based upon Martin Elvis’ body of 
work on the composition of asteroids. This section puts the ‘abundance’ of the solar 
system in context and demonstrates that while the sum total of material in the solar 
system is significant the currently accessible resources are more limited. This makes 
the necessity of a ‘property rights’ regime or some form of governance structure more 
of a necessity in order to avoid conflict over those ‘ore-bearing’ objects which are 
available. 
As discussed above, there is an abundance of interesting and useful material in the 
solar system, from iron, platinum group metals or water, however, the distribution and 
accessibility of this material is less clear, especially when the economic viability of 
extraction is considered. One of the concerns about the developments of a ‘space 
resource activities’ framework is that it will be based, essentially, on a ‘first come first 
served’ basis which will, once again, disadvantage developing States as the 
‘spacefaring’ States (i.e. the US, China, Japan, Luxembourg etc) will scoop up the 
lowest hanging fruit before the developing States have a chance to get in on the action. 
This will exacerbate the inequality between the rich States and the poor States. So far 
 
99Cornish 'Interplanetary Players’ (n 89)  
100‘Scottish Firm Unveils Plans for Asteroid Mining Mission’ (BBC News, 30 July 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-45006938> accessed 9 January 
2020 
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those advocating for the ‘space mining’ industry (whether they be actively involved 
or merely advocates) have largely argued that as there is so much material available 
the latecomers have nothing to worry about. This is worth examining. 
Ore, as used by the terrestrial mining industry, means commercial profitable material. 
"Ore is not simply a high concentration of some resource, but includes consideration 
of the cost of extraction of the resource and its price."101 Therefore when talking about 
the material wealth of the solar system it is not enough to simply talk about the vast 
quantities of material that is available in the totality of the system but the quantity of 
ore is what needs to be discussed. Now ore is obviously something of a fluid concept 
as what constitutes ‘economically viable’ will change based on technological 
development as well as the market price of the resource in question.  
Martin Elvis claims that focus should be on NEOs because main belt are 'too hard to 
reach'. NEOs are primarily asteroids but there are comets among them. There are 
20,000 NEOs larger than 100m diameter and over 10 million larger than 20m diameter. 
Elvis assessed NEOS for both platinum group metals and water. Elvis notes that the 
data available on NEOs and asteroids more generally is very limited. He assesses that 
the range of profitability based on the size of a PGM asteroid is quite vast, asteroids 
in excess of 100m diameter are most promising for PGM, smaller asteroids rapidly 
become unpromising targets102. "Good size and mass estimates are thus crucial to 
asteroid mining."103 
Elvis argues that 100m diameter seems like an 'optimistic' estimate for a profitability 
threshold, granted the costs of resource activity missions are yet unknown. And there 
are about 20,000 NEOs, however he estimates that the number of commercially viable 
 
101Martin Elvis, 'How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?'  (2014) 91 Planetary and Space Science 20, 20 
102Ibid, 20-23 
103Ibid, 23 
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(ore-bearing) NEOs (given costs of mission and getting to and from object etc) is only 
about 10 (assuming an outbound delta-v of 4.5km/s) though he stresses "that this 
number has large uncertainties and includes only metallic asteroids. Nonetheless, the 
number is surely smaller than would-be asteroid miners may have expected."104 
Elvis does note that if he allows for a slightly higher outbound delta-v assumption 
(5.5km/s) then the number of PGM ore-bearing NEOs would rise to about 100. "Water 
is often considered the first product likely to be mined from space. The water would 
be used in space either for life support or, separated into hydrogen and oxygen, for 
rocket fuel." Smaller NEOs are more viable targets for water miners than PGM. Elvis 
reckons that there are about 9000 water ore-bearing NEOS for outbound delta-v 
assumption of 4.5km/s and allowing for the same increase to 5.5km/s that would rise 
to about 90000. "Clearly improved surveys to find and characterize small NEOs would 
be extremely helpful in making the profitable mining of asteroidal water feasible." 
Elvis points out that there are also significant engineering questions that would force 
an adjustment of the assessment of what would constitute a profitable NEO. Elvis 
estimates that there are relatively few ore-bearing NEOs. Though water-ore-bearing 
NEOs will be more plentiful and easier to find. "Initial estimates give very low values 
for platinum group metals, larger, but still modest, numbers for water."105 
That said, understanding of distribution of material has improved due to various 
broadband sky surveys but our understanding of asteroid composition has not 
improved all that much. However, with the exception of the largest asteroids, 
spacecraft surveys will be the only way to determine composition of asteroids, and to 
date spacecraft have visited 12 asteroids. At least for MAB asteroids their ‘parent’ 
 
104Ibid, 23 
105Ibid, 23-26 
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body was probably hot enough to cause enough internal heating to give rise to 
differentiation which means that the remaining fragments (todays asteroids) will have 
different compositions (including metallic iron from the core).106 As displayed in this 
section the ‘abundance’ of space resources is more complex than often presented. That 
complexity will generate a host of issues particularly as a potential driver of 
competition for access to resources. Further, this section highlights issues with 
determining the composition of asteroids and Near-Earth Objects which will be 
discussed again, when examining the definition of the term ‘celestial body.’ The next 
section, will discuss a ‘sustainable’ approach to development of space resources, 
taking a longer-term view of the issue than is the norm. 
2.4 A Space Wilderness Reserve 
There are further questions regarding distribution and quantity of resources in the solar 
system. Elvis and Milligan have raised the question of whether a portion of the solar 
system needs to be set aside as a ‘wilderness’. Elvis and Milligan raise it as an 
economic sustainability argument, literally the issue that the resources under 
discussion are ‘finite’ and there is a point in which they will be exhausted and therefore 
if humanity is to avoid a catastrophic ‘crash’ there needs to be time to shift from an 
exponential growth model to a circular economic system. This section will look at the 
need for and ways to achieve ‘sustainable’ development of space resources. This is 
necessary for several reasons. First, as will be discussed, property rights are ultimately 
about distribution of resources, which requires a holistic approach. A ‘property 
management regime’ that does not take sustainability into account is not worth much. 
This section will also add weight to the argument that an international governance 
 
106N.E. Bowles, C. Snodgrass, A. Gibbings, J.P Sanchez, J.A. Arnold, P. Eccleston et al, 
‘CASTAway: An Asteroid Main Belt Tour and Survey’ (2018) 62 Advancements in Space 
Research 1998, 2002 , 2004-5 
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mechanism for space resources is necessary (albeit not legally required by the Outer 
Space Treaty) as a unilateral approach to space resources management is pointless in 
a multi-actor competitive domain; it takes all actors to prevent a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’.  
“The Solar System is big. It is so big that the idea that humans may fully exploit and 
deplete its resources seems absurd. Yet if a true economy emerges in space it will start 
to make use of the vast yet finite resources of the Moon, Mars and small Solar System 
bodies (such as asteroids).”107 They argue that it seems reasonable to expect that the 
off world economy will behave much as the terrestrial economy has done and therefore 
a growth rate of 3% seems a reasonable assumption, and such an assumption would 
see the economy grow to be 20 times larger at the end of a century.  Such exponential 
growth “could lead to problems of resource depletion of exhaustion surprisingly 
soon.”108 
This will be an even greater problem than the resource crunch that presents itself as 
Earths resources are ‘used up’ as “once we have exploited our solar system, there is 
no other plausible and accessible new frontier.”109 Elvis and Milligan refer to the 
“point where untapped resources cannot be readily be brought into use, as the point of 
‘super-exploitation.’” They argue that approaching a point of super-exploitation is 
something that we should be concerned about because we should take into 
consideration the future generation of humans, especially those generations whose 
lives we can influence within a reasonable time frame. They argue that this is at a 
minimum within the next 500 years. Beyond that it becomes practically impossible to 
predict impacts.  “Those who appeal to the future of humanity as a justification for 
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space exploration (or, indeed for any action whatsoever) should accept at 
least concern for future humans within this limited time-scale.” Elvis and Milligan 
argue for the adoption of a precautionary ‘one-eighth principle’ for the exploitable 
materials of the Solar System, specifically its solid bodies.110 
Their one-eighth principle holds that  
while economic growth remains exponential, we should regard as ours 
to use no more than one-eighth of the exploitable materials of the Solar 
System. And by ‘ours’ we mean humanity’s as a whole, rather than any 
particular generation of humans or group of generations. The remaining 
seven-eighths of the exploitable Solar System should be left as space 
wilderness.111 
 
Their growth rates apply to fresh materials, recycling will, of course, extend the 
timescales they are basing their assumptions on but as recycling will never be 100% 
effective it does not eliminate the problem altogether. Furthermore, their focus is on 
exploitable materials, they do not concern themselves with resources that may be 
excluded due to inaccessibility by say a gravity well (so elements found in Jupiter’s 
atmosphere, for example.)112  
As a further qualification, if growth is not exponential, i.e. if we ever 
reach a stable-state economic system, without any danger of collapsing 
back into exponential growth, or if we develop some effective 
and reliable overall breaking-mechanism which would allow us to 
transition at any preferred time from exponential growth to a stable 
state system than the one-eight principle might reasonably be set 
aside.113 
 
This principle is not to be taken as an argument against economic development and 
growth, their concern is not growth per se but rather unconstrained or runaway growth. 
“The principle would, in fact, be redundant if there was some broader case against all 
economic growth.”114 Furthermore they recognize that certain locations may require 
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specific or stronger protections.115 This is an argument advanced by Newman, 
particularly with regards to the Moon.116 Elvis and Milligan, treat the solar system as 
a closed system given the negligible transfer of materials, furthermore they clarify that 
“the one-eighth principle refers specifically to ‘wilderness’ rather than, for example, 
‘unused materials’, ‘territory’, or ‘pristine environments.’”117 
As our primary concern here is the avoidance of resource depletion 
rather than the protection of the natural against human activity, we will 
draw only upon a ‘think’ concept of wilderness that excludes various 
sorts of human use but not all forms of human impact.118 
 
They also stipulate that they are proposing that this seven-eighths reserve is applied to 
the totality of resources in the Solar System not any specific body. Estimates for future 
space economy are based on concept of exponential growth, the classic example of 
exponential growth is that of reproducing rabbits, 2 becomes 4 becomes 8 becomes 16 
etc. Economic history suggests that exponential growth even of a relatively low level 
is a valid assumption. Pace is important, key is the ‘doubling time’ or the time it takes 
to double the size of the economy, the one-eighth principle was formulated on this 
basis as reaching the one-eighth point would indicate that exponential economic 
growth was reaching an unsustainable level and we would need to make a transition 
to a stable-state economy (requiring no further resource extraction) and have the time 
to do so. “We ought not to deliberately expand beyond the point at which a future 
generation of humans could (reliably and safely) carry out an emergency slow 
down.”119 
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In defence of their choice of one-eighth, especially against those who argue that they 
are ‘anti-development, they argue that “one eighth of the iron ore in the asteroid belt 
would still be more than a million times greater than all the known iron reserves on 
Earth.”120 Furthermore they estimate “that even with the restriction imposed by the 
one-eighth principle, and setting aside the four larger asteroids, we could still build 2 
million Earth-orbit-girdling rings from Main Belt iron. That should be enough to go 
on with…”121 
A circular economy will help but it cannot be 100% efficient as fuel for example will 
be lost and material used to build habitats will be unrecyclable for practical reasons. 
However, a transition will be necessary and  
exponential growth removes the room for complacency in the face of 
the apparent security that vast solar system resources seem to offer. We 
may, instead, wonder whether the million times more plentiful resource 
in the asteroid belt is really going to be such a vast amount once our 
tendencies to expand and to consume are taken into account.122 
 
With an annual growth rate of 3.5% in 400 years there could be as few as 60 years 
before the exhaustion of space resources. This would “be even more serious than 
exhaustion of untapped Earth iron, given that we would have no larger body of 
accessible metals to which we could then look without venturing beyond the bounds 
of the solar system itself.”123 This is why they argue that  
The remaining seven-eighths of the solar system should be left as space 
wilderness. (In the thin sense that it should not be brought into regular 
economic use as a resource.) Failure to do so will mean that future 
generations will have insufficient ‘breaking distance’ after only a few 
centuries of exponentially growing economic activity/resource 
utilization. If unchecked, such growth will tend towards a point 
of superexploitation, i.e. a situation of resource depletion where new 
resources cannot readily be brought into use, even in an emergency 
situation. The dangers of superexploitation, for a space-faring 
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civilization whose limits are set by the bounds of a single solar system, 
are too great to be set aside.124 
 
In making this argument Elvis and Milligan do not advance any particular ethical 
theory or argument, their argument is more based on the logic of self-preservation, and 
self-interest. Their notion of constructing a ‘space wilderness’ for the preservation of 
space resources is particularly relevant as one of the primary arguments for the use of 
space resources and the development of outer space for use by humans is to advance 
the future of humanity into the solar system or even beyond. It therefore seems to be 
illogical to set up a scenario where future human generations face a catastrophic 
resource ‘cliff edge’ that would spell doom for a human civilization in outer space. 
Furthermore, as is explored elsewhere, and hinted at by Elvis and Milligan there are 
alternative arrangements that would allow for ‘sustainable development’ of outer 
space.  
There are other arguments for ‘embedding sustainability’ in the property rights regime 
for governance of space resource activities. Writing specifically with regards to the 
Moon but with arguments that are potentially applicable to other solar system bodies, 
Christopher Newman argues that there is a need to embed ‘sustainability’ in Lunar 
exploration policy. He argues that Moon is in fact poor target for commercial mining, 
asteroids far better, and the potential environmental damage from commercial lunar 
mining makes it undesirable.125 Furthermore, consideration should be given to the 
purpose of ‘use’; not all ‘use’ is necessarily equal. As Newman argues “sustainable 
lunar development and scientific exploration of the Moon are undertakings that 
have fundamentally different goals to commercial, for-profit activities.”126 
Furthermore, and in conformity with the notion that there should perhaps be differing 
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approaches to the differing celestial bodies, Newman states that “the assertion that 
commercial mining on the Moon is not worth the environmental impact it will cause 
does not mean that such a conclusion will follow for all other celestial bodies.”127 
Although as discussed there is nothing to support the notion that the space treaties 
themselves make any distinction between the various natural objects present in the 
solar system. However, Newman argues that  
This conflation of the Moon with other celestial bodies has 
contaminated all debate and discussion regarding the legal status of the 
Moon. Policy makers and lawyers need to acknowledge that the Moon 
is separate from other celestial bodies, and the issues it faces are 
unique.128 
 
It is also worth considering the value of the resources under discussion versus the 
potential damage that extracting them may cause after all while lunar resources are 
substantial enough to support ISRU activities in support of operations “it is 
questionable whether lunar mining will ever provide a stream of easily accessible, 
valuable resources”129 particularly as while the Moon’s gravity well is not substantial 
compared to a planetary gravity well it is still more energy intensive to deal with 
compared to a Near Earth Object.130 Furthermore, “disassociating lunar property rights 
from other, more potentially economically attractive celestial bodies reflects this 
reality and disengages the Moon from this key area of discord.”131 Finally, Newman 
essentially argues that there should be a prohibition on mining the Moon, similar to 
Antarctica, he states that “the essence of sustainability in a lunar context entails 
recognition of the Moon as a unique celestial body with a delicate environment upon 
which commercial mining should not be under taken.”132 Whether under such a 
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scheme Lunar resources would be considered part of the seven-eighths of the 
‘wilderness reserve’ proposed by Elvis and Milligan is doubtful as the point of their 
scheme is not the preservation of areas of the solar system but allowing a buffer to 
enable transformation of a ‘circular’ economy. An area excluded from use would 
therefore not contribute to the buffer. 
2.5 Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated, space resource activities (space mining) are a plausible 
industry which is in the process of being developed. Furthermore, States (such as the 
United States and Luxembourg) are taking this prospect seriously and have introduced 
legislation to regulate it. Therefore, space resource activities and the legal issues 
presented by it need to be taken seriously. Furthermore, it is imperative that the actual, 
physical distribution of resources is taken into consideration when devising any 
property rights regime or governance framework for space resource activities. 
Effective resource management is key for sustainability, which is necessary because 
while there is a considerable quantity of material available it is not infinite. 
Sustainability is, or should be, a key aspect of any property rights regime. Further, 
given the provisions of Article I OST planning needs to be undertaken to ensure future 
access to resources for those countries not yet ready to participate.  
The primary contribution of this chapter is to provide a foundation regarding the nature 
of space resource activities, and the distribution, availability and accessibility of space 
resources. This provides an explanation for why a space resources property rights 
regime is necessary and an important context for particular considerations such as 
what is meant by ‘in the interests of all States.’ 
The next chapter will discuss the international legal context within which space law 
operates. It will discuss the nature of ‘space law’ as a ‘special regime’ and how ‘gaps’ 
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should be ‘filled.’ It will also discuss the approach taken to the interpretation of 
treaties, particularly important given the centrality of the Outer Space Treaty to this 
enquiry, as well as the role of customary international law and the process for its 
creation and development. 
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Chapter Three: 
Public International Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, space resource activities (space 
mining) are a plausible industry which is in the process of being developed. 
Furthermore, States (such as the United States and Luxembourg) are taking this 
prospect seriously and have introduced legislation to regulate it. Further, resource 
management issues, which will undoubtedly arise given the physical distribution of 
space resources, will need to be considered as part of any international governance 
structure, for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will focus on 
the framework of public international law within which any space governance regime 
operates. 
The first section of this chapter touches upon the fact that space law is a ‘special regime 
(lex specialis) and what that means. This provides important context for discussing 
space law within the framework of international law. It is followed by a related 
discussion on the concept of ‘gaps’ and ‘silence’ in international law. Whether the lack 
of provisions for space resource activities in international space law constitutes a ‘gap’ 
or ‘silence’ matters because it has implications for whether there is a need for the ‘gap’ 
to be filled, perhaps by general international law, or whether there is simply no 
applicable law. The next section discusses treaty interpretation. Given the centrality 
of the Outer Space Treaty and a few other instruments, this is a vital discussion for the 
understanding of the approach taken in subsequent chapters and its grounding in 
international law. The subsequent section discusses customary international law and 
how it develops. This is important to the overall work because of the role that 
customary international law played and continues to play in the development of 
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international space law and undoubtedly will play in the development of law relating 
to space resource activities. Indeed, in a later chapter the developments in national law 
and at the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) are examined, in part, to determine whether these 
developments have made any impact on customary international law relating to space 
resources and it is argued that an opinio juris is beginning to crystallise.  Finally, the 
last section discusses soft law, which plays a significant role in international space law 
and potentially provides a ‘solution’ to some of the governance issues raised by space 
resource activities. Arguably, with the efforts of The Hague International Space 
Resources Governance Working Group attempts to formulate ‘soft law’ on the topic 
of space resource activities have already commenced. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the framework within 
which space law, and the discussions of the governance of space resource activities, 
operates. It makes the argument that while space law is a lex specialis it is not separate 
from general international law. It argues that the lack of provisions on space resource 
activities are not a ‘gap’ but a ‘silence.’ As well as that customary international law, 
has, is, and will play a role in the development of international law regarding space 
resource activities, as can be said of ‘soft law’.  This will particularly be relevant with 
reference to an ‘international’ or ‘multilateral’ framework on space resource activities, 
which, as will be argued, does not necessarily have to take the form of a binding 
agreement. 
3.2 Special Regimes 
This section explains what is meant by ‘special regime’ and how they fit into the 
broader fabric of international law. Space law is a lex specialis or a ‘special regime’ 
which is law governing a specific matter. It is well established that ‘special regimes’ 
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of international law do indeed exist, to quote Koskenniemi, “legal literature generally 
accepts the lex specialis as a valid general principle of law.”133 While lex specialis are 
accepted they are also limited in application and only one factor in treaty 
interpretation.134 Generality and speciality are relational: 
A rule is never "general" or "special" in the abstract but in relation to 
some other rule. This relationality functions in two registers. A rule 
may be general or special in regard to its subject-matter or in regard to 
the number of actors whose behaviour is regulated by it.135 
 
Furthermore, “no special regime has ever been understood as independent from 
general law.”136 There are no legal regimes outside of general international law, when 
the ‘special regimes’ rules ‘run out’ they fall back upon general international law.137 
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty makes this rather explicit with regards to space 
law stating that activities in outer space shall be conducted “in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.” Therefore, while space 
law is a lex specialis it is still part of international law and so in the event of any ‘gaps’ 
in the body of space law recourse should be made to general public international law. 
This issue of ‘gaps’ or ‘silence’ on issues that arise in international law will be 
addressed in the next section. 
3.3 Gaps and Silence 
A question that needs addressing is whether the ‘absence’ of specific provisions in 
international space law on space resources activities constitutes a ‘gap’ in the body of 
space law. All legal systems have silence, or ‘gaps’, upon which the system “does not 
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seem to speak.”138 However, it is important to understand the nature of that ‘gap’ or 
‘silence’ and what it means within the context of space law and international law more 
broadly. This section will look at the concept of ‘gaps’ and ‘silence’ in international 
law, how they arise, and what they mean, before looking at the specifics of whether 
the lack of specific provision for space resources in the corpus of space law constitutes 
either a ‘gap’ or a ‘silence’.  
There is no clear direction in international law on what to do in case of silence or a 
‘gap’. It is usually left to States or international courts to resolve, but there are many 
different approaches to silence. “One approach to silence is to assert that that which is 
not prohibited is legally permitted.” This approach is based on notion that international 
law is about limitations on State sovereignty and that States are free to act unless they 
have consented to be bound otherwise.139 
Quane argues that there are two approaches to take towards the sources of international 
law either they are a ‘snap shot’ at particular moment, or a ‘moving image’ that allows 
for evolving view. Quane argues that ‘moving image’ view is not only more useful but 
also probably more applicable, at least in international law.140 That ‘gaps’ exist in 
international law is not disputed and well recognized in legal scholarship.141 However 
as Quane puts it, is the ‘gap’ a ‘gap’ or a ‘gap in the law’? A ‘gap in the law’ or lacuna 
“is the absence of something that arguably ought to be there.”142 This requires a 
broader, higher normative order to measure the gaps against.  
There cannot be absence of norms within a normative order, because a 
normative order can consist only of norms. Only if a further normative 
order (natural law?) is superimposed upon the positive order can we 
classify lacunae as relating to ‘situations which this legal order ought 
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to govern’. We can refer to any behaviour that could be made the object 
of norms, and has not been made the object of norms, as gaps – and 
that means that any behaviour not so governed is a gap (like the 
sharpening of a pencil), yet it cannot be called a gap within the legal 
order.143 
 
Kammerhofer argues that legal scholars define gaps by way of their personal views of 
what the law should be. This is acceptable for natural law scholars as they operate 
within a higher ethical framework within which to identify ‘missing’ pieces of a 
broader normative order but for positive lawyers it is an unworkable solution.144 From 
a legal perspective 
nothing is missing. All other points of view, including moral, 
sociological, factual, political or natural-legal, are external to the legal 
view… This does not mean that the legal system is better than other 
norms, but it means that no normative order is by definition higher than 
any other and that Is and Ought are separate and do not directly create 
each other. Law is complete in itself, but not in relation to all possible 
forms of behaviour. Possible forms of behaviour might be a measuring-
stick for the law, but it is not a measuring-stick on a strictly legal view-
point.145 
 
“A further question is whether silence is intentional, inadvertent or simply a reflection 
of the international legal system’s indifference to the conduct in question.” Quane 
argues that there are several approaches to this – one view is that silence is not an 
intentional act. Therefore silence does not grant permission to act, rather it means the 
matter falls outside the scope of international law and “any permission to engage in 
that conduct is seen to flow from this factual state of affairs rather than any provision 
of international law.” Another approach is to distinguish between inadvertent 
‘deficiencies’ (lacunes) and times it is intentional or ‘willed’ (insuffisances sociales). 
In the latter, a court must declare a non-liquet.146 
By viewing international law as a moving image, it becomes more 
readily apparent whether silence is due to the matter being left 
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‘completely at large’ or whether the matter is in the process of being 
regulated albeit that such regulation has not yet crystallised.147 
 
Quane argues that it is also important to consider why international law is silent. If 
silence is because of the determination about the scope of international law, it may be 
appropriate to defer the matter to national law. She also argues that it matters whether 
international law is viewed as a system of permissions or prohibitions. There is no 
consensus on this point. The most common interpretation of Lotus is that of freedom 
of action in absence of prohibition. Quane argues that whether permissive principle 
exists rests on view of basis of international law. One approach, a positivist and 
voluntarist conception of international law, regards state sovereignty as the source of 
the international legal system. International law is only a limit on states’ freedom of 
action. In absence of clear prohibition states retain freedom to act.  An alternative view 
is simply that “if there ‘is no law, there is no law.’” Freedom of action would therefore 
be derived from the factual absence of law and thus be open to non-state actors too.148 
This is the view taken by Kammerhofer.149 He says that “States are not acting contrary 
to international law if they behave in a way international law does not regulate. ‘Gaps’ 
still cannot be closed absent positive norms that authorise someone to create law.”150 
Taking a positivist view means that the lack of provision for space resources in 
international space law is not a ‘gap’ but rather a silence. Then it is a question of 
whether it “is intentional, inadvertent or simply a reflection of the international legal 
system’s indifference to the conduct in question.”151 Looking at the Travaux 
Preparatoires indicates that this silence was not inadvertent, several delegates to the 
UNCOPUOS sessions which drafted the Outer Space Treaty raised the issue of space 
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resources,152 most notably the Japanese delegation.153 However, there was a general 
agreement that it was premature to discuss space resources as well as a general desire 
to keep the OST to broad principles so that it could adapt to changing, future 
conditions.154 So it could be argued that it was indifference that led to the silence in 
the outer space treaty but based on the Travaux it seems more appropriate to put it into 
Quane’s intentional silence category. This can be further supported both by the 
rejection of the Japanese delegation’s proposal to expand the ‘harmful contamination’ 
principle to include a duty to preserve and conserve the natural resources of celestial 
bodies155, and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, particularly given the rejection of 
that treaty by the international community. There was a choice not to include space 
resources or associated activities specifically within the corpus of space law. As 
mentioned, this was done as part of a broader effort to leave space law open to future 
developments. That said, space law is not entirely silent on the issue of space resources 
given the non-appropriation principle codified in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Finally, taking Quane’s ‘moving image’ approach it is becoming clear that space 
resources fall into category of that which “is in the process of being regulated albeit 
that such regulation has not yet crystallised.”156  The next section will discuss the 
process of interpreting existing international law. The first part of this involves the 
interpretation of treaties followed by customary international law, which plays a part 
in resolving these silences and enabling the crystallisation of new regulations, at least 
where a new treaty has not been implemented.  
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3.4 VCLT and Treaty Interpretation 
 
Treaty interpretation is a significant aspect of identifying ‘silence’ on a topic. The 
process of treaty interpretation is fairly established and codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).157 This section will examine the rules of 
treaty interpretation though the lens of the VCLT, as well as some of the established 
‘approaches.’ It will make the case for the evolutionary approach with regards to the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
The VCLT is a widely accepted treaty (116 parties and 45 signatories as of 19 July 
2018)158 and is also widely regarded as being reflective of customary norms.159  
Additionally, even though the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties the executive branch of the US government has stated that it 
regards it as “reflecting binding norms of customary international law” and the US 
courts have, on occasion, used the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to assist 
in the interpretation of treaties, despite the US not being a party to it.160 Furthermore, 
both Articles 31 and 32 are regarded as being reflective of customary international law 
and can and have been used to interpret treaties even where one of the parties is not a 
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party to the VCLT.161 Also the ICJ stated in both Pulau Ligitan/Sipadan162 and 
Kasikii/Sedudu Islands163 that the fact that Articles 31 and 32 are reflective of 
customary international law circumvents the non-retroactivity of the VCLT as set out 
in Article 4. In Pulau Ligitan/Sipadan the treaty that was being interpreted was from 
1891, and in Kasikii/Sedudu Islands the treaty was from 1890, well before the VCLT 
came into force. Therefore, the interpretive procedure set out in Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT can be used even on treaties that came into force before 27 January 1980, such 
as the Outer Space Treaty. 
Articles 31, 32 and 33 VCLT deal specifically with the interpretation of a treaty. 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that “a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”164 
This means that in the event that there is not a definition provided by the treaty itself, 
the first recourse should be to the ordinary, usual meaning given to a term. Article 32 
of the Vienna Convention, says that if the meaning is still unclear, or the giving the 
ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty leads to an absurd result then the 
preparatory work can be used to interpret the treaty. However, all of this need to be 
done with regard to the treaty as a whole, not just that specific term or article, and it 
needs to consider the context, and the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 33 
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VCLT stipulates that where a treaty is drafted in multiple languages they shall be 
regarded as being ‘equally authentic’ and terms shall be regarded as having the same 
meaning in all official languages of the treaty. 
The ordinary meaning of a treaty term needs to be understood in context with the rest 
of the treaty and in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty. However, it makes 
a good place to start,165 especially as textual analysis takes precedence.166 Hulme 
argues that the VCLT mandates that “the text always be considered when analysing 
the ordinary meaning of a treaty term.”167 However, while the text is important, and 
should be the first place to search for the ordinary meaning of a term it  
…is the starting point of an interpretation, but only if it is confirmed 
by investigating the context and object and purpose, and if on 
examining all other relevant matters (such as whether an absurd result 
follows from applying a literal interpretation) no contra-indication is 
found, is the ordinary meaning determinative.168 
 
Recourse can be made to dictionaries to find the ‘ordinary meaning’, even specialist 
dictionaries, and indeed the courts have done so.169 The acceptability of this is such 
that in her separate opinion in Whaling in the Antarctic Judge Sebutinde criticised the 
ICJ for not using the dictionary definition as the basis for its reasoning and analysis. 
She argued that given that the Oxford English Dictionary definition of ‘scientific 
research’ provided a ‘workable definition’ this should have been adopted as the basis 
for “the Court’s reasoning and analysis.”170 However, care must be used and as always 
the term must be interpreted in line with the rest of the Vienna rules. Furthermore, 
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even if the meaning of a term is clear it is still necessary to check it against the context 
and object and purpose.171 Additionally it is worth noting that “…consideration of the 
object and purpose and context of a provision may demonstrate that the meaning to be 
attributed to a term differs from its ordinary meaning…”172 Finally and on that note it 
is important to note that Article 31(4) VCLT states that ‘a special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.’173 Richard Gardiner 
says that “the most obvious evidence of such an intention is inclusion of a definition 
article.”174 Which is a feature distinctly absent from any of the space law treaties.  
However, while the text of a treaty is important, future development can also inform 
the interpretation of treaties. As Gardiner says the VCLT gives ‘a prominent role’ to 
subsequent developments both in terms of agreements and practice with regards to 
interpretation.175 Article 31(3)(a) says that “any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” 
shall be taken into account along with the context. Article 31(3)(b) says that “any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation.” Subsequent agreements do not need to take 
the form of formal amendments or even treaties.176 What constitutes ‘subsequent 
practice’ is less clear and can vary depending on the subject matter of the treaty in 
question. However, it includes executive, legislative and judicial acts of State 
parties.177 As Gardiner has said there is a logic to this as “words are given meaning by 
action.”178 He also argues that “treaties embody the common understanding of the 
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parties to them. Hence concordant practice of the parties is best evidence of their 
correct interpretation.”179 Legislation which implements treaties into national law may 
take an interpretive stance which can help to illuminate the interpretation of the State 
party but later legislation may also address specific points of interpretation which arise 
later180 (as with the space resource legislation promulgated by the United States and 
Luxembourg.) There needs to be a degree of frequency and consistency to the 
subsequent practice, it is after all meant to be the “common understanding of the 
parties.”181 It is also important to note that “the process of interpretation through 
subsequent practice is legally distinct from modification, although the distinction is 
often rather fine.”182 
That said it is worth considering how treaties can evolve. Treaties, and international 
law, is not a static thing, it develops and evolves. Hence the existence of the 
evolutionary interpretation approach. However, this is not a separate means of 
interpretation, but it is based on ‘intentions of parties approach.’ Evolutionary 
interpretation recognizes that the meaning of the terms of a treaty can change over 
time. Evolution occurs without specific effort of the parties to bring about change by 
amendment. The terms of the treaty need to be able to embrace change of meaning, so 
they are structured so as to allow for the expansion of their coverage “to include new 
activities, scientific advances, technological development etc where these would not 
have been specifically conceived at the time the treaty was drawn up.” Gardiner 
suggests there are three elements that indicate the evolutionary approach may be 
appropriate 1) the use of language in the treaty is adapted to evolve such as the use of 
‘generic’ terms 2) the treaty has a long or indefinite duration and 3) there was a 
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presumption or awareness of the parties that terms would evolve.183 The Outer Space 
Treaty meets all three of these ‘criteria’. Additionally, as discussed, the drafters of the 
OST expressed an expectation that an evolutionary, developmental approach to space 
law would be taken, which is why they stick to general principles in the OST.184  
Treaty interpretation is a central aspect of understanding international law although it 
is not the only aspect, the next section will discuss customary international law. This 
section has examined the process for elucidating the meaning of treaty terms but also 
understanding how the ‘common understanding’ of the international community can 
develop over time and this can be identified through subsequent practice and 
agreements, such as national legislation. Part of the process of the ‘evolution’ of 
international law and the ‘common understanding’ of the international community is 
the development of customary international law, which is discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
3.5 Customary International Law 
 
Customary international law is an important source of international law. Space law 
has its origins in customary international law and has continued to be shaped by it. 
This section will discuss the nature of customary international law looking at its two 
core components, State practice and opinio juris. Then there is an examination of the 
role of General Assembly Resolutions and Treaties in the formation, identification, 
and codification of customary international law. It will also look at some of the 
criticism of customary international law, specifically from the ‘realist’ perspective and 
from the ‘developing world.’ It will then move on to discuss ‘modern custom’ which 
looks at some of the ongoing debates about the nature and development of customary 
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international law. In particular the continuing relevance (or growing irrelevance) of 
‘state practice’ and ‘duration’ with a specific examination of ‘instant’ custom 
proposed by noted space lawyer, Bin Cheng as well as the alternate ‘Grotian Moment’ 
notion. This is followed by an examination of the concept of ‘soft law’ and the role it 
plays in the development of norms for space governance. The section then examines 
developments in customary international law relating to the development of space 
resource activities. 
Customary international law is one of the sources of international law. Specifically, as 
laid out in the Statute of the ICJ “international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.”185 Generally the view is that that customary international 
law is a practice that has been accepted over time to constitute a legal obligation. These 
two elements work together, it is not enough for the practice to exist, but it needs to 
be followed by States because they feel under a legal obligation to adhere to that 
practice. Generally, it is thought that the practice needs to have occurred for some time 
however neither the ICJ Statute nor any other document or provision actually specifies 
a timescale. There are those who have argued that custom can develop in a much 
shorter period of time. Bin Cheng, specifically discussing space law, argued that with 
sufficient support for the practice the development of a customary norm could be 
virtually ‘instant’. Scharrf takes a slightly different approach arguing that there are 
‘Grotian moments’ of fundamental change in which the paradigm can change resulting 
in rapid, although specifically not instant, development of new customary international 
law. It is worth considering whether space mining and the associated space law 
developments that have occurred over the last few years have resulted in development 
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of new customary international space law regarding space resources. This involves 
looking at the concept of customary international law itself, the notion of ‘instant’ 
custom as well as the ‘Grotian moment’ idea, but also the developments in space law 
relating to space mining and whether they fit into any of these paradigms but also the 
role of national legislation and policies in the development of customary international 
law. 
As mentioned, customary international law is one of the sources of international law. 
Specifically, as laid out in the Statute of the ICJ “international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law.”186 Generally the view is that that customary 
international law is a practice that has been accepted over time to constitute a legal 
obligation. These two elements work together, it is not enough for the practice to exist 
but it needs to be followed by States because they feel under a legal obligation to 
adhere to that practice. Generally, it is thought that the practice needs to have occurred 
for some time however neither the ICJ Statute nor any other document or provision 
actually specifies a timescale. Determining when something has gone from merely 
‘common practice’ to customary law is tricky. And as Hugh Thirlway, channelling 
John Finnis, notes there is a valid question as to how an authoritative rule can be 
created without anyone in authority actually creating it?187 
Customary international law applies to all states, unlike treaties, which only apply 
between the parties, however persistent objectors to the development of the customary 
norm can ‘opt out’, furthermore there are ‘special’ or ‘local’ rules of customary 
international law. Custom exists because states recognize a general pattern of 
behaviour and feel themselves under a legal obligation to adhere to it.188 “Custom – as 
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distinct from treaty obligations or the application of inchoate ‘general principles of 
law’ – continues to dictate broad swathes of international legal obligation.”189 
Customary international law “has permeated many domains of public international 
law – not only particular doctrinal niches, but also the very architecture of the 
system.”190 Opinio juris is central to the formation of customary international law, 
although as will be discussed below, there is debate as to just how central opinio juris 
is.191 
3.5.1 State Practice 
 
State practice does not garner the attention that opinio juris does in the academic 
literature, and there is a reasonable explanation for this. After all, State practice in and 
of itself does not constitute customary international law, the mental element of opinio 
juris is necessary to differentiate from the ‘custom’ of a non-obligated diplomatic 
nicety and the ‘customary international law’ which a State is legally obliged to adhere 
to. Furthermore, there is room for debate as to what exactly can and does constitute 
State practice however there is broad scope for consideration here and  
State practice can be reflected in the acts of the judiciary, legislature, 
or executive branch of government. It comes in many forms, including: 
Diplomatic correspondence; declarations of government policy; the 
advice of government legal advisers; press statements, military 
manuals, votes and explanations of votes in international organizations; 
the comments of governments on draft texts produced by the ILC; 
national legislation, domestic court decisions; and pleadings before 
international tribunals.192 
 
Bederman suggests that Article 38 of the ICJ Statute gets the formulation the wrong 
way round; ‘general practice’ is evidence of custom i.e. States engage in the ‘general 
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practice’ because they feel bound by the customary norm.193 This is why some scholars 
have argued that opinio juris, which will be discussed in the next section, is the key, 
potentially only, aspect of custom that matters. 
3.5.2 Opinio juris 
The existence of a state practice is, on its own, not sufficient for there to be a custom, 
States need to feel legally obliged. That mental element is often referred to as opinio 
juris. Thirlway suggests that opinio juris may be more important than state practice 
however “since the opinio juris is a state of mind, there is evident difficulty in 
attributing it to an entity such as a State; and it thus has to be deduced from the State’s 
pronouncements and actions…”194 Some even go further as say that opinio juris is 
essentially all that matters,195 a line of argument which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Regardless, opinio juris is certainly of central importance given the centrality of 
consent to the international legal system. 
The doctrine of consent generally teaches that the common consent of 
states voluntarily entering the international community gives 
international law its validity. States, and presumably other international 
actors, are said to be bound by international law because they have 
given their consent.196 
 
Regarding determining opinio juris “the most direct evidence is, of course, what States 
have in fact done, and what they themselves indicated as to their reasons for doing it 
– or not doing it.”197 Identifying opinio juris is challenging though but the United 
Nations can help. States regularly make statements on key issues in international law 
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and General Assembly Resolutions can provide evidence of the existence of 
customary international law. 
3.5.3 General Assembly Resolutions 
General Assembly Resolutions, and indeed the UN in general, have played an 
important role in the development of international law since 1945. It is a forum which 
allows States to discuss critical aspects of international governance and provides all 
States a platform to express their views. It is partly for this reason that General 
Assembly Resolutions can be evidence of opinio juris. Scharf suggests that the UN 
General Assembly has allowed the shift in focus from state practice to opinio juris as 
resolutions and the debates that their development generates provides written evidence 
of the thoughts of States. 198 Furthermore, the ICJ has expressed support for the 
normative value of General Assembly Resolutions in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion stating that 
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are 
not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain 
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the 
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish 
whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is 
necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is 
also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative 
character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradua1 evolution 
of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.199 
 
However, Scharf argues that UNGA resolutions do not properly or clearly differentiate 
between lex lata (what the law is) and lex ferenda (what the law should be). Also states 
often vote for resolutions in the spirit of compromise or international goodwill 
knowing that they are not binding.200 He says that “often resolutions reflect lex 
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ferenda cloaked as lex lata.”201 There is little support for the notion that General 
Assembly resolutions can give rise to a customary norm in and of themselves (this will 
be examined in greater detail in a later section). Bederman argues that 
General Assembly resolutions, precisely because they are 
recommendations, lack the necessary opinio juris for custom. This is 
so even though states may repeatedly vote for a resolution and process 
their support for the legal rule it stands for.202 
 
Helfer and Wuerth state that 
 
Rather, it is widely agreed that General Assembly resolutions provide 
only evidence of CIL, with the weight of that evidence dependent upon 
factors such as voting patterns, express reference to custom in the text, 
and, most importantly, whether legal norms referred to in the resolution 
are subsequently reinforced by other indicia of state practice and opinio 
juris.203 
 
However, Judge Cancado Trindade says that  
 
Despite these distinct patterns of voting, in my view the UN General 
Assembly resolutions reviewed in the present dissenting opinion, taken 
altogether, are not at all deprived of their contribution to the 
conformation of opinio juris as to the formation of a customary 
international law obligation of nuclear denuclearization. After all, they 
are resolutions of the UN General Assembly itself (and not only of the 
large majority of UN Member States which voted in their favour); they 
are resolutions of the United Nations Organization itself, addressing a 
matter of common concern of humankind as a whole.204 
 
Furthermore, Thirlway does suggest that it is potentially possible for the 
‘crystallization’ of a customary norm to ‘coincide’ with a widely supported General 
Assembly Resolution205 which given that “State votes on U.N. General Assembly 
Resolutions can thus be both a form of State practice and a manifestation of the State’s 
subjective attitude about the existence of the rule in question”206 means that while the 
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General Assembly Resolution itself does not ‘create’ the customary norm it does 
provide the evidence for the emergence of the customary norm which if not born at 
that moment at least finds explicit expression, which therefore may seem 
‘instantaneous’,207 however 
widespread and representative support for the resolution would at least 
have to be backed by consistent actual practice, limited though it might 
be, among those States ‘whose interests are specifically affected.’208 
 
While General Assembly Resolutions may not create custom in and of themselves they 
are potentially evidence of opinio juris and/or state practice and possibly the moment 
of crystallization of a customary norm of international law which may appear to be 
‘instantaneous’ although the norm, has in fact been gestating before that specific 
moment. Though beyond the formalities there are arguments for giving the outputs of 
the United Nations General Assembly more weight. 
Every society requires collective procedures to establish rules that 
differentiate between permissible and impermissible behavior. The 
United Nations plays a central role in this essential rule making for 
international society – largely through the Security Council, General 
Assembly, and associated world conferences – but other mechanism in 
international society also create rules. Some treaties are made outside 
the UN system, and regional organizations make rules as well. The 
murky institution of customary international law, which is greatly 
affected by the behavior of powerful states, also plays a role.209 
 
As Paul Kennedy says in his book The Parliament of Man, the United Nations General 
Assembly, while perhaps not the manifestation of the dreams of the internationalists 
of the 19th and 20th century who aspired to a ‘Parliament of Man’, is nevertheless 
the only real forum for world opinion – or, better, the opinions of the 
world governments that we have. Its resolutions may lack full follow-
up because it is a deliberative body with no power to make decisions 
binding on member states; but those pronouncements are often a good 
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barometer of international opinion and in many quarters regarded as 
having more legitimacy than the Security Council itself.210 
 
General Assembly Resolutions play an important role in the development of 
international law. They are part of the process of developing customary international 
law and help identify opinio juris. Furthermore, the process through which they are 
produced provides a platform for a multitude of States to express their opinions on 
important matters of international governance. This has indeed been the case in the 
development of space law, which began in earnest with General Assembly 
Resolutions, most notably the ‘Declaration of Legal Principles’ governing activities in 
outer space (UNGA 1721).211 Particularly given the similarities between the 
‘Declaration of Legal Principles’ and the Outer Space Treaty it is arguable that the 
Outer Space Treaty codified existing customary international law. This aspect of 
treaties will be discussed in the next section. 
3.5.4 Treaties 
Treaty provisions can codify existing custom, and in doing so, provide evidence for 
that custom, and treaty provisions can become customary norms, which is what will 
be examined in this section. However, it is important to bear in mind that even when 
treaties codify custom these remain two sperate and distinct sources of legal obligation 
and “the enduring separation of these sources is particularly important for non-
ratifying countries and for state parties that later withdraw from a treaty that embodies 
a customary rule.”212 Indeed, the ICJ made this point in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) saying 
that  
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The fact that the above-mentioned principles, recognized as such, have 
been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean 
that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, 
even as regards countries that are parties to such conventions.213 
 
Some treaties, like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, exist, at least in part, to 
codify pre-existing customary international law. “Such treaties may then serve as 
evidence of the content of the customary norm...”214 However, it is also possible for 
treaties to be reflective of customary international law without that necessarily being 
the explicit intention of the drafters. Furthermore, the treaty provision may be a slight 
variation or development upon the pre-existing customary norm. Additionally, 
to the extent that treaties do articulate customary norms it is often 
because they reflect pre-existing norms of customary law, like pacta 
sunt servada. The subsequent treaty does not render the pre-existing 
custom negotiated. To the contrary, the act of codification often 
changes the content of rule for the treaty but not for its customary law 
antecedent.215 
 
Treaties, especially ‘multilateral conventions’ can record and define rules of 
customary international law but it is also possible for them to help to develop new 
rules as a result. This is particularly true when such a convention has been ratified or 
acceded to by an “overwhelming majority of States.”216 However, the ICJ does set a 
high bar for the development of treaty provisions into norms of customary 
international law, because they are therefore binding on all states regardless of whether 
they are parties to the treaty or not. 
There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and does 
from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized 
methods by which new rules of customary international law may be 
formed. At the same time this result is not lightly to be regarded as 
having been attained.217 
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Furthermore, the nature of the provision is also relevant.  
 
It would in the first place be necessary that the provision concerned 
should, at all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating 
character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general 
rule of law.218 
 
The fact that international law rules can exist in parallel within treaty law and 
customary international law “expands the reach of the rules to those States that have 
not yet ratified the treaty.”219 Furthermore this means that “the customary international 
law status of the rules can apply to actions of the treaty parties that pre-dated the entry 
into force of the treaty.”220 Additionally, custom binds States that were not in existence 
when the custom came into force. regardless of how they feel about it upon the states 
creation, and withdrawal from custom is not possible once it has been formed, again 
unlike a treaty.221 This has been used by the ICJ to apply the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties of 1969 to disputes arising as early as 1890 between countries that 
did not exist at the time.222  
Treaties and customary international law are intertwined, as demonstrated in this 
section. This has particular importance for space resources given the virtual universal 
acceptance of the non-appropriation principle as customary international law which 
means that the ‘non-appropriation principle’ applies even to those States who are not 
party to the Outer Space Treaty or any who may withdraw from it, this assertion is 
even stronger if the ‘non-appropriation principle’ is an ius cogens as some have 
argued.223 However, there is a question as to whether it matters which States are party 
to a treaty or supportive of a particular norm being or not being customary 
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international law. This will be explored in the next section, as will the notion of how 
much time is required to establish CIL. 
3.5.5 ‘Specifically Affected States’ and Time 
This section will discuss the concept of ‘specifically affected States’ and the duration 
of practice required to form customary international law. This is particularly relevant 
for space law and space resource activities in particular as the number of States 
involved or whose nationals will be involved in space resource activities is likely to 
be limited for some time to come. Similarly, the novelty of these activities and indeed 
activities in outer space in general (‘only’ 60 years) potentially inhibit the formation 
of customary international law if a lengthy or numerous duration of practice is 
required. However, there is a view that State practice does not need to be of a 
particularly long duration nor does the opinio juris need to be backed by all States. In 
North Sea Continental Case the ICJ said that: 
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before 
a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of 
international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any 
considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative 
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it 
included that of States whose interests were specially affected.224 
 
However, it would be necessary that 
 
State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the 
sense of the provision invoked: - and should moreover have occurred 
in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or 
legal obligation is involved.225 
 
There is a logic to this as international law is based on the consent of states and if a 
majority or relevant portion of the international community of States ‘consented’ to 
the creation of a new customary norm there seems little reason why it could not arise 
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in an accelerated timeframe. Furthermore, there is the also question of which States 
can contribute to the opinio juris. As Thirlway says this is a clearer proposition in 
cases like maritime delimitation. As in that example, landlocked states are hardly able 
to add to the body of state practice and if state practice is evidence of opinio juris they 
have little therefore to contribute to that aspect of the development of customary 
international law as they have no coastline. However, this is less clear in cases like 
nuclear weapons as non-nuclear states could potentially become nuclear states. 
Additionally, their lack of nuclear weapons does not necessarily translate into a belief 
that nuclear weapons are illegal.226 However, even if non-nuclear weapons States do 
generally hold a belief that nuclear weapons are illegal there is the potential for nuclear 
weapons States (‘specially affected’ States) to block the formation of a customary 
norm, as recognized by the ICJ 
The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting 
the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing 
tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still 
strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other.227 
 
For this reason, and others, the concept of ‘specifically affected States’ draws criticism 
from some quarters, Goldsmith and Posner argue that this approach essentially means 
that the major powers and interested parties can engage in a ‘highly selective 
survey’.228 Similarly, Chimni says that this concept of ‘specially affected’ States and 
‘representative samples’ can be used to limit participation to powerful, developed 
Western nations.229 However in challenge to this idea Bederman argues that  
this is not, however, a thinly disguised bid for great power mastery over 
the levers of CIL formation. Rather, it is a recognition that, in 
measuring compliance with a supposed custom, what matters are the 
usages of states that had the opportunity to engage in such a practice.230 
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Pearce argues that  
 
while it may be shown that power and customary law are intertwined, 
this does not mean that customary international law is somehow less 
viable as a source of law. Nor does it mean that it is somehow less 
credible in its own right as a source of law.231 
 
Though he goes on to say, perhaps less helpfully, that the ‘dominance’ of powerful 
states is hardly relegated to customary international law but is the reality throughout 
international law and relations.232 Which, perhaps, underscores, rather than 
undermines, Chimni’s point. 
However, there is broad agreement, and as shown, support for that agreement provided 
by case law of the International Court of Justice, that consistency is key, that ‘constant 
and uniform’ practice, rather than unanimous uniformity, is the primary measure. 
While there are valid arguments that this may be unfair to developing states unable to 
maintain legions of lawyers to monitor and potentially object to developments in 
customary international law, to require all States in the international system to partake 
in a practice and have the necessary opinio juris (and be able to furnish evidence of 
that opinio) would essentially fossilise customary international law by thwarting new 
developments. This is particularly true in areas such as outer space where there are 
numerous least developed states who have little interest in, or ability to take an interest 
in, the concerns of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
especially regarding such topics as space resource utilization. Which renders even a 
requirement for unanimity of opinio juris untenable. 
Exactly how much practice or opinio juris is required will depend on the activity in 
question, the more destabilizing or repugnant the activity the less will be required and 
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the opposite is also true.233 An excellent example of this is the expansion of the 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf, i.e. the Truman Declaration, “the speed with 
which the custom crystalized was striking.”234 This gives customary international law 
a greater degree of flexibility than other sources of international law and that makes it 
a source of great strength for international law.  
It allows international legal actors to informally develop rules of 
behavior, without the necessity of resorting to more formal and difficult 
means of law-making (like treaties). Custom ‘tracks’ or follows the 
conduct of States, international institutions, transnational business 
organizations, religious and civic groups, individuals involved in 
international matters, and many other actors.235 
 
This is vital given the complexity and demands of the international system, as is 
evidenced by developments in outer space. Given the proliferation of new and novel 
activities there needs to be a way for the development and adaptation of space law to 
allow reasonable accommodation of those activities within the framework of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the existing body of space law. This is necessary if the corpus of 
space law is to survive as if States (or their nationals) feel unduly stymied by the 
existing law then they are likely to circumvent the existing framework. This will lead 
to fragmentation or worse. 
3.5.6 ‘Modern Custom’ 
There is a notion that there has developed a ‘modern’ customary international law. 
This ‘modern’ customary international law has a greater focus on opinio juris than the 
‘traditional’ customary international law. As Bederman argues traditional customary 
international law is inductive and opinio juris distinguishes between legal and 
nonlegal obligations whereas “modern custom is derived by a deductive process…” 
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this places the emphasis on opinio juris as opposed to state practice and depends on 
statements rather than actions. However, there is concern that ‘modern’ CIL therefore 
“lacks the legitimacy of state consent and could either be enlisted in the service of 
great power interests or advance norms that are not really founded in state practice at 
all.”236 Though Scharf argues that acts and statements should be given equal accord 
and stipulates that “the case law of international tribunals is replete with examples of 
verbal acts being treated as examples of practice.”237 He also argues that “verbal acts 
can count as either the objective or subjective element” and it is also possible for the 
same conduct to serve as both element, Therefore votes on UN General Assembly 
Resolutions can be both State practice and opinio juris. Furthermore, inaction or 
silence, particularly but not necessarily when a State would normally have been 
expected to lodge a protest can also constitute State practice.238 Scharf also provides a 
useful insight into the rationale for the shift in emphasis from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ 
customary international law. 
Traditionally, jurists and scholars have put more emphasis on State 
conduct than on the subjective element. That is because a State’s 
conduct was traditionally easier to ascertain than the belief of a State. 
With the introduction of the U.N. and other bodies where multilateral 
diplomacy is conducted in the open, however, the situation has in fact 
reversed.239 
 
Debates about the centrality and importance of opinio juris and the continued 
relevance and necessity of State practice abound. It seemingly depends on the activity 
in question, but also the context, some like Scharf argue that in moments of 
‘fundamental change’ or what he calls a ‘Grotian moment’ new norms of customary 
international law develop more easily. Cheng argues that, primarily owing to the 
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potential of UN General Assembly Resolutions, opinio juris may be all that is needed 
to develop a new norm of customary international law. Frederic Kirgis, articulated a 
view of a ‘sliding scale.’ 
On the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes 
a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of an 
opinio juris, so long as it is not negated by evidence of non-normative 
intent. As the frequency and consistency of the practice decline in any 
series of cases, a stronger showing of an opinio juris is required. At the 
other end of the scale, a clearly demonstrated opinio juris establishes a 
customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that 
governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the asserted 
rule.240 
 
In addition to being more flexible and ‘faster’, ‘modern’ customary international law, 
by relying “more on the element of opinio juris than on state practice”, has “more of 
an ethical” orientation and can be more open to progressive ideas and elements, which 
perhaps explains why it has faced less resistance from the developing world.241 This 
has relevance for discussion of space resource activities as, with perhaps the exception 
of the introduction of legislation in two jurisdictions, there have been no ‘State 
practice.’ As will be discussed in the next section, which will examine Bin Cheng’s 
notion of ‘instant custom’, the notion of focussing on opinio juris has been part of 
discussions of space law for several decades. 
3.5.7 ‘Instant’ Custom 
‘Instant’ custom is a notion proposed by space lawyer Bin Cheng. The basic 
proposition is that customary international law can develop ‘instantaneously’ as a 
result of General Assembly resolutions. For Cheng, the key in the formation of 
customary international law is the requirement that States regard something as being 
‘legally binding’ otherwise known as opinio juris. He argues that for certain principles 
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particularly when expressed in General Assembly resolutions this can be virtually 
instantaneous and does not require state practice. Cheng argues that practice is 
evidence of opinio juris. It is opinio juris that is the key to, and the only necessary 
element of, the formation of customary international law. He says that “not only is it 
unnecessary that the usage should be prolonged, but there need also be no usage at all 
in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the opinio juris of the States concerned 
can be clearly established.” He argues that this is the case owing to the voluntary 
nature of international law, essentially given that States are their own law-makers then 
if there is a general opinio juris between them then there is no reason that a new rule 
of customary international law cannot be created without practice.242 
Cheng argues that among other things, General Assembly resolutions can provide 
evidence of this general opinio juris. However, in order for a General Assembly 
resolution to have such an effect Cheng argues that there must have been the 
“necessary opinio communis juris among Members of the United Nations” and that 
the wording of the resolution much “unequivocally express this opinio communis 
juris.”243 Cheng points to GA Res 96(1) affirming the crime of genocide as one such 
resolution, pointing out that the later Genocide Convention assumes that genocide is 
already a crime and “merely provides for its ‘prevention and punishment.’”244 
He says that “provided that the intention is expressed articulately and without 
ambiguity, there appears to be no reason why an Assembly resolution may not be used 
as a means for identifying the existence and contents of a new opinio juris.” However, 
as with all General Assembly resolutions (barring those dealing with UN 
constitutional affairs) even these ‘law-finding’ resolutions are “still without force, but 
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provides strong evidence of the existence and contents of the rule of law it states…” 
Furthermore, Cheng argues that “there is no reason why a new opinio juris may not 
grow overnight between States so that a new rule of international customary law (or 
unwritten international law) comes into existence instantly. This shows that 
international law is a living law and explains how changes take place.”245 
Cheng, like Scharf, uses the development of space law as a ‘case study.’ He primarily 
looks at GA Res 1962 as it is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space but he also considers 
GA Res 1721. However, he says that GA Res 1721 made no “pretension to being 
binding” as it “merely ‘commends’ to the States ‘for their guidance’ certain 
principles’. Therefore, on the face of it GA Res 1721 would not be one of Cheng’s 
‘law-finding’ resolutions. However, Cheng argues that the US and the Soviet Union 
did consider it to be binding due to the resolution having been adopted unanimously 
by the General Assembly as well as being “declaratory of international customary 
law.” Though Cheng concedes that “it is questionable, however, whether the above-
mentioned view of the Soviet Union, which was expressed only once, can be treated 
as representative of its general attitude towards General Assembly resolutions.”246 
It is also worth noting that consensus and unanimity were part of how the UN space 
committee operated ordinarily, which perhaps undermines claims that space 
resolutions adopted unanimously have some special significance (if indeed unanimity 
has any special significance anyway.) As early as the opening session the principle 
was that COPUOS and its subcommittees would operate by ‘consensus’ “but in fact, 
as it was stressed by almost all the delegates, the essential point was agreement 
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between the two space powers.”247 Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
Soviets favoured a treaty over a GA Res as they felt that “General Assembly 
resolutions lacked binding force.”248 
With regards to differences between GA Res 1962 and 1721 Cheng notes that  
 
declarations do not constitute a separate legal category. A treaty may 
call itself a declaration and is no less binding for being so called. A 
General Assembly resolution which chooses to assume the name 
declaration is not thereby rendered legally more binding than any other 
recommendation.249 
 
He also notes that “in law a world of difference exists between a legally binding 
instrument and one the observance of which depends wholly on the good will of the 
States concerned.”250 Art 18 of the UN Charter provides no special significance to 
resolutions that were adopted by more than the required two-thirds majority. “Legally 
and constitutionally, no special virtue attaches to a unanimous vote, even though 
politically it may be of significance.”251 Furthermore, again indicating that there may 
be more to this notion politically than legally, Cheng notes that “experience has shown 
that unanimity between the two super-powers, which alone have effective space 
capabilities at present, is an essential condition of agreement on legal principles 
governing activities in space.”252 While the end of the Cold War and the relative 
decline of the Russian Federation has somewhat changed this dynamic it is still true 
that the ‘spacefaring nations’ hold greater sway in the formation of the norms and rules 
governing the use of outer space, and the United States maintains and perhaps even 
has an even greater, outsized strength with regards to the rule making for outer space 
given their ‘dominance’ in outer space. 
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3.5.8 ‘Grotian moment’ 
 
According to Michael Scharf the term ‘Grotian Moment’ was coined by Richard Falk 
in 1985253, but Scharf has significantly developed the concept in his work Customary 
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments. 
The concept of ‘Grotian Moment’, named after the ‘father of international law’ Hugo 
Grotius, is a “term that denotes radical developments in which new rules and doctrines 
of customary international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.”254 The 
phrase ‘international constitutional moment’ has also been used to describe a similar 
concept, but Scharf argues that this better suits international organizations, whereas 
‘Grotian Moment’ better describes the development of customary international 
law. Traditionally the development of customary international law, which is just as 
binding as treaty law, has been seen as a slow process which develops out of 
widespread State practice followed because States feel a sense of legal obligation 
(opinio juris). The general opinion that this process at least takes several decades.255 
However, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases the ICJ indicated that this 
could happen more rapidly.256 
The ‘Grotian Moment’ concept recognizes that “rapidly developing customary 
international law may be necessary to keep up with the pace of developments.” 
However, the ‘Grotian Moments’ concept is not synonymous with ‘instant custom’ as 
it still requires practice and time just less than normal – ‘time of fundamental change’ 
is important here.257 
The Grotian Moment concept is to be distinguished from the 
controversial notion of instant custom. Grotian Moments represent 
instances of rapid, as opposed to instantaneous, formation of customary 
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international law. In addition to General Assembly resolutions and 
international court decisions, Grotian Moments require some 
underpinning of state practice, whereas advocates of the concept of 
instant custom argue that customary law can form in the absence of 
state practice.258 
 
General agreement is that the requirements of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
comprise two elements, the objective and subjective element ie practice and opinio 
juris. State practice has tended to garner more attention, if for no other reason than it 
is easier to discern. Verbal and written acts have frequently been held to constitute 
state practice and inaction or silence, especially when a protest or objection would 
normally be expected have also been held to be state practice, the latter notably 
in Lotus. One way of looking at the development of customary international law is as 
a form of claim and response, i.e. a state makes a claim and the international 
community responds favourably or not.259 
Custom pioneers (the first states to initiate a new practice) have no 
guarantee that their action will actually lead to the formation of a 
binding custom. The response may be a repudiation of the claim. In 
such case, the repudiation could constitute a vigorous reaffirmation of 
existing law, which is strengthened thereby. Or, the claim and 
repudiation could constitute a kind of standoff, which could slow the 
formation of new customary international law. The reaction of third 
states is also relevant. Out of this process of claim and response, and 
third party reaction, rules emerge, are strengthened or degraded, or are 
superseded.260 
  
An alternative approach is “articulation” and “act”: 
 
The articulation can either accompany the initial act… or it can be 
embodied in a treaty, draft instruments of the International Law 
Commission, or resolutions of the UN General Assembly. Acts that 
follow and are consistent with the articulation will crystallize the policy 
into a principle that takes on life as a rule of customary international 
law. In other words, once there is a consensus articulation that states 
ought to conform to a given rule of conduct, a legal custom can emerge 
when some level of spontaneous compliance with the rule is 
manifest.261 
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Many scholars believe that claim and response is a better model for the reality of 
customary development than articulation and act. Furthermore, Scharf argues that 
general practice does not require uniformity or consistency of application but broad 
similarity. Furthermore, it is also important which States undertake the practice as 
Scharf argues that there is a qualitative aspect to it. ‘States of significance’ carry more 
weight in determining general practice, see Continental Shelf cases and space law… 
“It may be enough that the practice be representative, so long as it includes states 
whose interests are specially affected.”  He also argues that these types of states also 
have greater weight in objecting to the development of a customary principle.262 
“The purpose of the subjective element (opinio juris) is to differentiate state actions 
that give rise to legal norms from actions that do not.” Opinio juris “is necessary 
because state practice is often capable of being interpreted in various ways.”263 
Traditionally the process of customary development is regarded as a slow process 
requiring several decades of practice at least. “…if customary international law is in 
fact a product of claim and response (as characterized by Myers McDougal), by 
necessity there must be more than a single act and some time must elapse before a 
practice becomes habitual among states.”264 
However, as Scharf notes “…there exists no agreed-upon general formula for 
identifying how many states are needed and how much time must transpire to generate 
a rule of customary international law.” Furthermore “though usually overlooked, 
context can be an important third ingredient that explains the sometimes-accelerated 
formation of customary international law.” Scharf argues that in certain contexts (i.e. 
‘times of fundamental change’) there can be ‘paradigm shifts’ that give rise to new 
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customary international law faster than would otherwise be the case, this still requires 
practice, and time, unlike ‘instant custom’ but a ‘Grotian Moment’ requires 
considerably less of each than would be the case for normal development of customary 
international law.265  
Scharf points to three case studies in defence of the ‘Grotian moment’ concept. These 
are the Nuremberg tribunals, the Truman Declaration extending the continental shelf 
and the development of space law.  
Scharf has argued in an international tribunal that the Nuremburg tribunals constituted 
‘a Grotian moment’ and for that reason he argued that the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia should allow the notion of “Joint Criminal Enterprise”; the 
court ultimately allowed “Joint Criminal Enterprise” to be used based on the 
Nuremberg precedent and the UN General Assembly’s endorsement of the Nuremberg 
Principles.266  
“This General Assembly resolution [UNGA 95(I)] had all the attributes 
of a resolution entitled to great weight as a declaration of customary 
international law: it was labelled an ‘affirmation’ of legal principles; it 
dealt with inherently legal questions; it was adopted by a unanimous 
vote; and none of the members expressed the position that it was merely 
a political statement.”267 
  
It is for this reason that Scharf states that “Nuremberg, then, constitutes a prototypical 
Grotian Moment.” Scharf argues that as the Nuremberg principles were universally 
adopted by the then members of the UN and there was limited state practice of limited 
duration the only way of explaining their passing into customary international law is 
via the concept of a Grotian Moment.268 
“In sum, it was the paradigm-shifting nature of the Nuremberg 
precedent in response to atrocities of an unprecedented scale and the 
universal and unqualified endorsement of the Nuremberg Principles by 
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the nations of the world in 1946 that crystallized (at least the first two 
forms of) JCE [Joint Criminal Enterprise] into a mode of individual 
criminal liability under customary international law despite the initially 
limited number of cases reflecting state practice.”269 
 
Scharf states that “…the Truman Proclamation has all the hallmarks of a legitimate 
Grotian Moment.”270 The Truman Proclamation gave rise to the modern concept of 
the continental shelf. The proclamation “asserted U.S. jurisdiction and control over 
the natural resources of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States.” The US 
only claimed the shelf and made clear that the waters above would retain their 
character as the high seas. It was carefully worded not to mention of sovereignty, 
limiting its focus to jurisdiction over resources. The State department did express 
concern about the unilateral nature of the proclamation.271 
In sum, the legal rationale was based on geological reality, 
technological developments, national security, economic necessity, 
conservation, and the efficacy of costal state regulation. The United 
States recognized that it was acting as a legal pioneer, but it couched 
its justification in legal terms that would render the action easier to 
accept and replicate by other states. Thus, the legal advisor’s memo 
invited other governments to join the United States in the ‘practical 
application of the principles set forth above.’272 
  
The continental shelf concept was accepted and recognized with considerable speed 
and led to a spate of unilateral state declarations and brought with it a notable absence 
of protests or objections from other states which “prompted renowned international 
legal scholar Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to conclude that the concept of the continental 
shelf had become virtually ‘instant’ customary international law.” By the time of the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case the ICJ confirmed that the continental shelf 
concept as articulated in the Truman Proclamation was enshrined in customary 
international law…” Scharf notes that “the International Court of Justice observed that 
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customary norms can sometimes ripen quite rapidly, and that a short period is not a 
bar to finding the existence of a new rule of customary international law.”273 
Space is a third example that Scharf gives of an area of law in which customary 
international law developed rapidly during a ‘Grotian moment.’ Space law is an 
example which goes with Scharf’s argument that ‘key’ States can be have a great 
importance in the development of customary international law in such moments. 
Initially only the US and USSR were actively engaged in spaceflight but their activities 
‘overflew’ the territory of a number of states, none of whom objected. “Whatever the 
reason or their silence, their tacit acceptance quickly crystallized into a new set of 
customary international law rules.”274 These rules were laid out in UNGA Res 1962. 
Scharf notes that although “State practice was limited in the early years of space 
exploration, ICJ Judge Manfred Lachs concluded that ‘it is difficult to regard the 1963 
Declaration as a mere recommendation: it was an instrument which has been accepted 
as law.’”275 
UN GA Res 1962 was adopted unanimously and many states, most notably the US 
and USSR, considered it to be reflective of customary international law, though there 
were those, most notably France, who did not agree, this was eventually resolved by 
the Outer Space Treaty, a binding legal instrument. However, 
it is difficult to ascertain the exact moment the various rules governing 
activities in outer space crystallized into customary international law 
because there was no authoritative judgment on point from the 
International Court of Justice or any other competent tribunal.276 
  
Arguments can be made for the date of the conclusion of the OST or UNGA Res 1962. 
If OST is deemed codification of customary international law then its principles extend 
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to all states. This was tested with the Bogotá Declaration, but majority of states 
rejected this on the basis that OST represents existing general customary international 
law.277  
While some scholars have referred to the principles enshrined in the 
1963 declaration and 1967 treaty as ‘instant’ customary international 
law, the reality is that the two instruments reflected principles that grew 
out of the claims and reactions of many states during the course of 
eighty-three spaceflights from 1957 to 1967. This state practice was not 
conducted ‘in a legal vacuum.’ While ten years is an extremely short 
period for the formation of customary international law in most fields, 
the example of space law fits comfortably within the Grotian Moment 
concept, validating its accelerated formation.278 
  
Scharf argues that “the 1963 declaration was the first widespread clear indication 
of opinio juris relating to the law of outer space.” And similar to Cheng he recognizes 
the Declaration of Principles (UNGA 1962) is somewhat ‘special’ compared to other 
GA resolutions. It is labelled a ‘Declaration of Legal Principles’, it dealt with legal 
issues, was framed as a codification of customary international law at the time of its 
drafting, it uses ‘shall’ and ‘will’ rather than ‘should’ and was “adopted by a 
unanimous vote without any reservation.” Scharf argues that the 1963 space principles 
declaration is “an archetypal case of a Grotian Moment” as “despite the limited state 
practice and minimal times, states and scholars have concluded that sometime prior to 
or shortly after the adoption of the 1963 declaration, the fundamental principles of 
space law had ripened into customary international law.”279 
However, a Grotian Moment does not need to lead to ‘instantly’ fully fledged 
customary law, it can develop after the ‘moment’280 
….‘Grotian Moments’ are transformative developments that generate 
the unique conditions for accelerated formation of customary 
international law. In these circumstances, General Assembly 
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resolutions and judgments of international tribunals often play a 
heightened role in confirming the newly emergent rule…281 
  
Furthermore “…not every momentous technological, geo-political, or society change 
results in accelerated formation of customary international law – for like recrystallized 
gem stones, true Grotian Moments are both precious and relatively rare.”282 
3.6 Soft Law 
 
It is also worth considering so-called ‘soft law’ and the role it plays in the international 
system and the development of customary international law. Steven Freeland 
describes soft law as “written instruments that might purport to specify standards of 
conduct, but do not emanate from the traditional ‘sources’ of public international 
law.”283 There is also the notion of ‘legal soft law’ which includes soft obligations in 
treaties such as the requirement in Article I OST that space activities are carried out 
for the benefits and in the interests of all countries as verification, compliance with 
and even definition of this requirement is virtually impossible. Freeland argues that 
the omission of soft law instruments from Article 38 of the ICJ Statute “cannot be 
considered as an oversight, but rather as deliberate.” Soft law provides guidelines or 
aspirations but are not legally binding.284 However, “non-binding norms have complex 
and potentially large impact in the development of international law.” Non-binding 
instruments can provide evidence of opinio juris and the process of drafting and voting 
for “non-binding normative instruments may be considered a form of state practice.285 
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Furthermore, soft law itself can “eventually become customary international law,” and 
may “even be declaratory of customary international law in certain circumstances. For 
soft law to become customary opinion juris needs to develop (and state practice also 
needs to be taken into consideration.) Also there needs to a consideration of the 
intentions of the drafters of the instrument; a soft law option may not have been a 
second-best option but the deliberate choice.286 
Soft law can also form the basis for the development of an international regime. Soft 
law is often best suited for technical guidelines, it reduces the need for compromise 
and can be more easily updated than hard law options.287 Aoki feels that the use of soft 
law to ‘fill in the gaps’ will continue and is to be welcomed.288 She says that 
Soft law will continue to be the most appropriate type of rules in the 
fields where (i) only technical rules are needed; (ii) commercialisation 
and privatisation are concerned; (iii) the subject is not directly 
concerned with national security and (iv) other national interests (e.g., 
economic interests) are not of significant importance.289 
 
Shelton perhaps goes a bit further arguing that “the term ‘soft law’ itself seems to 
contain a normative element leading to expectations of compliance.”290 She also says 
that  
Recent inclusion of soft law commitments in hard law instruments 
suggests that both form and content are relevant to the sense of legal 
obligation. Some soft law instruments may have a specific normative 
content that is ‘harder’ than the soft commitments in treaties. Other 
non-binding instruments may never been intended to have normative 
effect, but are promotional, serving as a catalyst to further action.291 
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She also makes the argument that it is “it is not always clear where law ends and non-
law begins, or to use the current terminology, where ‘soft’ law should be placed.”292  
This is something that concerns d’Aspremont who argues that the distinction between 
law and non-law is blurring, that the number of actors, particularly non-state actors, 
involved in the creation of international norms is growing and that there is growing 
acceptance (based on reality) that normative activity is increasingly taking place 
outside the traditional remit of international law and that this has made scholars of 
international law less concerned with the rules about the sources of international law. 
He argues that we need to preserve “formalism in the theory of the sources of 
international law for the sake of the ascertainment of international legal rules and the 
necessity to draw a line between law and non-law.”293 This is potentially particularly 
important concerning the moniker ‘soft law’ as “it is generally assumed that 
denominating something ‘law’ makes a difference in expectations of compliance and 
consequences of non-compliance.”294 
However, while it can be hard to differentiate between hard and soft law instruments, 
and Shelton does argue that their ‘distinctive’ features really are starting to blur, she 
also argues that “it may have to be conceded that legal obligation is not as significant 
a factor  in state behavior as some would think.” However, she also suggests that “a 
further possibility is that law remains important and states choose a soft law form for 
specific reasons related to the requirements of the problem being addressed and 
unrelated to the expectation of compliance.”295 However, law does not operate in a 
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vacuum, which remains true for space law regardless of the nature of the environment 
in which the activities it regulates are conducted and 
In the end, the international legal system appears to be a complex, 
dynamic web of interrelationships between hard and soft law, national 
and international regulation, and various institutions that seek to 
promote the rule of law. In this system, soft law is playing increasingly 
important and varied roles.296 
 
3.7 Space resources and customary international law  
 
This section will examine developments with regards to space mining since the 
passage of the US space mining law in 2015 and whether there have been any 
developments in customary international law as a result. These developments include 
US legislation, Luxembourg’s space resources law, the work of The Hague Space 
Resources Governance Working Group and the discussions that have taken place 
during the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS, as well as recent efforts by the 
government of Luxembourg to establish agreements without interested states 
regarding some sort of multi- or bi-lateral framework regarding space resource 
activities. This is important for the general task of this task because there have 
potentially been subsequent developments to the treaties. Furthermore, an 
understanding of how to proceed in the future requires an understanding of the 
potentialities afforded by developments in customary international law. 
National legislation can play a role in the development of customary international law. 
National laws like the space mining legislation produced by the United States and 
Luxembourg can be a form of State practice297 but it can be or can also be proof of 
opinio juris.298 Regarding determining opinio juris “the most direct evidence is, of 
course, what States have in fact done, and what they themselves indicated as to their 
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reasons for doing it – or not doing it.”299 Though the act of one State or even two States 
cannot “serve in itself as sufficient evidence of a State practice for purposes of 
establishment of a custom.” However, “it might do so if coupled with the acceptance 
of a number of other States affected by the act.”300 Which as discussed in detail above 
is an issue, how many and which States ‘count’. This has always been a problem for 
space law specifically owing to the relatively small number of actors in space.301 As 
Thirlway highlighted there is also the question of which States can contribute to the 
opinio juris. This is certainly clearer in cases like Maritime delimitation that, say, the 
opinions of landlocked states are not considered as they cannot have any practice as 
they have no coastline but less clear in cases like nuclear weapons as non-nuclear 
states could potentially become nuclear states also their lack of nuclear weapons does 
not necessarily translate into a belief that nuclear weapons are illegal.302 Does 
customary international law relating to space mining need to involve ‘all’ spacefaring 
states (although what constitutes a spacefaring State, does that necessarily require 
launch capability, because if it does then that rules out Luxembourg)? What about 
those ‘non-spacefaring’ states whose economies are highly dependent upon resource 
extraction whose interests might be ‘specially affected’? Do they fit within Thirlway’s 
formulation that “what that practice must feature is the participation of States ‘whose 
interests are specially affected’, and it should be such as to show the existence of 
‘general recognition’ that a rule of law is involved.”303 It is certain that the spacefaring 
states must be involved in the development of the rules, treaty based, customary, non-
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binding or otherwise, for the regulation of activities in outer space304, what is not clear 
is the role the rest of the states of the international community plays. 
However, while the persistent object rule allows for states to thwart the development 
of new customary international law “it would seem that… fortune favors those States 
that aggressively stake-out new rules and hope that other nations simply do not notice 
or fail to act in a timely or compelling manner.”305 This is the role that the United 
States and Luxembourg are currently taking, while they are framing their actions as 
permissive under international law (and that claim is examined in greater detail 
elsewhere) it is clearly a new development that they are championing. So, while they 
are not ‘trying to get away’ with something they are staking out new ground in space 
law. This is part of how a customary norm comes about. Of course, there is not a 
specific moment of genesis or even necessarily a specific process, rather it is more of 
a ‘marketplace of rules’ in which emerging norms compete which different countries 
promoting and attacking the differing norms and they eventually emerge out of this 
struggle as new norms.306 Luxembourg is more clearly doing this with their network 
of bilateral agreements.307 And there is a possibility that these agreements as well as 
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the US and Luxembourg national legislation could fall under the subsequent practice 
in application of a treaty as laid out in Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.308 
However, space mining has not happened yet. While there are those who argue that 
some of the samples that have been taken as part of exploration initiatives might 
constitute ‘state practice’ Tronchetti emphatically rejects this asserting that 
It is simply not true that there is practice in the exploration and 
utilization of extraterrestrial resources, at least not in the form and 
context envisioned by the Act. Undoubtedly, through the 1960’s, 
1970’s, the Soviet Union and the United States collected lunar samples 
and brought them back to Earth. However, in these occasions, only 
limited amount of samples were taken and the primary purpose to do 
so was to gather scientific information about the lunar soil and its 
composition. Instead, what it lays behind the Space Resource 
Exploration and Utilization Act is the removal of asteroid natural 
resources by non-governmental entities, on a large scale, and with the 
goal of making a profit out of them. There is no practice related to this 
kind of activities.309 
 
This is a particularly salient point given that practice in and of itself does not create a 
customary norm, and there is no evidence that the opinio juris of the relevant States 
was that this provided a precedent for commercial space mining (and indeed in the 
case of the Soviet Union we can be fairly certain even without specific evidence that 
they certainly would not have thought that, especially as they tried to prevent any 
private activity in outer space during the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty.)310 
“International law is created by states”311 and “the environment in which customary 
international law operates changes constantly, this law needs to be flexible to be of 
use.” In order for customary international law and international law (and space law) 
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to endure it needs to be aligned with the interests and consent of States.312 There are 
plenty of people, particularly Americans who are willing to declare that “the 
international rules governing the use of Outer Space have also become outdated.”313 
Therefore there needs to be a mechanism for development, and that mechanism is 
customary international law, which, as has been shown can be developed by the 
enterprising acts of a few states through their national legislation, this can lead to a 
cascade of developments which can quite rapidly (perhaps to the point of seeming 
instantaneous) lead to the ‘crystallisation’ of a new norm of customary international 
law. Perhaps the best example of this is the expansion of the jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf, i.e. the Truman Declaration, “the speed with which the custom 
crystalized was striking.”314 
3.8 Conclusion 
An understanding of the Public International Law framework within which space law 
operates is vitally necessary and provides an understanding of the basis for much of 
the work of this enquiry. Further, as this chapter has demonstrated, while space law 
can be categorized as a ‘special regime’ it is also part of general international law, not 
only is this the case for all ‘special regimes’ but it is made explicitly clear as the 
situation for space law by virtue of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, 
when space law ‘runs out’ it rests on general international law. However, that does not 
preclude the lack of provisions regarding a topic, such as space resources. Though, as 
this chapter has argued, such ‘lack of provision’ should not be regarded as a ‘gap’, 
which assumes a natural ‘completeness’ and is not appropriate in a positivist 
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framework but as a ‘silence.’  This silence was intentional, and leaves space law open 
to future developments (such as those we are seeing) on the topic of space resources.  
This chapter also considered the process of interpreting treaties, particularly important 
given the centrality of the Outer Space Treaty. It presented the rationale behind 
focusing on the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of treaty terms and reliance on the ‘dictionary 
definition’ as at least an indicator of such a meaning. It also made the case for allowing 
future developments to influence interpretation and taking an evolutionary approach 
to interpreting the Outer Space Treaty. The OST meets the ‘three criteria’ for adopting 
the evolutionary approach as it has broad, and adaptable language, the treaty is of an 
indefinite duration and the parties intended it to be a framework which would facilitate 
future development as evidenced by the travaux preparatoires.  
The chapter also presented Customary International Law as an important piece of the 
puzzle which provides a process for the evolution of international law. While who 
qualifies as a ‘specially affected state’ might be unclear in the context of outer space 
(theoretically all states could be spacefaring, unlike landlocked states which cannot 
become costal states) that opinio juris, particularly when expressed at a forum like 
UNCOPUOS, can drive an accelerated development of new customary international 
law, particularly if there is State Practice to support it (such as national legislation) is 
reasonable given the framework of international law and its fundamental nature as a 
voluntary state led process. Opinio juris on space resources has not formed, however 
it is crystallising. Finally, the case was made that soft law provides a potentially useful 
avenue to creating a coordinating international framework which while not as robust 
as a ‘hard law’ approach would provide flexibility which given the embryotic nature 
of space resource activities is desirable. 
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The next chapter will focus on the specifics of space law, particularly examining 
Articles I and II, focusing on what constitutes ‘use’ and ‘appropriation.’ This is at the 
core of this enquiry. The chapter will argue that ‘use’ within the Outer Space Treaty, 
utilizing a ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of the term permits space resource activities albeit 
not without limitations.  Article II OST does indeed present problems for property 
(although not unsurmountable as will be proved by later chapters), but that does not 
prohibit the activity itself. While Article 11 of the Moon Agreement is relevant and 
needs to be understood, given its low uptake it is largely side-lined from this enquiry, 
but it is examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: 
Space Law Treaties 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the public international law framework within which 
space law sits as a ‘special regime’. It set out the approach to treaty interpretation that 
will be undertaken in this chapter. This is predominately the framework set out by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, though as explained an evolutionary 
approach which takes account of developments will also be utilized with regards to 
the Outer Space Treaty, which will be the main focus of this chapter. It also discussed 
customary international law, how it is created, and its role in the development of 
international law, however that is of greater relevance in the next chapter. 
Space law is unusually dominated by treaty, and one treaty in particular: the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, better known as the Outer 
Space Treaty (OST). There are other treaties, such as the Liability Convention315 and 
the Moon Agreement but the Outer Space Treaty dominates. This is largely due to the 
centrality the Outer Space Treaty plays to the space law regime, the other four major 
treaties build upon the ‘framework’ of the Outer Space Treaty which has been called 
both the Magna Carta316 and the constitution of space.317 The near universal 
acceptance of the treaty and the fact that all space capable and spacefaring states are a 
party to the treaty add to its importance.318 Therefore, the main focus of this chapter is 
the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty is the foundation of 
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the space law regime and therefore any enquiry into a space law related question must 
examine in detail the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. While, of course, treaty 
terms must be examined in the context of the entire treaty it is not necessary to examine 
the entire treaty within this chapter. Therefore, several key articles are focused on. 
The preamble is of vital importance as a setter of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty 
providing key context for interpretation. Article I OST is one of the most important 
articles and lays out the ‘freedom of use’ principle which underpins the ‘right’ to 
conduct space resource activities. It is necessary to examine whether or not ‘use’ as 
used in Article I OST does indeed permit space resource activities (this chapter will 
argue that it does.) In order to fully answer this question it is therefore necessary to 
look at Article II OST and the ‘non-appropriation’ principle which while one of the 
most important principles of space law is also the biggest potential barriers to space 
resource activities. Article III is briefly discussed; its importance is connecting space 
law to the wider body of international law. Article VI is the next to be discussed as the 
article which makes States responsible for the activities of their nationals in outer 
space it is the vital component of the space governance regime as it brings non-state 
actors under the umbrella of space law. Article VII is relevant to the question of 
jurisdiction in outer space.  The next section examines the Moon Agreement, 
specifically Article 11. While the Moon Agreement has a limited number of parties it 
is a valid treaty. Furthermore, as Article 11 is the only part of space law to specifically 
address the question of resources it is necessary to examine it in further detail. Finally, 
the chapter examines the resource provisions of UNCLOS. While, the Law of the Sea 
Convention of course does not apply to outer space, UNCLOS and the Moon 
Agreement were negotiated concurrently and the International Seabed Authority 
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provides a potential model regime for space resources, under or independent of the 
Moon Agreement. 
This chapter does not examine the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, nor 
the Registration Convention as while they are important parts of international space 
law their application to this enquiry is limited. Furthermore, they build on principles 
laid out in the Outer Space Treaty, the key aspects of which (with the exception of 
Article V OST, the origins of the Rescue Agreement) are examined in this chapter. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the key aspects of the Outer Space Treaty, 
and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, within the context of space resource activities. 
It looks directly at the space law on space resources, questioning the definition of ‘use’ 
in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty and ‘non-appropriation’ within Article II OST, 
and making the case that whatever issues there maybe regarding property, space 
resource activities are permitted under the Outer Space Treaty. 
4.2 The Outer Space Treaty 
As mentioned, the Outer Space Treaty is the foundational treaty for space law, 
however as not all of the treaty is relevant to the questions at hand the below will focus 
on the preamble, Articles I-III, VI and VIII. Finally, consideration of the ‘failed’ Moon 
Agreement will be given, especially the provisions of Article 11, as, despite the low 
uptake of the treaty it is not only a valid and active treaty which is binding on those 
states which are parties to it but it is also of considerable relevance to the question of 
the governance of space resource activities and property rights in outer space. This 
section will examine the relevant articles of the Outer Space Treaty within the context 
of space resources. 
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4.2.1 The Preamble 
According to Article 31 VCLT the meaning of a treaty must be derived from the treaty 
in its entirety which includes the preamble.319 The preamble sets out the reason for and 
general theme of the treaty. It is an important provider of context for the interpretation 
of the treaty as a whole. As Max Hulme has written “…the VCLT defines – almost in 
passing – the preamble as part of the text, the main focus of its interpretive approach, 
and an obligatory factor in the text-and-context analysis.”320 Further what Hulme 
classes the ‘object-and purpose approach to treaty preambles’ has been adopted in 
practice by ‘virtually all’ those engaged in treaty interpretation including, notably, 
international tribunals.321 Hulme argues that 
The preamble is a mandatory factor in interpretation, although the 
effect of this command will, of course, depend on the content of the 
particular preamble being examined. In other words, the text-and-
context approach primarily seeks to ensure that preambles will be given 
the appropriate interpretive weight in light of their drafting, which 
requires that they be examined in the first place.322 
 
The Outer Space Treaty’s preamble has several aspects that are worth noting, these 
include the references to the common interest of all humanity and the desire that the 
exploration of space be carried out for the benefit of all peoples. As well as calling for 
space to be explored and used for peaceful purposes and in furtherance of friendly 
relations and international cooperation. The preamble discusses the ‘great prospects’ 
provided by humanity’s “entry into outer space” as well as the value of the use of outer 
space for “all mankind.” These are themes which are repeated and further developed 
in the body of the treaty. The preamble indicates that part of the ‘object and purpose’ 
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of the Outer Space Treaty is the facilitation of the use of outer space and humanity’s 
future in space. 
4.2.2 Article I 
Article I is one of the most important provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and 
arguably in space law in general. It works in conjunction with Article II, which will 
be discussed specifically below. These two articles establish space as part of the 
‘global commons’ and demonstrate the res communis ominium status of outer space 
and celestial bodies.323 
Article I OST has several aspects to it. The overarching declaration of the article is the 
freedom of exploration and use of outer space. Additionally, it declares that “there 
shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies…” It also stipulates that the exploration and use of outer space 
“shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…” and “shall 
be the province of all mankind.” Further, it states that “there shall be free access to all 
areas of celestial bodies.” The treaty does not provide a definition of either the terms 
‘exploration’ or ‘use’ nor an explanation of what is meant by the phase ‘province of 
all mankind.’ These will be examined in turn. 
Exploration is an uncontroversial term in space law, as Tronchetti writes it “did not 
generate any particular debate. It refers to discovery activities of the space 
environment for scientific reasons.”324 Exploration of outer space is what Apollo 11, 
Cassini, Hayabusa and Rosetta did. That said, within the context of discussing space 
resource activities it is important to note that the terrestrial mining industry, has a 
different interpretation of the term exploration. It has a definitive purpose, to locate 
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commercially viable deposits of minerals or ore. The mining industry use exploration 
as a synonym for prospecting; it is the stage before extractive operations commence.325 
It is unlikely that this other, more commercial, more utilitarian definition would fit 
within the term ‘exploration’ as used in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, it must be 
recalled that the standard rules of interpretation as expressed by the VCLT stipulates 
giving terms their ordinary meaning within the context of the object and purpose of 
the treaty and specialist definitions are only to be applied if specified.326  ‘Exploration’ 
as used by the mining industry would better fit under the ‘freedom of use’ as will be 
explained. Further, it is worth noting that The Hague International Space Resources 
Governance Working Group did not make use of the term ‘exploration’, opting instead 
to use ‘search for’, which they subsumed under the overarching term ‘space resource 
activity’.327 That this is meant to cover specialised terms like ‘prospecting’ or 
‘exploration’ as used by the mining industry or even UNCLOS is made clear in the 
Commentary.328 Therefore, ‘exploration’ as used in Article I OST should be defined 
as a freedom of ‘investigation’329 and as Hobe says both exploration and scientific 
investigation “are to be distinguished from the actual use of outer space.”330 
The second freedom laid out in Article I OST is the freedom to use outer space, the 
Moon and other celestial bodies. No clear definition of use is provided by the treaty 
itself and it is not immediately clear whether ‘commercial operations’ can fit within 
it. Several delegates to UNCOPUOS involved in the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty 
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did raise the issue that the definition of ‘use’ was unclear331, the French delegate 
specifically queried whether ‘use’ included ‘exploitation’ or whether ‘use’ was simply 
limited to ‘use for exploration purposes’. In the course of this statement the French 
delegate observed that that the extraction of minerals on the Moon or other celestial 
bodies was hard to conceive at any point in the near future.332 There was a general 
sense that the Outer Space Treaty should not be too prescriptive and that therefore 
terms like ‘use’ should be left open to allow scope for future development.333 It is also 
worth bearing in mind that the Soviets had initially attempted to restrict activity in 
space to only State activities however they eventually conceded and a compromise 
was reached permitting non-state activities which resulted in Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty.334 The travaux preparatoires clearly supports a broad interpretation of 
the term ‘use’ as found in Article I, and a definition which would include commercial 
operations. That said, according to Article 32 VCLT335, travaux preparatoires are only 
a supplementary means of interpretation, first recourse should be to the ‘ordinary 
meaning’.336 
The question of whether or not use as used in Article One of the Outer Space Treaty 
includes commercial operations is actually a fairly straightforward one. The ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of ‘use’ is fairly broad and would certainly encompass commercial 
activity.337 Further examination of ‘subsequent practice’338 also provides ample 
support for the inclusion of the commercial operations within the scope of ‘use’. 
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Commercial operations are conducted in space on a daily basis, thousands of times an 
hour even and have been conducted since AT&T’s Telstar satellite in the early 1960s. 
Commercial space activities range from everything as simple as enabling international 
communications to the sale of satellites themselves and even includes tourism, albeit 
in a limited form to date. This has all been conducted without objection from the 
international community. Commercial use of space has clearly achieved the status of 
a customary principle by meeting the requirements of frequency and duration of 
practice. Scholars of space law also support the inclusion of commercial activity 
within the scope of the freedom of use. Fabio Tronchetti has written that “the word 
‘use’ can be interpreted to encompass both non-economic and economic use.”339 
Others have articulated that the freedoms laid out in Article I OST were intended to 
be as broad as possible. 340 
However, mining or resource extraction is potentially another matter. Lyall and Larsen 
raised the issue that exploitation, particularly if it involves permanent appropriation of 
materials, could have trouble fitting within Article I given the prohibition on national 
appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 341  Tronchetti has said that there 
is no clear internationally accepted rules governing the extraction of natural resources 
in space and that the controversy is not over scientific extraction but commercial 
extraction.342 However, Hobe, in the Cologne Commentary supports the inclusion of 
commercial resource extraction within the definition of ‘use’ saying “the freedom of 
use contains the possibility for any entity to utilise outer space and its resources as 
well as the resources of the celestial bodies, be it for commercial or non-commercial 
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ends.”343 Virgiliu Pop has argued that “any use is allowed, provided it is exclusively 
for peaceful purposes and does not harmfully contaminate the celestial body.”344 
Gennady M. Danilenko has also written that “the Outer Space Treaty proclaims 
freedom in the use of outer space, which, as generally recognized, includes the 
freedom to exploit its resources.”345 
To follow through on the standard procedure for interpretation it is useful to take a 
closer look at the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘use’. The Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary defines ‘use’ as, among other things, ‘1. take, hold, deploy as a means of 
achieving something 2. take or consume (an amount) from a limited supply.’346 This 
would clearly permit resource extraction. Further, the object and purpose of the Outer 
Space Treaty, as discussed is to facilitate humanity’s “entry into outer space” as well 
as promoting the development of its economic potential (there can be no value or 
benefit without development.) Additionally, looking at the Travaux Preparatoires it 
is clear that ‘use’ is intended to be broad and include ‘exploitation’.347 Further, the 
Japanese delegation proposed strengthening the ‘environmental’ provisions of what is 
now Article IX to ensure the “preservation and conservation of the natural resources… 
of celestial bodies” however this was rejected.348 Further, we now have, as a result of 
the legislation of the United States349 and Luxembourg350 as well as several years of 
discussion at the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS ‘subsequent practice’ which 
establishes that space resource extraction falls within the freedom of use in Article I 
of the Outer Space Treaty. However, that freedom is not unlimited or without 
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restriction. One of those restrictions is expressed in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty, which will be discussed in greater detail below. Another restriction or better 
put, condition, on the freedom of use, is the stipulation laid out in Article I that the use 
of space “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…” and 
that such use “shall be the province of all mankind.” 
The implications of that are not entirely clear. First, it is important to note that  
‘province of all mankind’ is not synonymous with ‘common heritage of mankind’ as 
used in Law of the Sea Convention or the Moon Agreement.351 Further, it applies to 
the exploration and use of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies not to outer 
space itself. Scholars have endeavoured to provide clarity on the meaning of these 
conditions to the freedoms expressed in Article I OST.  Stephan Hobe notes that the 
notion of the ‘province of all mankind’ is in line with the regulation of other areas of 
the ‘global commons’ like the high seas and the deep seabed. However, there is no 
common pattern in the regulation of the ‘global commons’ each area has its own 
distinct regime.352 Christol argues that the concept of the ‘province of mankind’ 
principle was meant to bolster the ‘in the interests and for the benefit of all’ concept, 
he says that the drafters saw little difference between province and benefit, but that 
this had a nuance that ‘benefit’ lacked on its own.353 Philip De Man has argued that 
the freedoms expressed in Article I are “qualified, inter alia, by the obligation to duly 
take into account the corresponding freedoms of other States.”354 Dembling and Arons 
argued that the language in Article I OST was largely designed and intended to prevent 
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a ‘first come, first served’ approach to accessing celestial bodies and ensuring that the 
benefits of space were accessible to all States even if they were ‘latecomers.’355 
In practice this aspect of Article I OST has not amounted to obligations on the part of 
space actors. For this reason, the ‘Space Benefits Declaration’ (UNGA Res 51/122)356 
was promulgated. The Space Benefits Declaration arose out of a desire by developing 
states to more precisely define the terms of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. Debate 
exists as to the legal effect of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, does it create merely 
moral obligations or is it legally binding? As Elena Carpanelli and Brendan Cohen 
have written, even if Article I does create legal obligations, the vagueness of the terms 
involved does still cause issues “one wonders, for instance, whether only the 
‘exploration and use’ must be beneficial, or also the resources resulting from this 
activity.”357 However, the vague nature of the provisions of the Declaration also 
substantially reduce its value as an authoritative means of interpretation of Article I of 
the Outer Space Treaty.358 That said, there is value in the Declaration on Space 
Benefits as a reaffirmation of the principle that space activities are meant to be for the 
benefit of all humankind, and could have an impact on interpretation, by a court, of 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty either as a ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent 
state practice’ as defined by Article 31(3) VCLT.359 Though perhaps the most 
significant impact of the Declaration on Space Benefits is to mark the end of the push 
by developing States for a more concrete expression of the principle that space is 
meant to be for the benefit of all humans. As Carpanelli and Cohen write “in this way, 
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they abandoned the claim that outer space, as the ‘common heritage of mankind,’ 
demanded the sharing of economic benefits that come from outer space activities…” 
in return the space powers reaffirmed their commitment to using space for the benefit 
of all countries and while this is not a legal obligation it does carry a moral weight.360 
4.2.3 Article II 
 
Article II is not long, and in order to aid discussion, it is worth including here. 
 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not 
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means. 
 
The question of what constitutes a ‘celestial body’ is examined in detail in the next 
chapter but for these purposes all naturally occurring physical objects in the solar 
system are considered ‘celestial bodies’ within the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty. 
This section will discuss the importance and role of Article II OST and the non-
appropriation principle. Then, several aspects of Article II need to be examined, first 
does it apply to non-governmental entities (private companies, for example), but also 
what does national appropriation mean, as well as ‘use’ within the context of Article 
II, occupation and ‘by any other means’. There will also be examination of it within 
the context of Article I and the ‘object and purpose’ of the OST. Then a brief 
discussion of the impact of Article II OST on private property rights in outer space, 
though that will be discussed in more detail later. 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is the other ‘most important article’ although it is 
possible that Article II OST is the most important, indeed it embodies what has been 
described as a “cardinal principle of space law.”361 This principle, the non-
appropriation principle, which Article II codifies, is widely, even universally 
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recognized as a fundamental principle of space law.362 Furthermore, the non-
appropriation principle was one of the earliest principles which was agreed upon and 
one which enjoys broad support.363 It has certainly attained the status of customary 
international law364 (and may even have done so before the Outer Space Treaty came 
into force)365 and some have even gone so far as to suggest that it has even attained 
the coveted status of a jus cogens norm.366 Though the case for this is less than 
convincing especially as the authors do not actually make a case they just declare it to 
be so. Which Matthew Saul says is actually fairly common for claims about jus 
cogens.367 However, it is abundantly clear that ‘non-appropriation’ is a fundamental 
principle of space law. 
The scope of Article II OST has two elements, the geographical scope, and entities to 
which it applies. As mentioned, the article applies to outer space, the Moon and other 
celestial bodies which are taken to be all naturally occurring physical objects in outer 
space. That Article II applies to States is clear and unequivocal, however there have 
been those who argue that it does not apply to private individuals or entities such as 
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companies. Stephen Gorove is perhaps the most notable of those who have made this 
assertion. Gorove made the distinction based on whether the activities are carried out 
by or on the behalf of the government or whether they are private activities. Under his 
formulation it could only be a violation of Art II OST if done under the ‘supreme 
authority of the state.’368 Others have picked up on this,369 Lee argues that the wording 
of the Chinese text of the OST, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement and even UNCLOS 
indicates that ‘national appropriation’ in Article II OST “may mean no more than the 
‘exercise of sovereignty.’ Accordingly, Article II does not prescribe any rights or 
duties concerning the assertion of title by private nationals, as long as they do not 
amount to an exercise of sovereignty by the state...”370 This does not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
While Article II OST does not mention non-governmental entities, when considered 
in conjunction with Article VI OST it is clear that it applies to them. Treaty terms 
should be interpreted “in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”371 
Article VI OST helps provide that context.  
Article VI OST will be examined in detail in the next section, but it makes States 
responsible for the activities of their nationals in outer space and requires that they 
‘authorise and continually supervise’ those activities. The authorisation is a key 
element, States cannot authorise that which they are prohibited from doing,372 
therefore States cannot authorise the ‘appropriation’ of outer space, the Moon and 
other celestial bodies by private entities. This view is backed up by the Travaux 
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Preparatoires of the OST373 and supported numerous scholars. As Ram S Jakhu, 
Joseph N. Pelton, and Yaw Otu Mankata Nyampong, write  
States are under obligation to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
the Outer Space Treaty by their private entities. If private appropriation 
were permitted to appropriate outer space and celestial bodies, it would 
defeat the purpose of the treaty and nullify the common interest and 
freedom principles.374 
 
Or as Tronchetti more succinctly puts it: “allowing private appropriation of outer space 
would go against the spirit and the idea behind the Outer Space Treaty.”375 Therefore, 
Article II applies to private entities just as much as it does to States, this is clear when 
the Article is interpreted in its context. 
‘National appropriation’ as a phrase appears to only be used in space law, and there is 
no specific definition provided by the Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to query what exactly is meant by the phrase. Looking at the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
the phrase requires first taking the terms separately. ‘National’ is defined as “relating 
to the nation” or “owned, controlled, or financially supported by the State.”376 Now, 
given Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (which provides context for the 
interpretation of the ‘ordinary meaning’) this is necessarily broader than the dictionary 
definition as the State is ‘responsible’ for the activities of their nationals in outer space 
and has to “authorise” those activities giving explicit State sanction to them, meaning, 
as discussed above ‘private’ appropriation is, within the lex specialis of space law, 
‘national appropriation’. Appropriation means “to take for one’s own use”377 although 
notably it is generally regarded as being “unauthorised” acquisition,378 which may 
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have implications for the necessity of a multilateral regime for authorising space 
resource activities, which will be explored later. Based on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
the component parts of ‘national appropriation’ a reasonable working definition is 
proposed as ‘the acquisition, in whole or in part, of outer space, the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, for the exclusive use of the State or its nationals.’ Although, of course, 
it needs to be examined in context and in line with the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Article I OST states that “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be free for exploration and use…” which necessarily means that there will be 
‘exclusive use’ of parts of ‘outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies’.  
Indeed, this has been ‘tested’ as there have been claims that prolonged or ‘permanent’ 
occupation of an orbital slot amounts to a violation of Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. However as De Man points out the meaning of these claims would essentially 
make many of the uses of outer space effectively unlawful and it would be absurd to 
draft the Outer Space Treaty which says space is free for use, and then turn around and 
declare the most common uses of space to be unlawful.379 It is also important to note 
that Article II does not prohibit the exercise of ‘sovereignty’ in outer space. Indeed, 
through Articles VI and VIII States are required to exercise sovereignty over their 
nationals in outer space and ‘objects launched into outer space’ which are ‘carried’ on 
their registry. It is territorial sovereignty, the acquisition of territory on ‘the Moon and 
other celestial bodies’ which is prohibited. Furthermore, it is a stipulation that ‘use’ or 
‘occupation’ or ‘anything else’ does not give rise to any rights inherent in the area. 
One of the key points about ownership is that rights are maintained “regardless of any 
actual or constructive control”380 whereas in outer space, as per Article II OST once 
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‘use’ or ‘occupation’ et al is over any other State is free to make use of that area. This 
was a point that the Soviet delegation attempted to clarify during the drafting of the 
Outer Space Treaty in 1966 stating that “in other words no human activity on the moon 
or any other celestial body could be taken as justification for national 
appropriation.”381 It is also worth noting that in accordance with ICJ cases, territorial 
acquisition under modern international law requires not only the “intention and will to 
act as sovereign” but also “some actual exercise or display of power and authority.”382 
As argued, Article II OST applies to private actors as well as governments by virtue 
of Article VI OST. This leads to a conclusion that property rights are prohibited. 
Indeed, Sir Kenneth Bailey, part of the Australian delegate to UNCOPUOS during the 
drafting process of the OST expressed concern that it was not sufficiently 
clear that outer space was not subject to national sovereignty and that 
no one could acquire property rights in outer space, including on the 
moon and other celestial bodies, by use or occupation, or by any other 
means.383 
 
However, despite Sir Kenneth’s concerns, there is broad agreement among scholars 
that Article II prohibits the creation of property rights.384 As Tronchetti stipulates 
Private property exists only is a superior authority recognizes and 
protects it. But a private entity cannot legally rely on national law to 
acquire property over part of the ‘global commons’ of outer space. If a 
state were to recognize claims to extraterrestrial properties by its 
nationals, this would constitute an appropriation of outer space ‘by 
other means’, which is prohibited under Article II.385 
 
Property rights, at least concerning land, requires a legal regime operating under the 
authority or protection of a sovereign power. As “States are forbidden from extending 
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their territorial sovereignty over outer space or any parts of it.”386 They cannot grant 
landed property rights to their nationals, for as Thomas Gangale has argued, States 
cannot grant title to that which they themselves are incapable of obtaining title to.387 
Furthermore, as the ability to exclude is central to property388 then it is in inherent 
conflict with Article I OST.389 Therefore, property rights over land are not possible in 
outer space. Although, Blount and Robinson, have argued that non-appropriation is 
primarily concerned with expansion of territory not property saying that "Article II 
functions to exclude outer space from the territory of States, thus appropriation only 
occurs when property rights flow from territorial claims."390 However, as the authors 
themselves admit "real property is directly connected to territorial sovereignty…"391 
Further, “the prohibition of national appropriation also precludes the appropriation of 
any national legislation on a territorial basis to validate a private claim to property.”392 
That said, the situation regarding resources, especially once they have been extracted 
from the celestial body in which they are found, may be different. 
The question of whether the non-appropriation principle extends to resources is one 
of the most debated in the field of space law.393 However, with discussions at 
UNCOPUOS in the wake of the US and Luxembourg space resources legislation there 
is ongoing development of customary international law, which while not yet an 
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international opinio juris, does indicate a growing acceptance of the compatibility of 
space resource activities with the Outer Space Treaty. Treaty terms can ‘evolve’ as the 
States Parties understanding of the term ‘evolves’ and has been argued the Outer Space 
Treaty is open to such ‘evolutionary interpretation.’ That said, this section will focus 
on the Outer Space Treaty itself and the contributions of scholars, particularly as while 
a customary development is crystallising it has not yet formed. 
One of the key arguments, that resources, especially once extracted or removed from 
the celestial body they come from, are not subject to the non-appropriation principle 
is that the non-appropriation principle is primarily concerned with territory.394 The 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the Outer Space Treaty do not provide much insight 
on their own on this point. As has been argued above, space resource activities can fall 
within the ‘ordinary meaning’ of ‘use’ as expressed in Article I OST but ‘non-
appropriation’ is trickier. Resource extraction and ‘use’ is appropriation as it quite 
literally is taking “for one’s own use.”395 Even if that use is to sell to someone else. 
However, the context, and object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty needs to be 
recalled when making this assessment and as has been argued in this work part of that 
object and purpose, as expressed in the preamble, is to facilitate ‘the exploration and 
use of outer space’396 which cannot happen, sustainably at least, without utilising space 
resources.397 Further, and while of limited value as scientific investigation is 
specifically endorsed by the Outer Space Treaty, and as Lyall and Larson have written 
exploration is legally different from economic exploitation,398 samples extracted from 
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celestial bodies can be appropriated and even sold.399 Additionally, there is some basis 
in the negotiation record to support the notion that resources are not covered by the 
non-appropriation principle, at least after being extracted from the celestial body they 
originated in. 
There was concern expressed by the Austrian, and French delegations that there was 
potential confusion between the terms “non-appropriation” and “use” which should be 
clarified.400 Given that the Japanese delegation called for a specific provision requiring 
the preservation of celestial bodies, including their resources401, which was not 
included in the final treaty and the clarification by the Soviet delegation that non-
appropriation should be taken to mean that activities conducted in outer space do not 
give any ‘sovereign’ rights over the Moon or other celestial bodies402, an inference can 
be drawn that resources were not intended to be covered within the scope of Article II 
of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The territorial nature of Article II enjoys broad support from scholars. The Cologne 
Commentary says that the non-territorial nature of space was ‘confirmed’ by Article 
II OST and that the primary objective was to prevent a colonial ‘land rush’ in space.403 
Blount agrees, stipulating that the ‘non-appropriation principle’ was primarily a 
security goal intended to prevent conflict over territory in space.404 The IAA study 
agrees saying that the non-appropriation principle only applies to territory.405 De Man 
argues that as Article II OST “neither mentions nor excludes” space resources then 
given that it “is an exception to the general rule of freedom of activity in outer space” 
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it should be regarded as being inapplicable to space resources. 406 That said, mining a 
celestial body out of existence, no matter how small, could be unlawful. Destruction 
is the ultimate form of appropriation and it would not be of benefit and in the interest 
of all States. Additionally, it would fail to take due regard for interests of all States.407 
4.2.3 Article III 
 
Article III of the Outer Space treaty declares that space activities shall be carried out 
“in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in 
the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting 
international cooperation and understanding”. This is an important point, space law 
does not exist in a vacuum, it is part and parcel of international law. While space law 
is a lex specialis or a ‘special regime’ which is law governing a specific matter 
(activities in outer space) it is also the case that, as discussed, “no special regime has 
ever been understood as independent from general law.”408 There are no legal regimes 
outside of general international law, when the ‘special regimes’ rules ‘run out’ they 
fall back upon general international law.409 This is made clear by Article III OST. The 
Cologne Commentary says that this makes Article III one of the “most essential 
articles in the Outer Space Treaty” as there was there was question as to whether space 
law was going to be a self-contained regime.410 However, the OST establishes that 
space law is a lex specialis within the broader framework of international law. This 
has a few benefits for space law, as while there are not specific dispute resolution 
mechanisms available for space law nor set out in any of the space treaties, any 
disputes that do arise are capable of making use of the existing dispute resolutions 
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services (such as, but not limited to, the International Court of Justice). Additionally, 
the United Nations Charter applies in space, meaning the prohibition on the use of 
force, except in self-defence, applies too. As well as the general obligation to resolve 
disputes peacefully.411 This could be important in disputes over property or mineral 
rights should they arise in the future. 
4.2.4 Article VI 
As discussed, there is an argument that Article II and its prohibition on national 
appropriation of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies is only for the 
attention of States and does not apply to private individuals or corporations. However, 
given Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty this is not the case, as has been argued in 
the section on Article II OST above. Article VI says that: 
“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental 
agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national 
activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in 
the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require 
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party 
to the Treaty…” 
 
This article makes states responsible for the actions of their nationals (natural, legal, 
or otherwise) in space. In fact, it goes further and requires that their activities be 
authorized and supervised by the appropriate state. An examination of a handful of 
state space laws will reveal that States certainly feel obligated to authorise and 
supervise the activities of their nationals (legal or natural). The UK, for example, 
requires British nationals to gain authorisation for space activity regardless of where 
that activity is being conducted from.412 Even if a convincing argument could be made 
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that Article VI has been misinterpreted given the opinio juris of states parties, the sheer 
number of occurrences and the duration of the practice, this principle has now become 
custom. 
States cannot authorize their nationals to undertake actions that are prohibited to 
themselves, therefore as States are not permitted to appropriate outer space, the Moon 
or other celestial bodies they cannot authorize their nationals to do so either and as all 
activities of their nationals in space require their authorization their nationals are also 
subject to the Article II prohibitions. However, that does not mean that there is a 
prohibition on commercial mining operations. States can authorize and license ocean 
going fishing vessels without needing to lay claim to areas of the high seas where the 
fishing operations will be conducted. This is the line of reasoning followed by both 
the Luxembourg and American space mining laws. Therefore, private individuals, 
corporations etc are prohibited from appropriation of territory on the moon and other 
celestial bodies as are states. However, this does not necessarily apply to resources 
found within the moon and other celestial bodies as is explained elsewhere. 
4.2.5 Article VIII 
 
Article VIII lays out the basis for States to exercise jurisdiction over space objects and 
their personnel (in the event there are any.) The ‘State of registry’ “retains jurisdiction 
and control’ as per the article. Article VIII OST also clarifies that “objects launched 
into outer space, including objects landed or contracted on a celestial body…” do not 
have their ownership affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body.413  
Therefore, despite Art II OST “the State of registry is entitled to exercise its 
sovereignty over the registered space object.” The formulation of ‘jurisdiction and 
control’ found in Article VIII “avoids a reference to State sovereignty and national 
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territoriality in outer space – an area of non-appropriation.”414 However, a mechanism 
for control and responsibility is still necessary for the maintenance of order in outer 
space therefore Article VII links to Articles VI and VII, which creates a chain of 
attribution for a space object and identifies one single state whose laws are applicable 
to the space object in question.415 Much like the oceans, an absence of sovereignty is 
not meant to create unregulated lawlessness. Similarly, just as “jurisdiction with 
respect to the high seas is not jurisdiction over the high seas as such” [italics in 
original] jurisdiction in outer space is not over outer space, the Moon or any other 
celestial body but the space objects and human beings operating in outer space.416 
“Jurisdiction and control over a space object can only be executed by one of the 
launching States, namely the one which has registered the space object.”417 The phrase 
‘object launched into outer space’ is not specifically defined, nor is the term ‘space 
object’ however  
“in practice, a common understanding of the term ‘space object’ exists. 
Accordingly, a space object is every object that was launched into outer 
space in order to explore or use outer space, as well as every object that 
is intended to be launched.”418 
 
There is no distinction between state objects and private objects, they are both equally 
subject to the ‘jurisdiction and control’ of the state of registry. The state of registry is 
key. Transfer of ownership of objects in outer space is possible but a transfer of 
ownership “does not imply a transfer of jurisdiction and control.” A bilateral 
agreement can ‘transfer’ liability and responsibility to another state but would not 
change the jurisdiction and control under international law. This is particularly a 
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problem for a transfer to a state that cannot be a launching state of the object in 
question as liability rests with the launching state.  
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Stephan Mick stipulate that “‘jurisdiction’ means the 
legislation and enforcement of laws and rules in relations to persons and objects.” 
They also stipulate that “Jurisdiction is decisive for the applicable law.” ‘Control’ as 
used in Article VIII “means the exclusive right and the actual possibility to supervise 
the activities of a space object and, if applicable, the personnel thereof.” In this context 
that “allows the ‘appropriate State Party’ to exercise ‘international responsibility for 
national activities’ and ‘continuing supervision’ under Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty.” It must be noted that “‘Jurisdiction and control’ must be read as ‘one 
block’.”419 Furthermore, 
The ‘control’ competence is more than a technical capability. It is the 
right of the State of registry ‘to adopt technical rules to achieve the 
space object mission’ and, if necessary, ‘to direct, to stop, modify and 
correct the elements of the space object and its mission’. ‘Control’ must 
be based on legitimate jurisdiction and not on factual control 
capabilities.420 
 
Additionally, this competence always rests with the state and not with a non-
governmental actor or private entity. As Schmidt-Tedd and Mick state “in contrast to 
general public international law, States’ international responsibility extends as well 
over activities of non-governmental and private entities.” Furthermore, “The legal 
consequence of jurisdiction and control is the applicability of the national law of the 
State of registry for the object launched into outer space, including over any personnel 
thereof.”421 
In relation to the mention of ‘ownership’ in Article VIII, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and 
Stephan Mick argue that  
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Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty does not establish ownership by 
means of a constitutive rule. It simply clarifies that ownership 
established on earth is not affected by the presence of those objects in 
outer space. More especially, the launch of an object in outer space 
does not lead to a loss of property or to the emergence of res derelicta 
or res nullius. The principle of non-appropriation of outer space as such 
does not affect ownership legally established on earth while those 
objects are in outer space.422 
 
Ownership in Article VII refers to both private and state ownership, no distinction is 
made. The property law that applies to the space object in question is that of the state 
of registry as they are the ones with jurisdiction.423 However, there is still a problem 
with objects ‘constructed’ on a celestial body.424 Under Schmidt-Tedd and Mick’s 
reasoning this would only apply to structures like the International Space Station 
which was assembled out of numerous space objects which had been launched into 
outer space from Earth. However, given the possibility of constructing facilities on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies out of space derived resources it will be necessary to 
clarify this issue.425 A potential work around is one proposed by The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group, which is to create a new 
term, what they call a ‘space-made product.’426 
4.3 The Moon Agreement 
 
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies427, or the Moon Agreement, is the fifth in the series of major space law 
instruments. The treaty was adopted in 1979 but did not enter into force until 1984. 
The Moon Agreement has been ratified by only 18 States428 which has led to it being 
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regarded as a ‘failed’ treaty429, although it is an active treaty and binding on those 
States that are parties to it. It is also worth bearing in mind that there is the example of 
UNCLOS, which was negotiated around the same time as the Moon Agreement and 
also contains the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle, albeit independent 
of the Moon Agreement, and was also regarded as being a ‘failed treaty’ until it was 
‘amended’ in 1994430, and now virtually all States have signed up to UNCLOS with 
the noticeable exception of the United States of America.431 
The Moon Agreement largely mirrors the Outer Space Treaty; however, the provisions 
of Article 11 develop, or attempt to develop, law on space resources and therefore 
warrants consideration. Though there are other provisions that warrant attention as 
well. Article 4 introduces the concept of ‘international equity’ (the idea that actors 
need to bear in mind the consequences for future generations of their actions and 
activities) into space legislation.432 Article 6 of the Moon Agreement also expressly 
stipulates that there shall be freedom of scientific investigation433 and states that such 
freedom shall include a right to collect and remove physical samples for scientific 
purposes. Those samples “remain at the disposal” of the parties that collected them 
though the article does encourage them to make the samples, or at least portions of 
them, available to other States. Further, States are permitted to use “mineral and other 
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substances” in support of scientific missions “in quantities appropriate…” to that 
mission.434 Which is explicit endorsement of what today would be referend to as In 
Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU). However, Tronchetti and Hobe have argued that this 
would not include ‘commercial’ ISRU operations,435 which would fall under Article 
11. As Tronchetti writes "the [Moon] Agreement makes a clear distinction between 
activities of scientific and non-scientific, i.e., commercial nature."436 
Much of Article 11437 attempts to elaborate on the prohibition of national appropriation 
contained in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.  The first section of Article 11 
declares that “the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind.”438 There is no explanation of what exactly this means. However, “common 
heritage” is usually taken to be a stronger, more communal statement than the 
“province of all mankind” found in the Outer Space Treaty.439  However, it is a phrase 
which remains open to interpretation. It is also important to note that it is the 
exploration and use of outer space which is the ‘province of all mankind’ whereas it 
is the Moon and its natural resources which are the Common Heritage of Mankind. 
The authors of the Cologne Commentary argue that the meaning of CHM in the Moon 
Agreement should be based on the Moon Agreement and not meanings in any other 
contexts (such as UNCLOS).440 However, while CHM as expressed in UNCLOS is 
not directly relevant to its meaning in the Moon Agreement it does demonstrate that 
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the CHM principle, in and of itself, is not static and can evolve.441 Indeed, it evolved 
during the discussion of the treaty itself, initially the developing world wanted an equal 
sharing of benefits, however, the final text stipulates that sharing should be on the 
basis of contributions made, which is in line with the likes of Intelsat, Intersuptnik and 
Inmarsat.442 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement is, however, far from establishing a 
clear and comprehensive regulation of the exploitation of lunar 
resources under the 'common heritage of mankind heading.' This 
agreement does not establish an international regime to govern such 
exploitation.443 
 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement lays a foundation for regulation, but it does not 
create a regime. A regime will need to be developed later by those States that are 
parties to the Moon Agreement. This is a further reason why the CHM principle is not 
‘set in stone’ as the subsequent agreement, establishing the regime under Article 11 of 
the Moon Agreement, can ‘adapt’ and ‘develop’ the meaning of CHM.444 
It is Section 5 of Article 11 that calls for the establishment of an international regime 
to govern the “exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation 
is about to become feasible.”445 Granted, it does specify the Moon, but there is no 
reason the international regime could not be extended to cover all celestial bodies, 
indeed given the provision in Article 1 section 1 it should be interpreted as applying 
to all the “celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the Earth…” except 
where other agreements may apply.  
Section 6 calls for State Parties to inform the United Nations Secretary General and 
the international scientific community of any resources they discover.446 This could 
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have implications for commercial confidentiality. Nevertheless, terrestrial resource 
extraction will necessarily involve disclosure of the proposed site of operations so 
steps can be taken to protect the rights of the discoverer.  
Section 7(d) calls for an equitable sharing of the benefits of the resources of the 
Moon.447 This is one of the features that causes much of the opposition to the Moon 
Agreement,448 however it is worth noting that equitable does not mean equal, it 
essentially means fair.  In total, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement would provide a 
mechanism for providing legal certainty vis-a-vis space resources. 
However, given the general rejection of the treaty by the international community it is 
unlikely that a substantial space resources governance framework will be developed 
under the auspices of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement. However, it remains relevant 
as there are several parties to the Moon Agreement and the number is steadily 
increasing. Further, those State Parties to the Moon Agreement have an obligation to 
establish an international regime when space resource activities become feasible, 
which could potentially have implications for the unity of space law. ‘Fragmentation’ 
of space law, as with international law in general, is something to be avoided. 
4.4 UNCLOS 
 
UNCLOS was negotiated around the same time as the Moon Agreement and can help 
provide useful context for Article 11. Further, the seabed mining regime laid out in 
UNCLOS is a useful model for consideration for application to outer space, with or 
without the Moon Agreement. Therefore, while UNCLOS does not apply to outer 
space, it is important to examine its provisions on resources. There are several different 
aspects of resource governance under the law of the sea. The seabed mining regime is 
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certainly worth examining given its obvious value as an analogous regime to space 
resources. An overview of the Law of the Sea will be undertaken first before 
examining the specific analogy of seabed mining, and the Common Heritage of 
Mankind principle. 
“The freedom of the open sea has never meant unregulated lawlessness.”449 And today 
the high seas are regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)450 which enjoys near universal accession451 and even the prime hold out, 
the United States, recognizes its validity generally, particularly as a codification of 
pre-existing customary international law.452 UNCLOS divides the ocean into five 
categories: internal waters, territorial seas, archipelagic waters, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the high seas. The EEZ and the high seas are what is mainly 
relevant for this enquiry however, the territorial sea will also be considered. The 
breadth of the territorial sea is set at 12 miles but the EEZ can be extended out to 200 
miles from the coast (there are specific rules for how to do this but as they are not 
relevant, they will not be outlined here.) UNCLOS also created the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 
UNCLOS was negotiated at approximately the same time as the Moon Agreement and 
there was ‘cross fertilization’ of many ideas, particularly surrounding mining of the 
high seas seabed.453 However, UNCLOS goes into considerably more detail than 
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Article 11 of the Moon Agreement and while both treaties contain the phrase 
‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ and declare the resources of their respective areas to 
be such,454 they are separate treaties for separate spheres of international law and 
therefore need to be considered separately (i.e. the definition of Common Heritage of 
Mankind in UNCLOS does not necessarily impact the definition in the Moon 
Agreement.) However, UNCLOS initially shared a similar fate to that of the Moon 
Agreement and for similar reasons as the developed countries objected to the 
technology and benefits sharing provisions of UNCLOS as well as a general unease 
with the Common Heritage of Mankind principle.455 However, unlike the Moon 
Agreement, UNCLOS was rescued from failure by the Implementation Agreement of 
1994 which smoothed the way for the industrialised states to ratify it as it modified 
the objectional sections of Part XI456, and as a result UNCLOS received sufficient 
ratifications and became effective on 16 November 1994 (having been opened for 
signature on 10 December 1982).457 UNLCOS now has 168 parties,458 with the most 
notable exception being the United States (although the US has signed the 
Implementation Agreement). 459  
4.4.1 Seabed Mining and the ‘Area’ 
 
Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention discusses seabed mining. It establishes ‘the 
Area’ which encompasses the seabed of the high seas. “The limits of the Area are the 
seaward limit of the continental shelf in the legal sense.”460 And this is “determined 
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by each State in conformity with international law.”461 The International Seabed 
Authority does not have the power to affect the limits of the area. 
Prior to UNCLOS III the view had been that the legal status of seabed resources would 
either be divided among costal states along the lines of the continental shelf, or 
resources would be res communis or res nullius. Any of those would disadvantage 
developing states, especially those without coasts. So Common Heritage of Mankind 
was introduced as a way to fairly distribute benefits of seabed resources. This 
“principle had been already introduced into space law, the LOSC established a more 
advanced mechanism.”462  UNCLOS also stipulates that activities in the Area shall be 
carried out for the benefit of humanity as a whole463 and that the Authority shall 
provide equitable sharing of financial or economic benefits from Seabed resources.464 
Tanaka argues that the Common Heritage of Mankind principle and benefits sharing 
are “intimately intertwined.”465 
Within UNCLOS “all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a 
whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act by virtue of Article 137(2)”466 and 
Article 133(a) defines ‘resources’ as ‘all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources’ in 
situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed and this includes polymetallic nodules.467 As 
with outer space, appropriation of the ‘Area’ is prohibited, however unlike space law 
UNCLOS also stipulates that appropriation of its resources are also prohibited except 
for under the supervision of the ‘Authority’. Therefore, as Tanaka stipulates “the Area 
must be distinguished from res communis.”468 
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Article 153(1) says that all the activities in the Area “shall be organised, carried out 
and controlled by the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole.”469 ‘Activities in the 
Area’ means all activities of exploration for and exploitation of, the resources of the 
Area. This includes “the recovery of minerals from the seabed and their lifting to the 
water surface” and essentially everything else.470 
Only activities connected with the exploration and exploitation of the Area’s mineral 
resources require permission of the Authority, activities unconnected with such 
endeavours do not require such permission. The Authority has broad jurisdiction but 
only over the ‘Area’ and resources activities conducted within the Area. The Authority 
also has jurisdiction over all natural and legal persons conducted resource activities 
within the Area and has the power to sanction non-compliance. All operators in the 
Area must gain approval from the Authority. The Authority can carry out mining 
operations itself via the Enterprise, however the Enterprise has never been established. 
When applying for permission to conduct operations the operational area requested 
has to be able to support two viable mining operations. The Authority designates part 
of this as a reserve area for the Enterprise or developing states and allows the applicant 
to operate in the remaining area. Many industrialized states refused to accept 
provisions of Part XI in particular, and therefore did not ratify the convention. In order 
to address this lack of ratification the 1994 ‘Implementation Agreement’ was created. 
The ‘Implementation Agreement’ modified Part XI of the LOSC, to move it towards 
a more market orientated approach to accommodate concerns of the industrialised 
states. One such modification is the removal of the mandatory transfer of 
technology.471 UNCLOS represents a potential solution to the issues faced by space 
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resources, an International Seabed Authority for space would have the jurisdictional 
authority to grant the certainty desired, at least to those party to the agreement. Further, 
while it would be natural for it to be established under Article 11 of the Moon 
Agreement there is no reason that it could not be a separate agreement independent of 
the Moon Agreement. However, as will be argued elsewhere in this work, it is 
premature to establish such a formal institution. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The Outer Space Treaty proves the foundational framework from which the entire 
space governance regime emanates. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the key 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in order to be able to discuss property rights 
given that all of the potential issues stem from the Outer Space Treaty. While it is 
arguable that customary international law recognized outer space as res communis 
rather than res nullius it is the Outer Space Treaty that codified that reality and 
therefore it is central to this enquiry to understand what it means. The Moon 
Agreement, specifically Article 11 is also looked at because it directly addresses space 
resources although as argued its actual relevance is limited given the low number of 
participants, but it does pose a potential threat to the unity of space law if the parties 
to the Moon Agreement opt to create a framework under Article 11 separately from 
whatever develops as a result of actions taken by those states which are only party to 
the Outer Space Treaty. This risk is exacerbated if further states, like the Russian 
Federation, join the Moon Agreement. 
The key objective of this chapter was to examine the definition of ‘use’ in Article I 
OST. This chapter makes the argument that, as indicated by the preamble, part of the 
‘object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty is to facilitate the use and development 
of outer space. This when combined with a ‘plain ordinary’ reading of ‘use’ in Article 
Page 139 of 342 
I OST supports a broad interpretation of the ‘term’ use, which would fit space resource 
activities within it. This is further supported by the travaux preparatoires as argued in 
this chapter. Therefore this chapter argues that space resource activities fall within the 
scope of the freedom of use as enumerated by Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, 
however this is subject to a few limitations such as the non-appropriation principle 
codified in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.  
Article II is a fundamental aspect of space law and enjoys broad support. As this 
chapter argues it applies to non-governmental actors by virtue of Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty, although the obligation to ensure compliance rests on the state 
responsible for that non-governmental actor. Regarding the meaning of ‘national 
appropriation’, this article makes the case that national appropriation should be 
interpreted to mean ‘the acquisition, in whole or in part, of outer space, the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, for the exclusive use of the State or its nationals.’ However, as 
evidenced by ‘orbital slots’ prolonged use does not amount to appropriation. The 
provision is intended to apply to acquisition of territory or property rights over land. 
This chapter also makes the argument, supported by Chapter Nine that the application 
of Article II to space resources has developed, even if non-appropriation did apply to 
extracted resources there is growing acceptance, albeit not yet sufficiently crystallised 
to be described as a customary norm, that resources once removed from the celestial 
body are appropriable. This is further supported by the object and purpose of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which as argued above is to facilitate the use and development of outer 
space. Resources are needed for that. Finally, the debates during the negotiation of the 
Outer Space Treaty clearly indicated that the intention was Article II ensures that 
activities do not give rise to sovereign rights over territory not that the article should 
prohibit activity. 
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With regards to Article VI this chapter explains how this ties non-state actors to the 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, albeit via the state that is ‘responsible’ for 
‘authorising and supervising’ their activities. The space resources legislation of the 
United States and Luxembourg need to be viewed through the prism of Article VI as 
those pieces of national legislation provide a mechanism for those countries to 
undertake that ‘authorisation and supervision.’ 
Article VIII is also discussed as jurisdiction is an important aspect of this enquiry. This 
chapter makes the argument that jurisdiction in space operates on a quasi-territorial 
basis over objects and on a personal basis over personnel. Further, Article VIII 
confirms that an object being in space does not have its ownership status changed by 
virtue of its being in outer space. 
The chapter also examines Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, though as mentioned 
while this directly addresses space resources given the low take-up of the treaty it is 
of limited relevance. However, it does have the potential to spur a ‘fragmentation’ of 
the space law framework if the Moon Agreement states and the OST states diverge in 
their approaches. It also looked at the relevant provisions of UNCLOS as a point of 
comparison as well as a potential model for a space resources governance framework. 
The primary contribution of this chapter is the finding that ‘use’ is a broad freedom 
under the Outer Space Treaty that has scope to permit space resource activities. 
Secondly, that the territorial nature of Article II allows scope for the acquisition of 
ownership of resources once they have been extracted from the celestial body they 
have originated in.  These have been core questions regarding space resources, as 
argued in this chapter and elsewhere in this work are in the process of being resolved 
by the international community. 
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The next chapter examines the concept of ‘celestial body’ which is important as it 
speaks to the scope of application of the Outer Space Treaty which applies to Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Further, it has been suggested 
that certain asteroids might be ‘too small’ to be classified as celestial bodies and 
therefore not be subject to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty thus being free for 
appropriation. However, as will be argued in the next chapter, this is not the case. 
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Chapter Five: 
What is a Celestial Body? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the Outer Space Treaty, and Article 11 of the Moon 
Agreement. The Outer Space Treaty provides the foundational framework for space 
governance and applies to outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
As discussed in the previous chapter while the freedom of use declared in Article I 
OST provides scope for space resource activities this freedom is limited by, among 
other things, the non-appropriation principle which stipulates that outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies cannot be appropriated. This chapter 
will determine what exactly is meant by ‘celestial bodies.’ 
The term ‘celestial bodies’ is used frequently in the treaties and throughout the 
secondary literature, yet there is no clear, established, agreed upon definition of the 
term. The term ‘celestial bodies’ was used in the very first work on space law, written 
by Vladimir Mandl in 1932 and was subsequently used in later writings during the 
1950s and ‘60s.472 It was also used in several of the UN General Assembly 
resolutions473 relating to space passed at the opening of the ‘space race’ and in the 
Outer Space Treaty and later Moon Agreement. However, despite using the term and 
its incorporation within the full title of both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon 
Agreement no definition of the term ‘celestial bodies’ is provided in either treaty. This 
is, as has been noted by Stephan Hobe, odd for both a UN treaty of a general nature 
and, in the case of the Outer Space Treaty, the first treaty to deal with outer space.474 
 
472Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies’ (n 4), 33 
473UNGA Res 1721 (XVI) (20 December 1961) UN Doc A/A987; UNGA Res 1962 (n 211); UNGA 
Res 1963 (XVIII) (13 December 1963) 
474Stephan Hobe, ‘Article 1’ in Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 
Cologne Commentary on Space Law, vol 1 (1st edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009), 29  
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This issue needs to be addressed as the definition of the term could potentially affect 
which naturally occurring space objects are subject to the terms of the Outer Space 
Treaty, and specifically which fall under the prohibition on national appropriation laid 
out in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. If a naturally occurring space object is not 
a celestial body, then it may not fall under that prohibition. If asteroids, or even certain 
asteroids, are for example, not celestial bodies, at least in the legal sense as meant by 
the treaties, then they would be free for appropriation. 
This chapter will take an in-depth examination of the definition of a celestial body. 
First it will look at what space law scholars have already said on the topic, before 
taking a look at what the space law treaties actually say and examining those terms in 
light of the travaux preparatoires. However, as in line with the VCLT, the main focus 
is on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the treaty terms, taking the dictionary definition as a 
primary guide as to ‘ordinary meaning’. Though, as it is sometimes appropriate to 
consider specialist or scientific definitions of terms, this chapter will then examine the 
scientific definition of the term celestial body. This is particularly useful as it could be 
possible for space law to create a new definition or even to categorize celestial bodies 
in a future space resources framework. However, the findings of this chapter would 
suggest that this would not be a prudent course of action. Finally, the chapter will 
examine ‘legal’ approaches to defining or categorizing celestial bodies, building on 
the work of Fasan and Pop. This essentially boils down to categorizing celestial bodies 
by virtue of size or their ability to be moved by human intervention. However, the 
argument ultimately made by this chapter is that celestial bodies as used in the space 
law treaties apply to all naturally occurring objects in outer space regardless of their 
ability to be moved by human intervention or their size. Further, it makes the case that 
Page 144 of 342 
regardless of the merits of any future legal categorization of celestial bodies it is 
premature to do so on the basis of existing planetary science. 
5.2 Defining a Celestial Body 
The issue of the lack of a definition has not gone unnoticed by space law scholars. 
Fabio Tronchetti asserts that the phrase ‘celestial bodies’ includes asteroids and the 
Moon475 but in his discussion of the legal status of celestial bodies in the Handbook of 
Space Law he makes no attempt to define the term ‘celestial body’ and is more 
interested in the legal status of resources than in the legal status or definition of 
‘celestial bodies’ themselves.476 Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen argued that the term 
‘celestial bodies’ has not yet been legally defined, and that even the category of 
‘planet’ is far from being concretely established.477 Ernst Fasan says that the legal 
status of the Moon is quite clear as it is specifically mentioned in the treaties, and that 
it is similarly clear that the planets are, at least in the legal sense, ‘celestial bodies’. He 
goes on to question whether altering the orbit of an asteroid would constitute ‘use’ as 
defined and permitted by the treaties, and whether an asteroid that is hollowed out and 
turned into a giant space station would remain a ‘celestial body’ or would it become a 
‘space object’? Fasan says, speaking of the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty in regard 
to ‘celestial bodies’, that “obviously they had substantial natural objects in mind.” 
Fasan broadly agrees with Working Group Three of the International Institute of Space 
Law in defining ‘celestial bodies’ as natural objects that cannot be moved from their 
natural orbits.478 
 
475Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Private Property Rights on Asteroid Resources: Assessing the Legality of the 
ASTEROIDS Act’ (2014) 30 Space Policy 193, 194 
476Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization’ (n 16), 777-778 
477Lyall and Larsen, Space Law (n 18), 175-176 
478Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies’ (n 4), 38-40  
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Virgiliu Pop has argued that the lack of a legal definition of ‘celestial bodies’ provides 
a potential way to circumvent the non-appropriation principle of Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty by declaring asteroids and comets as not being ‘celestial bodies’ and 
therefore not falling under the purview of the Outer Space Treaty479, Pop does not 
address the fact that even if these bodies are not, legally speaking, ‘celestial bodies’ 
they are still in outer space. 
Pop raises the questions as to the whether all astronomical objects are ‘things’ or 
‘celestial objects’ in the legal sense? And does that even include quasars in distant 
galaxies? He points out that the Outer Space Treaty provides no spatial limitation, 
whereas the Moon Agreement limits its application to this solar system, which Pop 
argues is a reasonable limitation to adopt.480 
Pop also discusses the possible methods for legally defining what constitutes a 
celestial body. Pop discusses four approaches, which he refers to as the spatialist 
approach, the control approach, the functionalist approach and the ‘space object 
approach’, all of which will be discussed in greater detail below. Ultimately Pop feels 
that it will be customary international law derived from actual practice that resolves 
the issue of the legal definition of ‘celestial bodies.’481  
Ricky J. Lee proposes two potential regimes for determining what legally speaking 
constitutes a celestial body, one based on the existence or absence of a human 
economic value, and one based on the existence of a solid surface for the landing of 
space vehicles. He also discusses the position advocated by Fasan that a celestial body 
is any natural object that cannot be artificially moved by humans as well as discussing 
the potential of classifying natural objects based on their size. Though he highlights 
 
479Pop, 'A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...'  (n 5); Pop, Who Owns the Moon? 
(n 5), 58 
480Pop, 'A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...'  (n 5) 
481Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 51-58 
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that the ever changing definitions of what bodies humans have an interest in and those 
that we are able to move would create an unwanted uncertainty in the legal definition 
of ‘celestial bodies’.482 
5.3 Treaty Term 
‘Celestial bodies’ is a term that is frequently used in the space treaties. With the 
exception of the last four articles (which deal with ratification of and withdrawal from 
the treaty), each article of the Outer Space Treaty uses the phrase ‘outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies.” The full title of the treaty also includes 
‘celestial bodies’ within it, it is quite clear that ‘celestial bodies’ are included within 
the scope of application of the Outer Space Treaty, despite there being no definition 
of that term. The Moon Agreement also fails to provide a definition of the term 
‘celestial bodies’ despite Article 1 of the Moon Agreement also including ‘celestial 
bodies’ within the scope of application of the treaty, along with its primary focus, the 
Moon.  However, it is important to note that initially the Moon Agreement was limited 
in application to just the Moon, the expansion of the treaty’s scope to include ‘other 
celestial bodies’ happened at the last minute.483 
In the UN resolution establishing the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS), only the term outer space was used, there was no specific mention 
of either the Moon or celestial bodies.484 The resolution passed in the following year, 
UNGA Resolution 1472, which established COPUOS as a permanent body also only 
mentioned outer space.485 It was not until 1961 that the phrase ‘celestial bodies’ was 
used in a UN document, specifically UNGA Resolution 1721.486 
 
482Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining (n 10), 187-191 
483Cheng, Studies In International Space Law (n 195), 362-363 
484UNGA Res 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958) 
485UNGA Res 1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959) 
486UNGA Res 1721 (n 473) 
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It is clear from the Travaux Preparatoires of the Outer Space Treaty that the notion 
that the term ‘celestial bodies’ included the moon and the planets was both generally 
accepted and uncontroversial.487 The phrases ‘the Moon and other celestial bodies’ 
and ‘outer space and celestial bodies’ are frequently used interchangeably, again 
indicating that the Moon is a celestial body like any other, although it was often 
regarded as worth special, specific mention though not a distinct legal 
categorization.488  
The position of the United States and the Soviet Union was not particularly far from 
one another on this point, the initial US draft proposal was simply called the ‘celestial 
bodies treaty’489, although later draft proposals titles included ‘the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies’490 whereas the USSR treaty proposal included the full phrase ‘outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies’491 that was incorporated in the 
final text of the treaty. The United States eventually gave way and accepted the 
inclusion of the term ‘outer space.’ None of the draft proposals included a definition 
of either the terms ‘outer space’ or ‘celestial bodies.’ 
 
 
 
487United Nations General Assembly ‘Letter Dated 9 May 1966 from the Permanent Representative of 
the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General’ (10 
May 1966) UN Doc A/6327; United Nations General Assembly ‘Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the Provisional Agenda of the Twenty-first 
Session’ (31 May 1966) UN Doc A/6341 
488United Nations General Assembly ‘Letter Dated 4 October 1966 from the Representative of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General’ (5 October 1966) UN Doc 
A/6352/REV.1; UNCOPUOS ‘United States of America – Draft Treaty Governing the 
Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (11 July 1966) UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/L.12 
489UNCOPUOS, ‘Letter Dated 16 June 1966 From the Permanent Representative of the United States 
of America addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ 
(17 June 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/32 
490UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.12 (n 488) 
491UN Doc A/6352/REV.1 (n 488); UNCOPUOS ‘Letter Dated 11 July 1966 Addressed to the 
Chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee By the Representatives of the USSR’ (11 July 1966) 
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.13 
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5.3.1 The Ordinary Meaning of ‘Celestial Body’ 
The term celestial body does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary, requiring 
an examination of its component parts. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
defines ‘celestial’ as something “positioned in or relating to the sky or outer space”492, 
with ‘space’ being defined as the area beyond the Earth’s atmosphere containing all 
of the planets, stars, galaxies, in short the rest of the universe.493 The term ‘body’ is 
defined by Oxford as “the main or central part of something, a mass or a collection.”494 
From this it is reasonable to regard the ‘dictionary definition’ of the term ‘celestial 
body’ as ‘the main or central part of a naturally occurring mass that is located beyond 
the Earth’s atmosphere.’  
Recourse can be made to dictionaries to find the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms, even 
specialist dictionaries, and indeed the courts have done so. However, it must be 
remembered that the dictionary definition, even if abundantly clear, still needs to be 
check against the object and purpose of the treaty as well as its context.495  The object 
and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty, was broadly to foster greater international 
cooperation in space, particularly scientific exploration and use of outer space, the 
Moon and other celestial bodies496, as well as forestall a ‘colonial land grab’ in outer 
space.497 Lyndon Johnson, then President of the United States, viewed the Outer Space 
Treaty primarily as an arms control treaty498, however while the treaty does prohibit 
the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on the Moon and other 
 
492Concise OED (n 58), 228 
493Ibid, 1381 
494Ibid, 154 
495Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 186-189 
496Outer Space Treaty (n 1), Preamble 
497Blount and Robison ‘One Small Step’ (n 390), 164-169; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth (n 
55), 187 
498McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth (n 55), 177-194, 420; Cheng, Studies In International Space 
Law (n 195), 215; Robert Dallek, ‘Johnson, Project Apollo and the Politics of Space Program 
Planning’ in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy eds., Spaceflight and the Myth of 
Presidential Leadership (University of Illinois Press 1997), 81 
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celestial bodies and prohibit “the establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military 
manoeuvres on celestial bodies”499 it is not the primary focus of the treaty itself as 
evidenced by the fact that these issues are concentrated in a single article. Additionally, 
it is worth considering scope of the treaty. The Outer Space Treaty applies to ‘outer 
space’ in addition to the Moon and other celestial bodies. There is no definition of 
‘outer space’ provided by the treaty, however the Moon Agreement does limit itself to 
application in the solar system.500 The lack of such a limitation in the Outer Space 
Treaty suggests a broader application, furthermore, if one is going to argue a broader 
understanding of such terms as ‘use’ then that broad interpretation needs to be adopted 
for the rest of the treaty unless there is a specific reason to do otherwise. This therefore 
endorses a broad interpretation of the term ‘celestial body’ to include any naturally 
occurring mass that is ‘located beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.’ 
5.4 Scientific Definitions 
Given the lack of definitions provided by the treaties it is useful to consider the 
definitions provided by the scientific community. However, the definitions of 
astronomical terms as provided by the scientific community are not necessarily the 
best definitions to use in order to construct a legal regime. Not only can the meaning 
of the term change, but the object in question can shift categories over time, therefore 
inviting uncertainty somewhat defeating the purpose of a legal definition. 
Furthermore, while scientific bodies such as the International Astronomical Union 
(IAU) are influential their categorizations have no legal authority. 
Regarding the value of scientific facts as a source of space law, Jenks wrote that  
 
499Outer Space Treaty (n 1), Article IV 
500Moon Agreement (n 2), Article 1(1) 
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scientific facts and evidence of acquiescence, both of which bulk 
largely in the literature of space law, should not be regarded as 
independent sources of legal obligation the significance and weight of 
which in space law calls for special appraisal, but as important, and in 
the case of the scientific facts vital, considerations within this accepted 
framework of legal obligation governing international relations 
generally.501 
 
However, it is still worth considering the opinions of the scientific community. The 
main focus will be on ‘minor bodies’ such as asteroids and comets, however it is worth 
remembering that the space treaties use a fairly sweeping category of ‘other celestial 
bodies’, the Moon is the only celestial body that is specified in any of the space treaties, 
furthermore the Moon Agreement was initially going to be limited in application to 
just the Moon.502 There will be a discussion about planets and moon, however their 
status as ‘celestial bodies’ generates little controversy (with the notable exception of 
the dwarf planets such as Pluto and Ceres) and therefore needs less attention. The 
operative question is whether or not ‘asteroids’ are ‘celestial bodies’ within the 
meaning of the space treaties. 
5.4.1 Planets 
The planets in our solar system come in two ‘varieties;’ the ‘terrestrial’ inner planets 
(Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars) and the ‘giant’ outer planets (Jupiter, Saturn, 
Uranus and Neptune). All the planets are on roughly the same orbital plane and orbit 
the sun in the same direction.503 The term ‘planet’ however had never been properly 
defined504, indeed asteroids used to be called ‘minor planets’ however this is now 
 
501Jenks, Space Law (n 34), 183 
502Stephan Hobe and Fabio Tronchetti ‘Article 1 (Scope of Application)’ in Stephan Hobe, Bernhard 
Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Peter Stubbe eds., Cologne Commentary on Space Law, 
vol 2 (1st edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2013), 35 
503David A. Rothery Planets: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010), 9-11 
504Ibid, 16  
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considered to be an outdated term.505 Then in 2006, the IAU developed a definition.506 
The IAU declared: 
that a ‘planet’ is defined as a celestial body that (a) is in orbit around 
the Sun, (b) has sufficient mass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid 
body forces so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round) 
shape, and (c) has cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit.507 
 
They also created the concept of a ‘dwarf planet’: 
 
(2) A "dwarf planet" is a celestial body that (a) is in orbit around the 
Sun, (b) has sufficient mass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid body 
forces so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round) 
shape, (c) has not cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit, and (d)is 
not a satellite.508  
  
And that all other objects, with the exception of satellites, “orbiting the Sun shall be 
referred to collectively as ‘Small Solar System Bodies.’”509 
5.4.2 Moons 
 
First when discussing moons, is the need to differentiate between the Moon and 
moon(s), the Moon is the one in orbit of the Earth and is specifically mentioned in the 
space treaties (‘outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies’). The Moon is a 
substantial body and “if the Moon were to orbit the Sun independently there is no 
doubt that it would be ranked among the ‘terrestrial planets’.”510 The Moon has been 
called the Moon for as long as it is possible to trace in Germanic languages.511 
Moon(s) are “smaller bodies close enough to orbit the planet rather than the Sun.”512 
Or put another way “planets go round the Sun, and moons go round their planets…”513 
 
505The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 60, 312  
506Rothery Planets (n 503), 16 
507‘IAU 2006 General Assembly: Result of the IAU Resolution Votes’ (International Astronomical 
Union 24 August 2006) <https://www.iau.org/news/pressreleases/detail/iau0603/> accessed 
10 January 2020 
508International Astronomical Union ‘Resolution B5: Definition of a Planet in the Solar System’ 
<https://www.iau.org/static/resolutions/Resolution_GA26-5-6.pdf> accessed 10 January 2020 
509Ibid, (3)  
510David A. Rothery Moons: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2015), 17 
511Ibid, 17 
512Rothery Planets (n 503), 11-12 
513Rothery Moons (n 510), 15 
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However, due to the effect of their parent’s gravity anything in orbit around a moon is 
inherently unstable therefore no moon has a moon.514 
There are several broad categories of moons: 
Inner moonlets – “mostly less than a few tens of kilometres in radius 
and irregular in shape. They are closely associated with the planet’s 
ring system and their orbits are circular, lie in the planet’s equatorial 
plane, and have radii less than about three times that of the planet 
itself.”515 
 
Large regular satellites – exceed 200 km in radius “which is large 
enough for their own gravity to have pulled them into near-spherical 
shapes, a condition described as ‘hydrostatic equilibrium’. Their orbits 
are only slightly less circular than those of the inner moonlets, and have 
radii up to twenty or thirty times that of the planet. These too lie pretty 
close to the planet of the planet’s equator.”516 
 
Irregular satellites – “mostly less than a few tens of kilometres in 
radius. The term refers both to their irregularity in shape and to their 
orbits which can be strongly elliptical and are usually considerably 
inclined relative to the planet’s equator. They extend to about 400 times 
the radius of Jupiter and Saturn, over 800 times the radius of Uranus, 
and nearly 2,000 times the radius of Neptune.”517 
 
The origins of moons can be quite diverse and the exact origins of the Moon are still 
up for debate, there are several theories, the theory of widest acceptance currently is 
that if formed after the impact of Earth with another body.518 However, irregular 
satellites are believed to be fragmented asteroids, small asteroids or comet nuclei and 
some of Saturn’s moons may be remains of a larger moon as may Neptune’s moon 
Nereid. Another of Neptune’s moons, Triton, is possibly a captured ‘Kuiper belt 
object.’ 519 Mars has two small rocky irregular moons, they have very low densities 
 
514Ibid, 15-16 
515Ibid, 60 
516Ibid, 60 
517Ibid, 60-61 
518Ibid, 42-44 
519Ibid, 69, 73-76 
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and are probably loose ‘rubble piles’ like many asteroids with low densities, they 
resemble asteroids in spectroscopic analysis.520 
In addition to ‘moons’ the gas giants also have ring systems, Saturn’s is the most 
spectacular however Saturn’s rings as a whole contain less mass than its smallest 
moon, Mimas. The rings are mostly water ice and are made from “chunks ranging 
from about one centimetre to five metres in size. Each such chunk is in orbit about the 
planet. It would be perverse to regard every one of them as a moon, though there is no 
agreed lower size limit for what can be called a moon.”521 
While moons do not have moons small solar system bodies do have moons, as of 2015 
there are 184 asteroids known to have moons522 and there are various objects beyond 
Neptune which also have moons.523 “…only comets are devoid of known moons.”524 
5.4.3 Small Solar System Bodies: Asteroids and Comets 
 
After planets and moons are ‘small solar system bodies’ which essentially divide into 
asteroids and comets, although as will be demonstrated the difference and division 
between the two is less than absolute. However, as David A. Rothery has written:  
Although planetary scientists have come to realize that the boundaries 
are somewhat blurred, these ‘junk’ objects can be divided into three 
broad classes: asteroids, trans-Neptunian objects, and comets.525 
 
An asteroid can be defined as “one of the small planetary bodies (also known as minor 
planets or planetoids) that mainly, but not exclusively, populate the region of the solar 
system between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter.”526 The first asteroid discovered was 
Ceres, at first it was assumed to be yet another planet, albeit a small one.527 Ceres is 
 
520Ibid, 115-116 
521Ibid, 79-80 
522Ibid, 124 
523Ibid, 12-13 
524Ibid, 123 
525Rothery Planets (n 503), 13 
526The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 303 
527Ibid, 57 
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now classified as a dwarf planet alongside the likes of Pluto and Eris. 528 However, 
Ceres is also an ‘asteroid.’ Just as Pluto and Eris are also ‘Trans-Neptunian Objects.’529 
A comet is a ‘small solar system body’ with a highly eccentric orbit, that goes from 
periods close to the sun to often far out into the reaches of the solar system. The 
comet’s core is generally just a chunk of dusty ice only a few kilometres across.530 
Comets when: 
…approaching the sun to within about the orbit of Mars, may grow one 
or more tails, that can be tens or hundreds of millions of kilometres 
long. It will die when its volatiles are exhausted. There are several 
documented cases of comets whose activity has died, leaving a dark, 
inert body of asteroidal appearance.531 
 
Beyond Neptune, small icy bodies become common, these object form what is known 
as the ‘Kuiper Belt.’ Together with ‘Scattered Disk’ objects these make up the ‘trans-
Neptunian objects’ (TNOs) which have a mass “200 times that of the asteroid belt 
(one-fifth of an Earth-mass), and in total there may be nearly 100,000 bodies more 
than 100 kilometres in size.” Pluto and Eris are both ‘Dwarf Planets’ and Trans-
Neptunian objects.532 
However, given that the space resources industry, as well as this enquiry, are focusing 
on asteroids, the asteroids will be the focus of this section. Although it is also worth 
remembering that astronomical terms themselves are vague and “any small sized body 
orbiting the Sun could be defined as an asteroid.”533 Furthermore, the core or nuclei 
of a comet may over time become what would be classified as an asteroid as it is baked 
and stripped of its icy exterior by the Sun.534 Indeed, “some near-Earth objects are 
 
528Rothery Planets (n 503), 101 
529Ibid, 16  
530Ibid, 15  
531William Napier, ‘Hazards from Comets and Asteroids’ in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic (eds), 
Global Catastrophic Risks (Oxford University Press 2012), 226 
532Rothery Planets (n 503), 14-15  
533The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 72 
534Lewis Asteroid Mining 101 (n 83), 32; Rothery Planets (n 503),  15 
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probably defunct comets with remnant water-ice surviving beneath their dusty 
surfaces.”535 
“Asteroids range downwards in size from 950 kilometres across (the diameter of 
Ceres, the largest example), with no lower limit.”536 While they were once assumed to 
be the remains of a destroyed planet they are now thought of as having never been part 
of a planet and the total mass of all asteroids is calculated at being less than a 
thousandth of the mass of Earth. Most asteroids orbit in the ‘main belt’ between Mars 
and Jupiter, some do come closer towards the Sun and some do orbit beyond Saturn.537 
“Asteroids are not strongly coloured, but can be grouped into several classes according 
to their reflectance spectrum.”538 
There are three main types of asteroids: stony, carbonaceous and metallic; these divide 
into 24 subtypes of asteroid and 34 subtypes of meteorites. There are several different, 
overlapping classification systems for asteroids and meteorites, based on different 
methods of analysis and observation. Asteroid size is determined based on how much 
sunlight is either absorbed (near-infrared) or reflected (optical) and size only allows 
us roughly define an asteroids mass given the variation in asteroid density. Further 
complication is added by the fact that groups of asteroids such as the Near-Earth 
Asteroids or Trojans etc are identified not by size or composition but the location of 
their obit within the solar system.539 
A Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) or Near Earth Object (NEO), again highlighting the 
ambiguity, is one whose orbit is smaller than 1.3 AU.540 There are approximately 5000 
known NEOs, and their orbital parameters are not constant, NEOs can move over time 
 
535Rothery Planets (n 503), 108 
536Ibid, 13 
537Ibid, 13-14 
538Ibid, 103 
539Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ (n 82), 81-129, 88-98 
540Shepard, Asteroids (n 83), 16  
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due to the gravitational influence of other solar system bodies.541 NEOs are primarily 
asteroids but there are comets among them. There are 20,000 NEOs larger than 100m 
diameter and over 10 million larger than 20m diameter. Martin Elvis notes that the 
data available on NEOs and asteroids more generally is very limited.542 
Different, overlapping classification systems for asteroids and meteorites, exist. 
Spectrographic tools are not yet sophisticated or accurate enough to form a clear 
picture, not for commercial purposes and certainly not to form the basis of a legal 
regime.  NEOs are categorized by orbit not size or composition. Asteroid size is 
determined based on how much sunlight is either absorbed (near-infrared) or reflected 
(optical). Size only roughly defines mass given variation in asteroid density.543 
Determining an asteroid’s size, mass and density, is hard and does not provide a firm 
enough basis for legal system of classification.544 Spectrometric are observations not 
reliable to commercial standard, for example, Mikael Granvick et al state that M-class 
asteroids were thought to be primarily Iron (Fe) and Nickel (Ni) but it turns out that 
they have much more silicate content that was thought545 
As N.E. Bowles and others state in a recent paper arguing the case for the need for a 
mission to survey the ‘main belt’: 
Our understanding of the composition of asteroids is still very limited: 
Broad ‘spectral types’ are defined based on the shape of spectra, 
usually in only the visible wavelength range, but only a few thousand 
of the larger asteroids (from a total population of billions) have been 
observed. The fundamental connection between these asteroid 
observations and the laboratory samples we have (meteorites) is 
approximate and only partially understood.546 
 
541The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 190-197-199 
542Elvis, 'How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?'  (n 101), 20-21 
543Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ (n 82), 81-129, 88-98 
544Mikko Kaasalainen and Josef Durech, ‘What’s Out There? Asteroid Models for Target Selection and 
Mission Planning’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy and Material 
Resources (Springer 2013), 131-150; Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ (n 82), 87-88 
545Mikael Granvick et al, ‘Earth’s Temporarily-Captured Natural Satellites – The First Steps Towards 
Utilization of Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy and 
Material Resources (Springer 2013), 151 
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The best way to measure an asteroid mass is sending a spacecraft close to it547, and 
with the exception of the largest asteroids, spacecraft surveys will be the only way to 
determine composition of asteroid, and to date spacecraft have only visited 12 
asteroids. Additionally, more detailed compositional information can be measured 
from samples, mainly meteorites but also a small amount from sample return 
missions.548 As far as composition is concerned: 
The majority of smaller asteroids examined to date show evidence 
(from morphology, shape and density measurements) of ‘rubble-pile’ 
structure, although there is a population of asteroids with (partially) 
differentiated interiors and higher densities. 549 
 
However, and at least for ‘main belt asteroids’, their ‘parent’ body was probably hot 
enough to cause enough internal heating to give rise to differentiation which means 
that the remaining fragments (todays asteroids) will have different compositions 
(including metallic iron from the core).550 
5.5 Legal Definitions 
As stated above the treaties fail to provide a definition of the term ‘celestial bodies.’ 
This has contributed to the lack of a legal definition of the term. Stephan Hobe has 
suggested that this was in fact deliberate, that the drafters of the treaties deliberately 
left terms undefined out of a “general fear that too many definitions would bear the 
risk of the agreement being outdated easily.”551 However, given the rising interest in 
asteroid mining from the likes of Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, 
among others, it is now time to provide a clear legal definition of what is and is not a 
celestial body. 
 
547Elvis, 'How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?'  (n 101), 21; Martin Elvis and Thomas Esty, 'How Many 
Assay Probes To Find One Ore-Bearing Asteroid?' (2014) 96 Acta Astronautica 227, 227  
548Bowles et al, ‘CASTAway’ (n 106), 2003-5 
549Ibid, 2005 
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Most of the debate has focused on the legal status of outer space and celestial bodies 
as opposed to providing a definition of the terms. Ernst Fasan was the first to address 
the question of the definition of celestial bodies but Virgiliu Pop has expanded upon 
the topic in the greatest detail, Ricky J. Lee has also addressed the issue but Pop 
remains the leading authority. 
5.5.1 Pop’s Four Approaches 
Pop has argued that there are four approaches to defining celestial bodies. His four 
approaches are; the ‘spatialist approach’ which would categorize naturally occurring 
objects based on their size; the ‘control approach’ which would categorize an object 
based on the ability of humans to move it; the ‘functionalist approach’ would 
differentiate between objects treated as celestial bodies and those simply being used 
as moveable orebodies; the ‘space object’ approach arises out of the discussion of the 
possibility of converting asteroids into spaceships, and would allow for converted 
asteroids to be registered as ‘space objects.’552 
Pop writes that “a spatialist approach would define celestial bodies as objects over a 
certain size, while objects under that size would not be celestial bodies.”553 The issue 
would then become at what size does something become a celestial body? Pop goes 
on to argue that in the absence of a natural boundary the law can set a conventional 
boundary. He uses the analogy of the age of adulthood in support of this proposition, 
as well as referencing the delimitation between territorial seas and international waters 
found in the law of the sea. He argues that the law of the sea initially utilized a control 
approach which eventually evolved into a spatial approach and now utilizes a 
functionalist approach. He also uses the sea analogy to demonstrate that legally 
 
552Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 51-57 
553Ibid, 51 
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defined boundaries can be moved without destroying the regime, as the sea boundary 
has shifted from three miles to 12 miles to 200 miles without unduly undermining the 
law of the sea.554 Finally Pop writes that “the spatialist approach has its merits insofar 
as it distinguishes between small objects- that are not celestial bodies- and big objects, 
that are celestial bodies. However, the problem still remains to agree on how small is 
small.”555 
Pop’s control approach “would distinguish between immovables – celestial bodies – 
and movables in outer space literally, according to the actual ability of moving 
them.”556 The control approach would mean that if humans can move it then it is a 
moveable but if it can’t be moved by humans then it is an immovable.557 
His functionalist approach “would differentiate between objects used in their spatial 
dimension – these being deemed as celestial bodies or in their material dimension, 
these being moveable orebodies; or, if used for navigation, they would be space 
objects.”558  
His fourth approach is a variation on the functionalist approach and is based on the 
fact that there have been proposals to use asteroids as ‘spacecraft.’559 Indeed, Fasan 
discussed this too.560 Pop argues that any such converted asteroid would most logically 
be regarded as a ‘space object’ and registered as such, which would only happen under 
the functional approach. 561 Pop argues that the Registration Convention could allow 
a state to permit the registration of asteroids as ‘space objects.’562 
 
554Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 51-53 
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However, Pop’s four approaches can essentially be reduced to two approaches which 
provide three options for legal classification; either asteroids and comets are 
categorized by their size or by their ability to be moved by artificial means. A third 
option is to state that all are celestial bodies and neither their size nor our ability to 
move them makes any difference to their legal status. 
5.5.2 Size 
Categorization based on size would mean that objects over a certain size would fall 
into the legal category of ‘celestial body’ and objects below that size would not be 
classed as ‘celestial bodies.’ Of course, as has been mentioned above, the debate would 
then shift to where that line falls. Dr. Ernst Fasan argues that the drafters of the Outer 
Space Treaty certainly had “substantial natural objects in mind”,563 though he gives 
no indication as to what exactly might constitute ‘substantial.’ Pop argues that the 
Outer Space Treaty implies that a celestial body needs to be big enough to land on.564 
Although, the recent Rosetta mission has demonstrated that mass is perhaps more 
important that raw size in the ability for a spacecraft to land on an object, as it is mass 
and not size that dictates an object’s gravity. The preparatory work of the Outer Space 
Treaty would certainly support the argument than a celestial body needs to be an object 
big enough to land on, especially as the Soviets indicated that the main concern of the 
Outer Space Treaty was ‘scientific exploration’, meaning that the object in question 
had to be of a large enough size to make such an endeavour worthwhile.565 That said, 
NASA’s Stardust mission collected dust particles from a comet’s tail, so objects that 
are worthy of ‘scientific exploration’ may, in fact, be rather small. 
 
 
563Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies’ (n 4), 40 
564Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 53 
565UN Doc A/6341 (n 487) 
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5.5.3 Moveable v Immovable 
The other approach to legal categorization would be to base it on the ability for humans 
to artificially move an object; Virgiliu Pop calls this the ‘control approach’. Pop claims 
that most scholars fall into the control school.566 Indeed in a Draft Resolution of March 
15 1964 Working Group Three of the International Institute of Space Law said that 
“Celestial Bodies in the sense of the treaties and agreements on outer space are natural 
objects in outer space including their eventual gaseous coronas which can not be 
artificially moved from their natural orbits.”567  However, NASA General Counsel 
Neil Hosenball rejected the control approach in July 1980 while testifying before the 
US Senate, as have several others.568  
The problem with the ‘control approach’ is that it would require an ever shifting and 
therefore uncertain definition based on technological development. Indeed a recent 
study determined that it would be possible to move a 500,000 kg asteroid using 
existing technology569 and it may even be possible to move an asteroid by painting 
it!570 This approach would also generate its own questions such as how far does an 
object need to be moved in order to bring about a change of category? A minor ‘course 
correction’ is a far different proposition from moving an object from the asteroid belt 
between Mars and Jupiter and bringing it to Earth orbit. 
5.6 A definition of celestial body 
This chapter has considered the plain ordinary meaning of celestial bodies, scientific 
understanding of the term and the planetary science involved, and potential approaches 
for categorisation proposed by legal scholars. However, the approach that most closely 
 
566Pop, Who Owns the Moon? (n 5), 54 
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fits within the interpretive framework provided by the VCLT is to regard all naturally 
occurring objects to be celestial bodies as that term is utilized in the Outer Space 
Treaty. There is no basis within the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of the term for 
differentiation. Further, there is nothing in the drafting history of the treaty to suggest 
that a specialised definition was intended nor that certain types of solar system body 
were intended to be exempt from the non-appropriation principle. Finally, with regards 
to any future space resources governance framework that considers introducing 
categorization the drafters should bear in mind the limitations of spectrographic 
analysis and avoid reliance on it at least until further in depth studies of the various 
‘small solar system bodies’ can furnish more data. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The definition of the term ‘celestial body’ is vital to the scope of application of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the non-appropriation principle. Therefore, it was imperative 
to examine this. This chapter looked at what space law scholars have already said on 
the topic, then examined what the space law treaties actually say and examining those 
terms in light of the travaux preparatoires. However, as in line with the VCLT, the 
main focus was on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the treaty terms, taking the dictionary 
definition as a primary guide as to ‘ordinary meaning’. The finding from examining 
the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘celestial body’ is that it is a broad term that 
applies to all naturally occurring bodies in the solar system regardless of their size or 
the ability to be moved by human intervention. Though, as it is sometimes appropriate 
to consider specialist or scientific definitions of terms, this chapter took a further 
examination of the scientific definition of the term celestial body. This was particularly 
useful, even in light of the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ definition as it could be possible 
for space law to create a new definition or even to categorize celestial bodies in a 
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future space resources framework. However, the findings of this chapter would 
suggest that this would not be a prudent course of action. Finally, the chapter examined 
‘legal’ approaches to defining or categorizing celestial bodies, building on the work 
of Fasan and Pop. This essentially boils down to categorizing celestial bodies by virtue 
of size or their ability to be moved by human intervention. However, the argument 
ultimately made by this chapter is that celestial bodies as used in the space law treaties 
apply to all naturally occurring objects in outer space regardless of their ability to be 
moved by human intervention or their size. Further, it makes the case that regardless 
of the merits of any future legal categorization of celestial bodies it is premature to do 
so on the basis of existing planetary science. This may have potentially negative 
implications for space resource activities undertaken in a certain way particularly on 
very small celestial bodies (if the ‘resource extraction’ process essentially results in 
the consumption of the entirety of the body, for example) however it is the conclusion 
best supported by interpretation of the treaty terms in accordance with the process as 
laid out by the VCLT. 
The next chapter examines the history of the concept of property in order to provide 
context for the examination in the following chapter of property from a philosophical, 
legal, and economic standpoint. It is also intended to determine whether there are any 
alternatives to the existing property paradigm that could prove useful when developing 
a space resources governance regime within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty 
given the limitations imposed by Article II OST. 
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Chapter Six: 
History of Property 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the various different potential approaches to defining 
the term ‘celestial body.’ This is a key term regarding the scope of application of the 
Outer Space Treaty and Article II OST in particular. The ultimate conclusion of the 
preceding chapter is that the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘celestial body’ 
incorporates very naturally occurring physical object in the solar system regardless of 
size or the ability for it to be moved by human intervention. This means that no body 
in the solar system falls outside of the non-appropriation principle and subsequently 
cannot become the private property, in whole or in part, of any State or non-
governmental actor. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the history of the 
concept of property in order to provide context for the examination in the following 
chapter of property from a philosophical, legal, and economic standpoint. It is also 
intended to determine whether there are any alternatives to the existing property 
paradigm that could prove useful when developing a space resources governance 
regime within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty given the limitations imposed 
by Article II OST. 
Legal scholars tend to start with John Locke when discussing the origins of property. 
Further, they focus on philosophers (political, legal, and economic) when examining 
the origins and concept of property. However, as useful as Locke’s ‘state of nature’ 
theoretical framework is, it is vital to consider the actual history of property 
particularly within the Western ‘world.’ This serves two primary functions. First, it 
demonstrates an underlying flaw in numerous philosophical examinations, particularly 
Locke and other ‘state of nature’ approaches, which is that their history is simply 
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wrong. Property did not precede the state, indeed property, as a legal phenomenon, 
requires the state and the law in order to exist. And as John C. Scott has demonstrated 
the establishment of the state was hardly a voluntary collective of landowners looking 
to secure their rights but rather coercive, violent and fragile entities dependent upon 
unfree labour.571 The actual history of property also provides further support for the 
‘bundle’ approach, as the ‘absolute’ model, to the extent that it ever existed, was a 
short lived, and a ‘recent’ development of the Early Modern era and only becoming 
the dominant paradigm in the 18th and 19th centuries572, although its origins can be 
directly traced to the developments of the English common law in the 12th century573 
and its constituent elements can be found in Roman law. 
Further, while there is a focus on property as ‘land,’ it has a broader implication, and 
indeed in the early English common law, property was predominantly focused on 
‘movable’ goods rather than land. This demonstrates a broader application of many of 
the principles of ‘property’ as a legal institution, as again, this focus, almost 
exclusively, on ‘land’ is a recent phenomenon. Finally, land is not completely 
irrelevant to this study. As while space resources may be able to be distinguished from 
the ‘land’ (celestial body) they are found in, particularly once extracted, space resource 
activities cannot be. Even if resource activities do not require ownership of the land 
they are being conducted on, exclusively or at least some form of protected access to 
an area will be required in order to allow safe operation and provide a degree of 
security for investment in the operation. As this section makes clear, there are 
alternative models, particularly from the pre-Modern era which allow for multi and 
 
571James C. Scott Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (Yale University Press 2017), 
27-28 
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variable use of areas with or without ‘ownership’ or ‘appropriation’ of the territory 
which may prove useful for the future governance of activities in outer space.  
This chapter will look at the historical evolution of modern property, from Rome 
through the ‘invention’ of property in 12th century England to its rise to dominance in 
the modern era. Roman property law is relevant both because it serves as a foundation 
for Western property, even that derived from English common law, but also because 
elements of Roman law exist in international law and the law of outer space. 
Understanding what Roman law means by the term res communis, for example, helps 
elucidate the difference between describing outer space as res communis versus ‘a 
commons’ in the sense of the English common law. 
6.2 Rome 
Roman property law “distinguished between land (immovables) and anything else 
(movables) that could be owned privately.” Regarding moveables they essentially 
divided between fungibles and non-fungibles. “Fungibles were things that were 
regarded as existing primarily in quantities (e.g., money, grain) rather than as separate 
entities. Fungibles are normally consumed through use.” Whereas “non-fungibles 
were things which had a separate identity and a degree of permanence.”574 Though the 
focus of this section shall be law relating primarily to land. As mentioned, the modern 
absolute model of property can be traced back to Roman law, specifically the concept 
of dominium 
although Roman property was much more complex and diverse that 
dominium would suggest. Absolute dominium was only one of the 
many conceptual building blocks of Roman property, many of which 
speak to a relative and pluralistic notion of property, but it is the 
concept that exerted the most lasting impact on generations of modern 
lawyers.575 
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Dominium was the ultimate form of property title, roughly or crudely analogous to fee 
simple in English law.576 “Roman dominium symbolized the highest and most perfect 
form of property reserved to Roman citizens and immune from interferences by 
neighbors and by the state.”577 
Res refers to the ‘thing’ that comprises the property. Originally res simply meant 
‘thing’ as in physical object but later it came to mean “any asset that had economic 
value.”578 Res were divided into that which could be owned privately and that which 
was publicly owned, which in turn were subdivided into four different categories. 
Res Communes were things enjoyed by all people, this included things like the air, 
running water, the sea et al. These things were not capable of being owned but there 
was a legal recognition of a right to use res communes and deliberate interference with 
this right could result “in a delictual remedy of insulting behaviour.”579 The second 
category, res publicae refers to those public things which belonged to the state. Such 
things as perennial rivers although the beds and banks of such rivers could be subject 
to ownership with the proviso that access to and use of the river itself could not be 
impeded. Res Universitatis, the third category, refers to things that are owned by 
corporate bodies such as municipalities and colonies (so things like parks and stadiums 
etc). Res Nullius refers to things belonging to no one this was “a heterogeneous 
category which included wild animals, abandoned property, and ‘divine’ things.”580 
Things that are res nullius may never have been owned before or they may have 
reverted to that status.581 Which as it implies means that “certain res nullius could fall 
into private ownership (at which point they ceased to be res nullius.) For example, 
 
576Borkowski and Plessis, Textbook on Roman Law (n 574), 157 
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ownership could be acquired over wild animals and abandoned property by 
occupatio.”582 Occupatio means to take possession with the intent to ‘own’ it. This is 
important because possession (distinct but not unrelated to ownership) in Roman law 
required both physical possession and a mental element which probably meant “the 
intention to hold the property as one’s own.”583 Early Roman law seems to have lacked 
clear concept of ownership. An element of the communal concept of ownership, 
especially in land, survived throughout the Republican period.584 
This is important, as while, there are elements of the modern absolute model of 
property in Roman property law there are clear differences. And there was a 
recognition of a communal interest in land that would survive into the medieval period 
but be lost with the transition to the modern absolute private property model. 
Furthermore, while Roman owners had an unrestricted right to control which includes  
the right to use (ius utendi), the right to draw fruit (ius fruendi), and the 
right to abuse (ius abutendi). The owner has very limited ability to 
parcel out to other individuals these three entitlements in the way an 
owner can, for example, in the Anglo-American common law, divide 
ownership of land between a life tenant and a reversioner. This limited 
ability makes property a ‘unitary’ or ‘concentrated’ right.585 
 
6.3 Medieval Law 
 
Elements of Roman law, which were usually transmitted via the later Imperial legal 
codes like those of Justinian, would survive and be evident in Medieval property law 
and thought as will be explored via the developments starting in the 12th century in 
England. 
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Medieval property law, such as it was, is characterised by feudalism. While feudal 
lords are often portrayed as great landowners the relationship was more complex than 
that and  
in flat contradiction with Roman dominium, which was unitary, medieval 
property is a duplex dominium. Property is split. Both the lord and the vassal 
are owners of the fief. The lord has dominium directum, or superior ownership, 
and the vassal has dominium utile, or actual use.586  
 
Roman or Civil law (the system in operation in much of Western Europe) held that 
land  
had to have a lord who was obliged to guard it, as a father guarded his 
family, on behalf of his sovereign. In return he could expect to be 
obeyed by those who lived there and to enjoy their services. This was 
the matrix of the feudal system. Crucially, these rights of property went 
with the land rather than existing separately. Should an estate be 
confiscated, or its inheritance be disputed, the contract of mutual 
obligation disappeared, and with it the rights of ownership.587 
 
Feudalism is about personal relationships and mutual obligations; the lord provides 
protection and the tenant provides homage.588 “Claims to land were claims for the 
benefit of a personal relationship. Personal relationships and the tenures dependant on 
them were essentially different from property rights.”589 
6.4 English Common Law 
As a result of the Norman Conquest and subsequent struggles between the Crown and 
the barons, English law developed differently from most of Western Europe, which 
remained more feudal in origin.  This was not a particularly ‘revolutionary’ change as 
it was a more evolutionary process which gradually evolved towards the modern 
understanding of property as expressed though the English common law. The English 
common law of real property developed and evolved during between 1153 and 1215. 
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“The common law gave royal protection to free tenements, replacing feudal 
relationships as the primary bond structuring society.”590 Property was antithetical to 
the feudal relationship, and only began to appear around 1200591 (though the term itself 
has a more complicated story which will be discussed below.) The great inflation of 
1180-1220 seems to have been one of the primary causes of the “appearance of 
property as a legal phenomenon.”592 This great inflation seems to have been limited to 
England and the changes in land management practice that followed also seems to 
have been limited to England.593 
In the legal manual of 1188, it is clear that a tenant’s title was based on a personal 
relationship between the lord and the tenant. However, by 1220 the rights of the tenant 
had increased, the ability to ‘divide’ the tenancy between sons for example no longer 
needed the lord’s approval and disinheritance became a harder, more formal, legal 
process.594 
Property, at least in England, was “not an intentional creation.”595 It was a subtle but 
momentous evolution596 which  developed as a result of negotiations, compromises 
and political struggle between the lords and the king, but the intention was not the 
creation of property rather the achievement of specific things, like the restoration of 
the disinherited after the Anarchy, or to regulate the appointment of successor tenants 
to smooth the process during a more peaceful age. This rather haphazard process gave 
rise to litigation to sort it out which increased the role of the courts and the bureaucracy 
and resulted in a ‘hardening’ of the law.597 
 
590Ibid, 1 
591Ibid, 4  
592Robert C. Palmer ‘The Economic and Cultural Impact of the Origins of Property: 1180-1220’ (1985) 
3 Law and History Review 375, 376 
593Ibid, 380 
594Ibid, 382-384 
595Palmer ‘The Origins of Property in England’ (n 573), 46 
596Ibid, 8 
597Ibid, 46-47 
Page 171 of 342 
This was not a deliberate reform nor was it necessarily recognized or recognizable to 
those at the time, but it is clear that the change occurred, although while land did 
become more ‘marketable’ there was by no means a large market. However, ‘property’ 
provided a greater security of tenure; a tenancy that relied on a personal relationship 
with the lord always carried with it the risk of being revoked, especially if the 
landholder occupied land ‘owned’ by more than one lord. This made the focus of the 
tenant on maintaining relations with the lord, whereas property allowed more focus on 
the development of the land itself. The security of ‘property’ provided a more secure 
basis for investment in economic development.598 “The regulation that secured tenants 
from lordly supervision and so produced property, produced by the same token greater 
liquidity of the major economic resources of that society: the land.”599 The legal 
institution of property, and the rule of law, do provide economic benefits, ‘property’ 
without the legal protection provided by the state is of limited value. It is this security, 
which provides the economic value. This is part of why it is argued that ‘property,’ 
particularly over ‘land’ cannot exist in outer space, at least in any meaningful way, as 
given Article II OST the state has, at best, limited ability to offer that security. 
Furthermore,  
the origins of property demonstrate that law is not merely a reflection 
of society and social mores. Even at the beginnings of the English legal 
system, one can discern an interaction between law and mores. While 
undeniably a major portion of property law derived from social custom, 
part of the law developed by accident: by acts that had unintended 
consequences. Such consequences had substantial impact on social life. 
Law is, after all, bureaucratic force tightly focused on particular aspects 
of social relationships. From one perspective, the change was precisely 
the appearance of property. But property was not a ‘mere’ legal 
phenomenon, an intellectual construct without social relevance. 
Property, antithetical to feudal relations, determined the existence of 
power in society.600 
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There is an assumption in contemporary analysis that land is central to the paradigm 
of property, however,  
for more than two centuries, the steady development of property 
doctrines in medieval English common law was completely divorced 
from disputes concerning the possession of land. It focused instead on 
controversies about goods and animals. Later, English lawyers in the 
Tudor era formulated an abstract concept of property and assimilated 
land to their treatment of goods and animals. At the same time, they 
wove into their doctrines the strands of a contemporary theological 
debate about the origins of individual ownership and the role of the 
state. English lawyers developed and elevated their concept of property 
to a position of central importance in their thinking.601 
 
Seipp argues that for almost two centuries, “from 1290 to 1490 English lawyers didn’t 
use “any single term that had the scope, application and explanatory power that later 
lawyers found in the words ‘property’ and ‘ownership.’” Before 1280 English 
common lawyers and jurists used the Latin proprietas but when the language shifted 
to Anglo-Norman French vocabulary changed.602 Furthermore when they did speak of 
‘property’, which was infrequently, it is clear that they “referred to interests in 
domestic animals and goods…” This further supports the notion that the primary 
concern of ‘property’ is rights (interest) and support the ‘bundle approach.’ 
Furthermore, it is also clear that the basic thinking was different.  
One did not say ‘this is my property,’ as we use the term now. Rather, 
one said ‘I have property in it’ or ‘the property of it is to (or with) me.’ 
Property was thus a characteristic or attribute (or ‘property’) of a cow 
or a jewel or a sum of money, not a shorthand referent to the thing 
itself.603 
 
A later treatise in the 13th century made the distinction between actions focused on 
property and those focused on possession. There was a preference given to dominium 
not proprietas. There was a shift away from treatise to Year Books and there was also 
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a shift in vocabulary, for example, “instead of paring ‘property’ and ‘possession’ of 
land, as the treatises had done, Year Book lawyers spoke simply of ‘right’ and 
‘possession.’”604 This separation between ‘rights’ and ‘possession’ is being 
resurrected in contemporary property law (as will be discussed in the next chapter) 
and has a useful relevance with regards to space resource activities. Companies are 
not looking for ‘territorial possession’ but rather the ‘right to use’ which is clearly not 
at odds with ‘property’ nor necessarily at odds with the prohibition on ‘appropriation’ 
in Article II OST.  
As Seipp points out this was not simply a change in vocabulary but an important 
conceptual change. You could have property in goods and animals, but you had ‘right’ 
over land. This concept could be transposed to outer space, i.e. ‘property’ in extracted 
‘ore’ but ‘rights’ over areas of celestial bodies. Writs concerning land were divided 
into those concerning possession and those concerning right. Under this system right 
was greater than possession. This is important when considering the social context, as 
well as the latter shift in the sixteenth century.605 
Further, under Roman law, at least as transmitted to the medieval lawyer by Justinian, 
goods and animals were ‘moveables’ and ‘immovable.’ One of the main reasons ‘Year 
Book lawyers’ discussed ‘property’ was because domestic animals and goods could 
“stray far from their rightful possessors” either of their own volition (sheep do wander) 
or not (this was a period of private wars, civil wars and wars between England, 
Scotland and the Welsh). Therefore, a distinction between land and, goods and animals 
made sense  
a person’s ‘property’ in goods or animals could continue despite the 
lack of possession, control, or knowledge of their whereabouts. Land, 
by contrast, remained where one had left it. The identification of the 
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rightful holder of land was common knowledge to the surrounding 
population. Goods and animals required notional nametags – 
ascriptions of ‘property’ to some persons, who might be unknown in 
the county where the goods or animals were found. Goods could be 
made and then consumed or destroyed, animals were born and would 
perish, but the land remained indefinitely. The temporal dimension 
posed problems for the ascription of ‘property’ to goods and animals.606 
 
To put it simply, “chattels could be consumed, destroyed, lost, or hidden. They could 
be entirely appropriated, rightfully or wrongfully, by a single individual. Land, in an 
important sense, could not.”607 Similar things can be said about space resources, they 
too can be moved, seized, be consumed or destroyed. Whereas the Moon and, at least 
the larger celestial bodies, retain the properties of ‘land.’  
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, the social context is important; the idea of 
exclusive, individual ownership would have been an unrecognizable image for 
landholders in this period. One could have exclusive ownership over a horse or a plow 
but such a conception of rights over land was not possible; land had multiple, 
overlapping rightsholders.608 Again, there is a similarity with the situation in outer 
space, exclusive ownership of land is prohibited.  
The focus on goods and animals made sense because ‘property’ to the exclusion of 
others except in cases of leasing or safeguarding was desirable. Furthermore, property 
was preserved regardless of where the good or animal was and the relation provide the 
person with the ‘property’ in the good or animal the basis to bring actions in court and 
to initiate transactions out of court. 
In the practical arrangements of life in late medieval England, it was 
goods and animals, not land, that came closest to what Blackstone 
would later call ‘that sole and despotic dominion… in total exclusion 
of the rights of any other individual in the universe.’609 
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In the fifteenth century the terminology of ‘property’ increased in frequency of use but 
it is still used in reference to goods and animals not land. Starting in 1490 we see 
indications “of a universal, abstract notion of ‘property rights’ or a ‘law of property.’” 
Seipp argues that a conceptional category was emerging that could contain land, goods 
and animals.610 It was a broad and abstract terminology and ‘property’ could be found 
in a growing range of things.611 However it is possible to say that “after 1490, 
practitioners of English common law began to assimilate their terminology for 
landholding to their terminology for ownership of goods and animals. There could 
now be ‘property’ in land and ‘owners’ of land.”612 
It was in the 16th and 17th century that textbooks and handbooks “brought land and 
goods under the general rubric of ‘property.’” And in the political debates during this 
period, including the civil war, 
lawyers and laymen alike identified the crucial function of law to be to 
protect ‘property’ in this broader, more abstract, and more fundamental 
sense. Out of the legal and political rhetoric of this period came Thomas 
Hobbes’s and John Locke’s philosophical accounts of property and the 
settled discourse of the later seventeenth-century lawyers, who 
regarded a unitary, abstract, more or less absolute property right as a 
bedrock element of their conceptual structure of law.613 
 
It was at this time that “English common lawyers restored most of the familiar 
terminology of the Romans, making basic conceptual building blocks of ‘public’ and 
‘private,’ ‘civil’ and ‘criminal,’ ‘property’ and ‘contract’ law.”614 
From the seventeenth century we can talk more accurately about a general law of 
property. Social historians have argued that it was the social mobility of ‘new families’ 
of merchants acquiring land that help change the conception of property. They brought 
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ideas about the exclusive ownership of goods and animals into their thinking about 
their landed ‘property.’615 And 
by writing about property in land and ownership of land, lawyers from 
the sixteenth century onward invoked a stark mental image of one 
solitary person alone in complete and exclusive possession of one tract 
of land. It became possible now for lawyers in England to speak and 
write about ‘property in general’ with reference at once to land, goods, 
and animals alike. This was a powerful generalization, destined for 
enormous impact on law and government, but was one that could not 
have been uttered while the lawyers’ language about goods and 
language about land remained separate.616 
 
6.5 Property Revolution 
 
As mentioned, the modern conception of ‘absolutist’ property developed in the 
‘modern era’, with developments starting in the 15th century but more properly the 
‘revolution’ occurs in the 16th and 17th centuries. It is linked with the rise of capitalism 
and a long prevailing view is that “the definition and enforcement of property rights 
are among the key institutional conditions for markets to work.”617 This reasoning is 
part of why the desire for private property rights in space is so great, as private property 
rights are foundational to the capitalist economic model, and provide a vital security 
for investment. As Linklater has argued the ‘private property revolution’ began in the 
early 1500s and transformed the feudal, communal, and mutual obligations of the 
manorial social contract into a more individualistic modern ‘private’ property model.  
This model, despite the hardships it meted out on the ‘losers’ of the enclosure 
movement, enabled society to grow more food and escape the ‘substance’ farming 
‘trap’ and laid the foundations for the transformative growth of Western capitalist 
industrial society. However, we fail to recognize the significance of this revolution 
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largely because the mindset it established is now so integral to our society, we cannot 
think outside it.618  
As discussed, feudal rights to land were based on the relationship between lord and 
tenant, and they were not necessarily individualistic, it was not an exclusive 
relationship between lord and tenant, there were communal, village rights, not just in 
things like the village commons (not to be confused with res communis which is a 
different concept) but in the fields; farmers often owned strips or had usage rights 
which necessitated a community approach to land management and generated rights 
and obligations to a network of people. This ‘community approach’ would today be 
regarded as a ‘stewardship’ approach, which is being revived as will be discussed in 
the next chapter. This took time to disappear, and as Weaver argues never did entirely 
as “a property right is a relationship between a person and other persons respecting 
access to material resources.”619 The word relationship is particularly important in this 
definition as it “underlines the social and political character of property rights.”620 To 
put it simply, in order for property rights, especially ‘exclusive’ property rights to work 
they need to have a societal acceptance and be backed by state power. This, in 
particular, has relevance for space resources, as it is not sufficient for the US (or any 
other state) to simply ‘declare’ or ‘recognize’ the property rights of their nationals, in 
order for those ‘property rights’ to have any value they need be accepted and regarded 
as legitimate by the international community, otherwise they will have to be defended 
by raw force. 
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Further, while today a capitalist economy essentially translates as free market this has 
not always been the case and in the 17th century, England and the Netherlands 
produced competing models of capitalism. England’s was a market-based system 
rooted in private property rights over land, whereas the Netherlands was a mercantilist 
trading system. This difference can be illustrated by the fact that the Dutch transported 
an essentially feudal land system to their colonies in North America and Southern 
Africa in contrast to the English colonies where land could be owned exclusively by 
settlers.621 The developments in the colonies helped to fuel and propel the property 
rights ‘revolution’ and ‘modern’, absolute conception property became the dominant 
model in the late 18th and 19th century.622 
6.6 Colonial Developments 
European colonies, particularly the British ‘settler’ colonies like the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, not only accelerated the 
development of the modern, absolutist conception of property but extended its reach 
and impact across the globe. As Weaver says; 
A British-born will to possess and improve landed property, enhanced 
by American innovations, guided the way in which property rights 
developed in far-flung states, so that by the end of the twentieth century 
something close to a global convention about private property rights 
reached out and enfolded items other than land...623 
 
However, this revolution was a gradual one. Indeed, the original charter for the 
Mayflower colony was very communal, the Pilgrims would be working in common 
for the good of the community. There was a religious motivation for this, a desire to 
return to an early Christian commune type of lifestyle in which all worked for the good 
of the community not individual profit. However, many of the younger male members 
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of the group objected to this arrangement once in America and eventually the land was 
divided up within individual families. As Linklater notes this had the consequence of 
dividing the community and spreading it out around the bay diminishing the town 
considerably. Issues relating to property had not been given much initial consideration 
when establishing the colony, it was intended by its funders as a trading outpost 
dealing mostly in salt cod and beaver skins and the Pilgrims themselves were mainly 
concerned with escaping religious persecution and, as mentioned, they wanted to 
attempt to establish a community on their understanding of an early Christian ideal. 
As Linklater says, no one involved in the establishment of the colony “thought the 
ownership of land to be of any importance.”624 
Linklater argues that it was the second wave of Pilgrims that really forced the issue 
over land. The first wave had nothing to lose, they were, for the most part, refugees 
living in the Netherlands, whereas the second wave were more established people still 
residing in England and often of comparative means. They wanted to know that they 
were “braving the dangers and harsh climate” not only to gain the freedom to worship 
but “to live in a new English society where land could be individually owned.” 
However, there was question as to whether the principles of land law in English 
common law could exist in the wilderness of the New World. In a pamphlet published 
in 1629, well in advance of the writings of John Locke, the notion that private 
ownership was created by human toil not the law was advanced. These views wove 
together “Puritan doctrine and the pragmatic outlook of the [enclosure movement]”.625 
However, 15th century lawyers had previously debated the labour theory of property 
rights, particularly over acquisition of things like crops and wild game, so it was not 
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as revolutionary an idea as is sometimes supposed.626 Though in the more exclusive 
modern system of landholding the notion that someone other than the landowner could 
have rights in the produce of the land clearly sat less comfortably. 
Outside of the New England colonies “the question of how property came into being 
hardly arose” as  
possession of the earth, in both America and the Caribbean, was 
deemed to be derived from the royal charter that granted the territory 
to a company or to a powerful proprietor… Every charter detailed how 
the land was to be owned and administered, and ended with a striking 
phrase explaining that the monarch had made this happen by ‘our 
especiall grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion.’ In other words, 
the king’s royal power, backed by ‘divine grace,’ as the charter also 
specified, was the ultimate authority that enabled colonists to claim that 
particular bit of the earth’s surface as their property.627 
 
Once again, there is a clear link between property and the state. Even if the ‘right’ of 
the States to cede that title was dubious at best, it was clearly accepted and understood 
that for title to have meaning or economic value it needed to be backed by a ‘sovereign 
power.’ 
There was an important political dimension to this debate, which concerned where 
ultimate political and legal authority lay. For “if property was created by individual 
effort, and not just by the king’s ‘mere motion,’” then everyone could potentially have 
the same power and authority as the king, which was a dangerous and revolutionary 
notion.628 However, government was an important part of the property rights system. 
The government operated the system of title deeds and enforced it. “Title deeds 
described how the property had been created and come into the owner’s hands, and 
any incursion upon it brought the whole panoply of the law against the perpetrator.” 
Title deeds “recruited the power of government to the side of the property owner.”629 
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However, in North America in particular there was a recognition of the need to ‘deal’ 
with native title; land needed to either be purchased from the natives or ‘won through 
conquest.’ There was no doubt that European sovereignty was ‘superior’ but, with the 
exception of Australia, land was not regarded as being terra nullius. Indeed, colonial 
governments often conceded property rights to indigenous tribes but “monopolized 
sovereignty” and then used that power to take control of native land.630 This reinforces 
the conceptual link between property and sovereignty. 
“English attention to landed property rights differed from that of other colonial 
powers.” However, all European powers transplanted their property rights regimes 
into their colonies. The Dutch colonies in New Netherland and South Africa were 
intended as trading outposts and bases from which to wage war against the Spanish. 
When settlement was established land was granted on largely feudal terms, although 
these ‘patroonships’ never really took root. The French in North America established 
an essentially feudal land holding regime for their sparsely populated colonies with 
settlers owing labour and military services to the crown. This was done primarily as a 
method of defending the huge and sparsely populated (at least by Europeans) territory 
stretching from New Orleans to the Gulf of St Lawrence comparatively cheaply, but 
it shaped property law in the region, especially as the British in Canada integrated 
rather than replaced the system once they took over.631 
English North America had a diversity of land holding systems. Part of this reflected 
the developments that were happening in England so the colonies represent stages in 
the ‘property revolution’ of the 17th century (and the political upheavals) but also that 
the focus of revenue generation for English colonial efforts shifted from commerce to 
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land. There was a “relatively early recognition of land as a source of private wealth in 
the English colonies.” This had not been the initial intention, English settlements, like 
their Dutch and French counterparts were intended either to be trading outposts (fur) 
or provide raw materials (trees for the Royal Navy, gold etc) however, “by the 1620s, 
new-world companies formed in England were failing to make their merchant 
sponsors rich. Wealth came from raising tobacco, not from the hoped-for discoveries 
of minerals or from the trade in furs.”632 Which required a different form of land 
tenure. 
“England liberalized land tenure laws by the mid-seventeenth century.”633 Property 
law would be gradually simplified in settlement colonies over the next two hundred 
years. However, the revolution of the seventeenth century primarily came from 
England rather than the ‘frontier.’ This would not be the pattern in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The ‘frontier’ would drive the evolution and development of 
property rights. To some extent this makes sense. The ‘frontier’ faced pressures and 
circumstances that required adaptation. Not least of which was the need to survey 
‘new’ lands and delineate property boundaries. One of these innovations was a registry 
open to public inspection. This innovation helped to develop “private markets in real 
property and advanced the formation of credit arrangements. Registries reduced 
uncertainties about property title and allowed land, when presented as collateral for 
loans, to act as a lever in its own transformation.”634 Registries continue to play an 
important role in providing information and acting as a form of ‘transparency and 
confidence building measure’. The Hague Working Group Building Blocks call for 
the establishment of registry for space resource activities.635 
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Land registries were first established in Scotland in the 16th century as Scottish law 
required filing of documents, whereas English common law relied on oral testimony 
to confirm land holdings.  England followed Scotland’s lead and established registries 
in the 18th century to combat fraud. New England colonies usually had land registries 
but these were initially poorly maintained owing to the lack of experience with such 
institutions, but they improved. By the late 18th century registries were standard in 
newly incorporated counties. South Australia was the first to offer government-
guaranteed land titles, a system which eventually developed into the Torrens title 
which was established in 1840.636 
Torrens title spread throughout the British colonies and even to the United States; it 
eventually spread beyond the Anglophone world and was implemented in part of 
French Africa. Registration and Torrens helped reduce incidences of fraud. “The 
purpose of registration of property instruments, however, was the same everywhere: 
it simply put information at the disposal of buyers and lenders.” While registration 
was a form of insurance against bad title it “did not guarantee titles.”637 
As frontiers congealed into settler societies, reform of property laws in 
ways designed to decrease this litigation was much desired, but 
contentious on details. No speculator relished costly lawsuits. The 
prospect of seeing interests bled white in courtrooms was unnerving. 
Thus reformation of property rights transpired amid debate and 
compromise.638 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the modern absolute model of property can be 
traced back to Roman law, specifically the concept of dominium. However, while, 
there are elements of the modern absolute model of property in Roman property law 
there are clear differences. And there was a recognition of a communal interest in land 
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that would survive into the medieval period but be lost with the transition to the 
modern absolute private property model. 
Medieval property law, such as it was, was characterised by feudalism. While feudal 
lords are often portrayed as great landowners the relationship was more complex than 
that. Furthermore, there was a difference between Civil Law and Common Law, 
differences that were exacerbated by the developments under the English Common 
Law. Roman or Civil law (the system in operation in much of Western Europe) held 
that land “had to have a lord who was obliged to guard it…”639 English law developed 
differently and over time things began to change, gradually evolving towards the 
modern understanding of property 
Feudalism is about personal relationships and mutual obligations; the lord provides 
protection and the tenant provides homage.640 . Property was antithetical to the feudal 
relationship, and only began to appear around 1200.641 Prior to 1200 it was clear that 
a tenants title was based on a personal relationship with the lord. However, by 1220 
the rights of the tenant had increased.642 
Property, as a legal phenomenon, requires am existence not dependent on the strength 
of the possessor nor on a personal relationship or set of personal relationship it requires 
that title is “protected by a bureaucratic authority according to set rules. Property 
derives from the state; it cannot exist prior to the state.”643 Property, at least in 
England, was “not an intentional creation.”644 It was a subtle but momentous 
evolution.645 ‘Property’ provided a greater security of tenure; a tenancy that relied on 
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a personal relationship with the lord always carried with it the risk of being revoked, 
especially if the landholder occupied land ‘owned’ by more than one lord. 
It is also important to recognize that the conception of property changed. In the 
medieval period property meant goods and animals. You had rights over land but you 
had property in goods and animals.646 Part of this was the nature of the ‘thing’ in 
question, goods and animals could be destroyed, requiring compensation to ‘restore’ 
damages but land could not be destroyed in the same sense and therefore ‘possession’ 
could be restored to the ‘rightful’ tenant.647 
As discussed, a conceptual change occurred around the 15th century which saw a 
broadening of the conception of ‘property’ to include land. And in the period 
surrounding the English Civil War a growing sense that the “crucial function of the 
law” was to protect ‘property’ in this new, broader conception.648 From the 17th 
century we can talk more accurately about a general law of property. Social historians 
have argued that it was the social mobility of ‘new families’ of merchants acquiring 
land that help change the conception of property. They brought ideas about the 
exclusive ownership of goods and animals into their thinking about their landed 
‘property.’649  
This led to the ‘private property revolution’ which transformed the feudal, communal, 
mutual obligations social contract of the manor to a more individualistic modern 
‘private’ property model, however we fail to recognize the significance of this 
revolution largely because the mindset it established is now integral to our society.650 
This revolution then led to the emergence of capitalism as it enabled landholders to 
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capitalize their landholdings.651 While the ‘revolution’ lead to a more individualised 
conception of property rights the relational aspect never fully disappeared, as “a 
property right is a relationship between a person and other persons respecting access 
to material resources.”652 To put it simply, in order for property rights, especially 
‘exclusive’ property rights to work they need to have a societal acceptance and be 
backed by state power. 
European colonies, particularly the British ‘settler’ colonies like the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, not only accelerated developments 
of modern, absolutist property but extended their reach and impact across the globe. 
The next chapter will examine ‘property theory’ as a political, legal, and economic 
concept.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Property Theory 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the history of property in the Western tradition. It 
examined the development of the concept from Roman law to the development under 
the English common law and then the property ‘revolution’ of the 17th century when 
the modern concept of property began to emerge as well as the further development 
that were undertaken as the Western conception (specifically the Anglo-American) 
conception of property pushed into and beyond the frontiers of European settlement. 
It demonstrated that property is not a static concept but one that has developed and 
evolved as societal changes have pushed it. Further, it demonstrated that property is a 
product of the state and law and can therefore be shaped by it. This chapter will 
examine property through a more theoretical lens as undertaken by political, legal, and 
economic theorists. Following on from this theoretical discussion of the nature of 
property is a discussion of the role of the state in relation to property. The chapter 
finishes with a discussion of some alternative conceptions of property. 
This chapter has three key, essential arguments. It makes the case that property is an 
evolving, complex concept which has historical and societal context. There is no one 
definition of ‘property’, it is not a static or fixed concept. Further, property is a product 
of society and ultimately government, even in a Lockean state. Property is intertwined 
with the existence and authority of the state, it is a political creation. Finally, property 
is ultimately about distribution of resources, it is a mechanism for controlling access 
to, and use of, various resources be it gold, land or deposits of water ice on far flung 
asteroids. 
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The nature of property, essentially ‘what it is’, how it works, and the role of the state 
in its creation, protection, and enforcement is at the heart of this enquiry. If property 
is a ‘natural right’ acquired through the application of ‘labour’ to an object then there 
is potentially little issue with companies acquiring ‘property rights’ over extracted 
resources from celestial bodies. If however the State is required to assign title, then 
there will be significant issues with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. There is, of 
course, a spectrum between these two extremes and there are potential alternative 
models of ‘resource management’ that will be explored in this chapter. 
This chapter will examine and dismiss the ‘Lockean’ approach to property rights, 
arguing for a positivist or ‘bundle of rights’ approach to understanding the nature of 
property. It also places the State at the centre of ‘property’, vital for its creation, 
protection and enforcement. The latter is argued to be particularly important as 
property rights that cannot be enforced are practically worthless. Yet such enforcement 
is challenging under the structure of the Outer Space Treaty, at least without some 
form of international framework. This chapter therefore supports one of the 
overarching conclusions of this work that while not required by the Outer Space Treaty 
there will need to be an international framework on space resource governance. 
Finally, this chapter discusses some of the alternatives to the dominant paradigm of 
property, particularly notions of ‘stewardship’ which in addition to doing a better job 
of adhering to the ‘interests and benefits’ aspect of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 
would also help to alleviate some of the concerns expressed by the likes of Elvis about 
the long term sustainability of space resources. 
The first section of the chapter will discuss the common notion that property is a 
‘thing’ and that this view is mistaken, though popular. It will reframe the nature of 
property as about ‘rights’ and relations between individuals regarding ‘things.’ The 
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next section will look at the natural school of property, as exemplified by the work of 
John Locke. It will dismiss this approach to property rights; however, it is vital to 
examine it given the influence of Locke in Anglo-American thinking and the 
‘Lockean’ reasoning expressed in the US space resources legislation of 2015. The 
following section will focus on the ‘bundle of rights’ approach which is the dominant 
paradigm in modern legal scholarship. It will focus on the elements of ‘exclusion’ and 
‘use’ while questioning whether or not they are equal. The next section Will look more 
explicitly at the relationship between property and the state, particularly its nature as 
an institution for managing the distribution and use of resources and the societal 
context it has as a result. The following section will discuss the role of enforcement 
and the rule of law  which is not only vital in order for property rights to have any 
practical or economic meaning but also one of the main potential hurdles regarding 
space resources. This, as mentioned, will help to reinforce the argument that it is 
necessary, practically if not legally speaking, for there to be an international space 
resources governance framework in order to effectively enforce property rights. 
Finally, alternatives to the mainstream approaches to property will be discussed, from 
Proudhon, who ‘famously’ declared that ‘property is theft’653 to Elinor Ostrom’s 
‘common pool resources’, and the notion of stewardship. 
7.2 Property as a ‘thing’ 
 
According to Proudhon, “property is theft”654; according to Kevin Gray, property is 
an illusion655; and according to Laura Underkuffler, “property is seen as a bulwark 
which protects material wealth, liberty, and autonomy.”656 Property is fairly central to 
our economic system and even our political life. That said, it is ill defined and 
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understood. The basic underlying issue is whether property is a right or a thing. The 
property as a ‘thing’ idea is the prevalent popular conception of how property works 
i.e. my car is my property. Most people do not think of the title or the deed to their car 
or house as being their property but rather the ‘object’ of ownership itself. The 
property as a ‘thing’ concept dates back to Roman law, originally res simply meant 
‘thing’ as in a physical object, however it later came to mean “any asset that had 
economic value.”657 This difference is important. In a true ‘state of nature’ situation 
‘property’ does not matter, possession is key (and might makes right.) It is society and 
its embodiment in the state that makes property meaningful, that allows it to have 
economic and practical value (as discussed in the last chapter ‘property’ did not 
emerge in post-conquest England until the rule of law had been (re)-established in the 
12th century.) This context is vital, as Underkuffler has written: 
The idea of a man’s coconuts being his property makes no sense if he 
is stranded, irrevocably, on an uninhabited island; property has 
meaning only when human relations, or conflicting claims among 
people, are at stake. Furthermore, the idea of ‘property as things’ 
assumes a model of ownership… that involves a kind of complete 
freedom of individual choice regarding use, exclusion, and transfer that 
is (in fact) rarely conferred by law. Thus, although the idea of property 
as ‘things’ commands great cultural and rhetorical power, it fails to 
reflect the rich meanings of property in social discourse and law.658  
 
Modern legal scholarship takes the view that property is about rights between people 
in relation to ‘things’, and therefore ‘property’ is a grouping or constellation of 
elements and rights. However, it is still worth considering the natural law school, 
especially as grounded in the work of John Locke, especially given the prevalence of 
‘labour theory’ particularly among the rather vocal ‘libertarian’ section of the US 
space community.659 This will be explored in the next section. 
 
 
657Borkowski and Plessis, Textbook on Roman Law (n 574), 153 
658Underkuffler, The Idea of Property (n 656), 11-12 
659Gangale, The Development of Outer Space (n 8), 4-5, 202, 213 
Page 191 of 342 
7.3 John Locke and Property as a Natural Right 
 
Probably the most prominent writer in the ‘property is a natural right camp’ is John 
Locke. In Locke’s view God gave the world to all humans as common property.660 
However the key point is that this was the case in the state of nature, which while for 
Locke was not Hobbes’ hellish state of constant warfare, was a primitive era in human 
nature logically surpassed by the modern age of states and political society (Native 
Americans were, in Locke’s view, living in a state of nature, at least prior to the arrival 
of Europeans.) Locke also made the case, now known as the ‘labour theory of property 
rights’ that it was the act of labour by man to acquire an object that gave rise to his 
rights over that object. However this only applied to that which he is able to use, 
without waste.661 Locke recognized that this had its disadvantages, and that the 
generally lawless state of nature meant that one would have to be constantly on guard 
against those who would want to take this property, and that in the end, man decided 
to come together to create a society in order to preserve and regulate property.662 
Although, as argued in the previous chapter, this view has little basis in historical 
reality. 
John Locke has had the biggest individual impact on property theory, at least in the 
English-speaking world.663 This combined with his use by those who argue that the 
state is not necessary for the existence of property, particularly within the ‘space 
libertarian’ community,664 make his thoughts on property worth examining in greater 
detail. It is logical to examine the work of the man himself before moving on to what 
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scholars have to say about his work. Unsurprisingly given his stature, there is 
considerable writing about Locke’s theories on property. 
In Locke’s view God gave the world to all humanity as common property, i.e. in state 
of nature the world is a commons.665 However, it is important to note that as Margaret 
Davies points out Locke’s commons was not exactly what we mean by the term today, 
she says that: 
In the Christian world inhabited by Locke the commons were a gift 
from God, available to all in the state of nature, but ultimately to be 
used for the benefit and prosperity of ‘mankind’... Locke’s ‘commons’ 
were somewhat akin to an unlimited realm where everything was res 
or terra nullius. It was not a protected public domain, nor a limited 
commons, since objects could be removed from the commons without 
the consent or even the participation of other ‘commoners.’ 666 
 
In this state of nature one was free to take as much property they are able to use or 
enjoy without it going to waste or spoiling.667 In Locke’s famous words “whatsoever 
then he removes out of the State that Nature has provided and left it in, he hath mixed 
his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”668 This does not require the consent or assignation of anybody else, simply 
the application of honest labour.669 However, Locke recognized that in the state of 
nature, in the absence of any government, one was also powerless to protect one’s 
property without the use of vigilance and force, so the property owner would have to 
be constantly on guard against those who would take their property by force. This is 
why humans created society or the state. Or in the words of Locke: “The great end of 
Man’s entering into society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and 
Safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the Laws established in that 
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Society.”670 This was a point he made repeatedly throughout his Second Treaties, that 
the key role or end of political or civil society (by which he essentially meant the state) 
was the protection and regulation of property.671 He even went so far as to say that 
without the protection of the state, property has little value; “for I have truly no 
Property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against 
my consent.”672  
Matthew Kramer holds that Locke’s error is assuming that in state of nature people 
need ownership of goods to enjoy them. As Kramer explains “people in the state of 
nature could readily survive without owning any goods, so long as they all had 
privileges to use and consume the goods.”673 Indeed, as Scott has demonstrated ‘cities’ 
or settled communities existed before the state, which was hardly the provider of 
security as asserted by Locke.674 Further, Kramer argues that Locke demonstrates 
quite clearly that there can be the right to use something without needing ownership 
rights over that thing. He says that the principle drawback of the state of nature was 
the insecurity of persons and holdings not the absence of the right or ability to use 
items.675 One criticism that Kramer makes of Locke’s labour theory of property rights 
is that its assumes that individuals are wholly responsible for their exploits, talents and 
achievements.676 However, Kramer retorts that  
at least in principle the Lockean Theory can provide for the collective 
shaping of skills and goods, by insisting only that everyone should 
garner reward in line with what he or she has contributed to societal 
welfare through the employment of his or her productive 
capabilities.677 
 
 
670Ibid, 355 
671Ibid, 268, 323-326, 348, 360  
672Ibid, 360-361 
673 Matthew H. Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations 
of Individualism, Community, and Equality (CUP 1997), 114-115 
674Scott Against the Grain (571), 3-7, 24-28  
675Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property (n 673), 115, 120-121 
676Ibid, 140-141 
677Ibid, 142 
Page 194 of 342 
However, Locke concluded all lawful acts of appropriation to be acts giving rise to 
rights of ownership678 or as Margaret Davies puts it “in Locke’s state of nature the 
world was, to be blunt, up for grabs – as long as it was grabbed in the right way.”679 
And in a manner that would be used as a justification for European imperialism, Locke  
argued that land and resources which were not used, or not sufficiently 
used, could legitimately be appropriated for the benefit of humankind. 
Such an appropriation was effected by labour, and did not rely on 
anybody’s consent. As formulated by Locke, this argument only 
applied in the state of nature. It did not apply to areas of the world, such 
as Europe, which had gone beyond this state of nature and where 
property ownership was governed by positive law.680  
 
As Jeremy Waldron has written “in Locke’s system, property was generated by the 
unilateral action of appropriators and cultivators approaching unowned resources 
without any authorisation.”681 
Unlike Hobbes, Locke does not feel that the state of nature is synonymous with a state 
of war. However, war is bound to be more common in the state of nature.682 Waldron 
argues that it is this logic that causes Locke to argue that this is why man enters into 
society, i.e. creates government, to preserve not create property. However, Waldron 
does not agree with Locke’s explanation of the origin of property. He feels unable to 
accept the removal of the state from the equation in that way.683 He says that “Locke’s 
theory has it that property rights in their origin are independent of government and 
law.”684 But goes on to say that “there is no getting away from the fact that property 
rights are entangled in public legislation.”685 Waldron is not alone in this line of 
thinking, and as demonstrated, the historical record undermines Locke’s case. Further 
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as Peter Laslett says that Locke’s case is that the development of property led men 
from state of nature to government in order to preserve and protect that property which 
they had acquired through their labour.686 He goes on to say that according to Locke 
“property, both in the narrow and in the extended sense, is insufficiently protected and 
inadequately regulated in the state of nature and this is the critical inconvenience 
which induces men to ‘enter into society...’”687 And Sandra F. Joireman has said that 
John Locke viewed “property rights as intertwined with the existence of the political 
community. For Locke, the presentation of property is the “chief end” of the formation 
of the state...”688 Furthermore, Locke acknowledged that nature of acquisition of 
property rights would change once man entered ‘society.’689 Therefore, perhaps a 
revaluation of Locke is in order, instead of the libertarian that he is so often perceived 
as being these days (because he argues that property is a natural right that does not 
need the state to exist), he in fact takes the classical liberal position that the reason for 
the state is to protect property. This is an important distinction. Even if we accept that 
property rights can exist independently of the state, they need the state to have any 
value. Without security and certainty property rights are worthless, as will be 
elaborated upon below. 
Indeed, the state which was probably more impacted by the thinking of John Locke 
than any other was founded by people who generally agreed that while God had 
wanted man to form a political society (i.e. the ancient Kings of Israel etc) they, 
influenced heavily by John Locke, believed that the purpose of political society was 
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“the preservation and regulation property. It had been formed by agreement or 
compact among property owners for these purposes.”690 
As mentioned, Locke is important, as is the ‘natural school’ of property rights for 
which is serves as the standard bearer. He cannot be ignored, particularly given his 
influence in the US. Indeed, the influence of his thinking can be detected in the US 
space resources legislation, the formulation in which the act of ‘obtaining’ a space 
resource ‘entitles’ a US citizen to that resource, is clearly an application of Locke’s 
‘labour theory’.691 However, as explored in this section there are several issues with 
Locke. First, outer space is not in ‘the state of nature.’ Human activities in outer space 
are subject to international law, this has certainly been the case since the enactment of 
the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 but a clear case can be made for this being the situation 
since at least UNGA Resolution 1962. Further, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
requires States to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals in outer space. Outer Space, 
therefore, is clearly not outside the scope of the ‘State’, ‘society’, or the law, and thus 
cannot be considered as being in the ‘state of nature.’ As demonstrated above, Locke’s 
labour theory only applied in that circumstance. Further, Locke’s conception of the 
development of property is simply not supported by the historical record. The state 
preceded property and property relies on state and its enforcement mechanisms (and 
the effective rule of law) in order to have any economic or practical value. Finally, 
Locke himself recognizes the importance of the state in providing this value. Locke is 
influential, but positivism or the ‘bundle of rights’ school of property theory provides 
a much better framework for understanding the origin and nature of property and is 
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more compatible with the Outer Space Treaty. This will be examined in the next 
section. 
7.4 Positive Property or Bundle of Rights 
 
Property is a fundamental concept to both society and the economy, furthermore 
“perhaps more than any other fundamental legal concept, the notion of property invites 
contention.”692 Numerous scholars agree that property is a relationship between people 
in relation to an ‘object’, there is also fairly board agreement amongst modern legal 
scholars of property that it is comprised of multiple elements or ‘bundles’. Alexander 
and Peñalver say that property is not about a person’s relationship to a thing but about 
the rights people have against each other in relation to a thing.693 Kevin Gray and 
Susan Francis Gray have written that “property is not a thing but a power relationship... 
a power relationship of social and legal legitimacy existing between a person and a 
valued resource.”694 Macpherson says that what is commonly referred to as property 
generally means a thing, but in law it really means title, the exclusive right to a thing.695 
Margaret Davies wrote that “property is not an object at all, but rather a legally defined 
relationship between persons with respect to an object.”696 Svetozar Pejovich says that 
“property rights are relations among men that arise from the existence of scarce goods 
and pertain to their use.”697 J.E. Penner said that “property is pictured as a bundle of 
different rights, such as the right to consume, the right to destroy, the right to manage, 
the right to give, the right to lend, the right to sell, and so on.”698 John Christman says 
that “private liberal ownership amounts to the enforcement of individual rights to use, 
 
692Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law (7th edn, OUP 2011), 30 
693Alexander and Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory (n 388), 2 
694Gray, Land Law (n 692), 32 
695Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’ (n 388), 6-7 
696Davies, Property (n 41), 13 
697Svetozar Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of Comparative Systems 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990), 27 
698J.E. Penner The Idea of Property in Law (CUP 1997), 1-2 
Page 198 of 342 
posses, destroy, transfer, and gain income from goods.”699 As  Jeremy Waldron says 
the modern view of property is as ‘bundle of rights’ and this is dominant paradigm.700 
As indicated, there is broad support for viewing property as a ‘bundle of rights’, 
however there is debate over the constituent elements of this bundle. Gregory S. 
Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver, in their book An Introduction to Property Theory 
list the essential elements of the bundle as including:  
the right to possess (which includes the right to exclude), the right to 
use, the right to manage, the right to the income a thing generates, the 
right to the capital (i.e., the thing itself), the right to security, the right 
to transmissibility and the absence of term (potentially infinite 
duration), the duty to prevent harm, the liability to execution (e.g. to 
satisfy a debt), and the incident of residuarity (the idea that, when lesser 
interests come to an end, the full interest in the property reverts to the 
owner.701 
 
The core components of the ‘bundle’ particularly concerning space resources are the 
right to exclude and the right to use. Essentially these two ‘core’ sticks of the ‘bundle’ 
are about control over who and how the resource is used. It is this control over how 
the resource is used which distinguishes “property entitlement from other species of 
right recognized by law.”702 
7.4.1 Right to Exclude 
 
That the right to exclude is fundamental to the concept of property is a widely held 
position among scholars of property law. And Morris Cohen says that “the essence of 
private property is always the right to exclude others.”703 Cohen also argues that there 
is not any guarantee that one can actually use their property but that the right to exclude 
others from using them is the key. He says specifically that “the law does not guarantee 
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me the physical or social ability of actually using what it calls mine… But the law of 
property helps me directly only to exclude others from using the things that it assigns 
to me.”704 However it is worth noting that the absolute nature of the right to exclude, 
if it ever existed, has certainly diminished over time and now a wider and societal 
consideration needs to be taken.705 The right to exclude is perhaps the biggest single 
issue with the notion of ‘property rights’ in outer space, as the right to exclude flies 
squarely in the face of Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. That said, you can 
have right to use without the right to exclude. However, use by its very nature often 
involves exclusion; Penner uses the example of a library book, while in use by one 
library patron other library patrons are excluded from using it for as long as the first 
patron retains the book.706 Of course, this is a potential issue for space resources as the 
‘use’ of the space resource will generally render it permanently unusable by other 
parties. Further, Penner argues that the idea that property is the right to exclude others 
is a misconception, he says that the right to property is more of a general duty on others 
“to exclude themselves from the property of others.”707 As Penner argues, there is no 
interest for anyone in preventing the use of a resource708, it is about selective control, 
choosing who to exclude and who to let use the item. While exclusion is an important 
aspect of property, however without the right to actually use the resource property has 
limited, if any value. 
7.4.2 Right to Use 
 
Margaret Davis has written that “intrinsic to the existence of private property is the 
power to control the object.”709 An important part of that is controlling who and how 
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it is used. As Kevin and Susan Francis Gray have said, that the owner is entitled to 
determine how to use the resource; it is this control which “distinguish property 
entitlement from other species of right recognized by law.”710  
‘Use’ can mean an active engagement with an object but there is also a broader 
meaning of ‘use’. “In this broad sense ‘use’ refers to a disposition one can make of 
something that is purposeful and can be interfered with by others.” This broader 
definition does not require continual engagement as long as future engagement is 
planned or considered. Long term interests make the broad definition of ‘use’ the most 
appropriate one to use.711 This is particularly important for space resources, especially 
on asteroids, as given the nature of orbits, there may be significant periods of 
‘disengagement’ from the ‘use’ of a site for resource extraction while future operations 
are still planned. 
That there is a right to use one’s property is logical. However, this is not an unlimited 
or unconstrained right. There are environmental protection rules that, for example, 
limit the ways in which a farmer can use her fields or heritage protection rules that 
limit the colour a homeowner can paint their 16th century home. Furthermore, use is 
not an exclusive right of the owner, nor does use give rise to ownership. Borrowing a 
wheelbarrow does not transfer ownership, using a swing in a municipal park does not 
make it yours, even eating an apple, though destruction is the ultimate form of 
appropriation,712 does not render the apple yours. A right to use is certainly part of 
property, though as mentioned not an absolute right, but it also, on its own does not 
indicate the existence of property, in this sense the right to exclude is the stronger 
‘stick.’ 
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7.4.3 Are All Sticks Equal? 
 
However, as Underkuffler points out there is a problem with the ‘bundle’ theory as it 
is unclear if something is property because of those elements or whether because it is 
property it therefore gives rise to those rights. She argues that it is possible to take a 
results-based approach, i.e. a property rights regime is supposed to advance individual 
liberty or promote human flourishing. This approach would impact what is included 
on the ‘list’ of elements of the bundle.713 Further, there is a question of hierarchy, as 
Underkuffler argues 
The rights to use, possess, exclude, devise, and so on are often cited as 
usual incidents of corporeal property ownership. Because these rights 
are almost always described in the same breath, one might expect that 
they are equally held and equally protected.714 
 
However, she argues that this is not the case, that there is actually a hierarchical 
ordering, with the right to exclude being considered the highest ranked and most 
essential. The right to use and the right to sell are considered less important and 
therefore have been given less protection.715 
However, Penner takes issue with the centrality of the exclusive use of property. He 
argues that property “must involve more than a right to the exclusive use of a thing.”716 
However he recognizes that exclusivity is vital to the interest in property but it is about 
the exclusion of the determination of the use of the thing.717 Penner argues that 
the right to property is the right to determine the use or disposition of 
an alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others 
excluding themselves from it, and includes the right to abandon it, to 
share it, to license it to others (either exclusively or not), and to give it 
to others in its entirety.718 
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He argues that property is not necessarily about excluding everyone, but about 
controlling who we share with. He uses the example of a bottle of wine to illustrate 
the point, arguing that we do not share a bottle of wine with everyone but with a few 
select people. For Penner, use “justifies the right” while exclusion is more about a 
practical aspect that might also be formulated as ‘non-interference’. However, “the 
basic idea is that non-owners of the property in question may not trespass, handle, 
damage, or destroy the property…”719 
7.5 Property and the State 
 
That property and the state are intertwined is clear. Indeed, for ‘ancient’ philosophers 
it was often part of the foundational nature of the State. For Rousseau the state is 
established “only in order to provide security for private property...”720 Locke takes a 
similar view, in the state of nature labour gives rise to ‘property’ over resources721 
however, in this state of nature anyone is free by force to take ones property and there 
is no recourse, other than responding in kind, to this violation.722 Therefore man 
entered into a society, created government and the state in order to provide protection 
of property.723 However, Locke’s Labour theory of property was controversial in his 
own day724, and indeed, as has been discussed was not a novel argument but one that 
had been debated during the 15th century.725 Hobbes took a similar view that man 
created the state, or submitted to a sovereign (i.e. Leviathan) in order to gain security 
from the eternal state of war that existed prior to the state. In his view there cannot be 
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any property when there is no security and in order to have security one needs a state 
(sovereign).726 
However, it is worth noting that this notion that the state is something ‘endured’ for 
the sake of security is a modern phenomenon. For Aristotle the state (polis) was a 
natural development of humanity, first came the household, then the village then the 
city. In his view the state is a natural phenomenon, humanity needs it; humans by 
nature are political animals and therefore create polities. The purpose of the state is 
not to defend property but to bring about the enjoyment of a good life, property is 
necessary for the good life727 and the regulation of property is among the most 
important considerations for the state because the distribution of property is one of the 
main sources of conflict, and the state should strive to avoid internal conflict.728 Cicero 
similarly views the state as a natural phenomenon. States are created not because of 
weakness (i.e. security a la Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) but because of an “innate 
desire on the part of human beings to form communities. For our species is not made 
up of solitary individuals or lonely wanderers.”729 Cicero similarly views the state as 
being central to the creation of the good life stating that “the good life is impossible 
without a good state; and there is no greater blessing than a well-ordered state.”730 
Of course, it is worth considering that these views do not match the historical reality. 
James Scott has examined the development of the earliest states and found the 
evidence does not stack up with the narrative. As he discusses the rise of agriculture 
and the subsequent rise of the state is central to our narrative of civilizational progress; 
the superiority of a sedentary, farming society is generally assumed without much 
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examination. Yet there is considerable evidence of resistance to settlement. This 
narrative of progress does not stand up to the archaeological evidence.  
Mainstream modern legal scholars view the state as being intertwined with the 
institution of property. Kevin Gray says that “the state takes on a critical… role in 
defining the concept of ‘property’. The state itself becomes a vital factor in the 
‘property equation: all ‘property’ has a public law character. Private ‘property’ is never 
truly private.”731 Waldron has said that “there is no getting away from the fact that 
property rights are entangled in public legislation.”732 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis 
Gray declare that “property is a socially constructed concept.”733 Several scholars have 
argued that property is inherently political although the legal system attempts to 
neutralise this political aspect by making it ‘objective’ and ‘technical’. However, as 
property is about the allocation of scarce resources it is inherently political.734 
Margaret Davis has said that “private property only exists insofar as it is publicly 
acknowledged through the institution of law.”735 However, property is both an 
institution and an idea and one that is different from other rights like freedom of speech 
as “property involves allocation: with regard to property, the giving to one person 
necessarily denies or takes from another” (emphasis in original).736The protection of 
rights like freedom of speech are ‘cheap’ to society as protecting one person’s freedom 
of speech does not take anything away from another person. The protection of property 
is different, however. “If the enjoyment of a particular good by one person is protected, 
then the enjoyment of that same good by others is denied. The extension of property 
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protection to one person necessarily and inevitably denies the same right to others.”737 
Property “is, in its essence, the resolution of conflicting claims.”738 Therefore the state 
takes an active role by denying claims and allocating rights to specific persons. 
Therefore “the state cannot simply be the ‘watchman’ for this right. It cannot protect 
without intervening. Property rights are, by nature, positive rights, allocative rights” 
(emphasis in original).739  Furthermore, she argues that property rights are social rights  
they embody how we, as a society, have chosen to reward the claims 
of some people to finite and critical goods, and to deny the claims to 
the same goods by others. Try as we might to separate this right from 
choice, conflict, and vexing social questions, it cannot be done. 
(emphasis in original).740 
 
This means that  
 
Property rights are not, in fact, private interests which the state 
neutrally abides. Property rights are collective, enforced, even violent 
decisions about who shall enjoy the privileges and resources of this 
society. Questions about what kind of society that we are, and the kind 
of society that we wish to become, must be inherent parts of the 
interpretation of this right.741 
 
The point about enforcement is particularly important. Without effective enforcement 
property rights are ‘worthless’742 as will be discussed in more detail below. However, 
this does mean that, as Macpherson argues, property is an inherently political concept, 
especially as it requires society to enforce it and it is enforcement that gives it value.743 
As Underkuffler says “property laws, of all laws, are the most inextricably intertwined 
with the use of coercive state power to allocate the resources necessary for human 
life.”744 This is to be expected because as Waldron argues “all law involves something 
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like state agency, if only because in the end it is the state that is called upon to come 
to the aid of private litigants in upholding their private law rights.”745 He goes on to 
argue that “law works holistically. And property rights are not defined in isolation 
from the rest of the law. What my property rights amount to is partly a matter of how 
things stand in other areas of the law.”746 Property rights are “creations of the law, 
designed to serve social interests.”747 However, as Margaret Davis points out, to say 
that property is a socially constructed  or even legally constructed concept or a political 
institution created by positive law not nature is not to argue that does not exist but that 
it is a construct, one that exists in a broader social and cultural context.748  
There is also an economic context, and it is arguable that the value of property rights 
is really in the economic context which is enabled and facilitated by the legal 
institution that property has its value. One proponent of this view Yoram Barzel argues 
that trying to determine the origins of property rights is a futile, pointless exercise. 
That in effect, property rights have always existed and even if we could identity a pre-
property rights era it would not tell us anything of value. Studying the evolution of 
property rights is a much more useful exercise.749 
As a rule, in an already functioning society the creation of rights is an 
ongoing process. Rights are created in the presence of state authority, 
which has a comparative advantage over private individuals in the use 
of violence and which tends to discourage its private use. When a state 
authority is in place, the role of allocation devices other than violence 
is greatly enhanced.750 
 
Barzel argues that “the government, as a rule, participates in defining and in protecting 
private [property] rights.” Barzel says that “new rights are created in response to new 
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economic forces.”751 Which leads to the implication that property rights are “largely a 
matter of economic value rather than of legal definition.”752 The economic context of 
property rights, particularly the value of the institution will be discussed in greater 
detail below. However, in connection with the role of the state, enforcement is vital, 
as Joireman argues, without effective enforcement property rights are ‘worthless’753 
and this enforcement role makes the state central to the institution. 
7.6 Enforcement, the Rule of Law and the Value of Property Rights 
 
As has been mentioned above, and will be explored in greater detail below, effective 
enforcement is vital to the institution of property. However, Robert Ellickson has 
demonstrated it is possible to have ‘order without law’; he argued that society does 
not necessarily need formal rules to exist and that informal rules are capable of 
providing, and do provide, considerable order and stability, and this can include 
property rights.754 Ellikcson examined cattle ranchers in the Western United States 
and their ‘informal’ processes for managing access to grazing land. The US gold 
rushes also provide an interesting case study; there was in effect no law in operation 
in these camps but miners peacefully established system of property rights.755 
Violence in the gold mining camps was nowhere near as rampant as is assumed 
“miners avoided the negative-sum game of violence, opting instead for establishing 
and enforcing property rights.”756 Miners would often work out rules and dispute 
resolution mechanisms themselves, without the need for formal government. Mining 
camps tended to create rules regarding property rights, particularly with regard to 
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claims. Anderson and Hill report that disputes were usually settled peacefully (though 
how much of a role the ubiquity of firearms played in this is unclear).757 As Anderson 
and Hill argue 
Far from being a ‘theater of tragic events – the scene of bloodshed and 
strife,’ mining camps in California were a crucible for institutional 
evolution. Miners recognized violence as a negative-sum game and 
devised efficient methods for defining and enforcing property rights.758 
 
However, circumstances matter, while the surface miners in California were able to 
rely on informal rules and mechanisms, the subsurface miners of Nevada, by contrast, 
felt the need for more formal, government backed property rights as the value of the 
claims they were dealing with were higher, as was the demand for capital investment, 
meaning miners were willing to spend more pursing disputes.759 This is important, 
while property rights are about managing access to resources, there is also an 
economic value to them. This economic value relies on formal property rights, and the 
rule of law. While it is certainly possible to have ‘order without law’ the economic 
value of property is only really unlocked by law. 
Which is drastically evidenced by the disparity between the West and the developing 
world, especially those states with weak property rights protections and limited rule 
of law. As Hernando de Soto has argued the lack of secure legal rights to resources 
deny many in developing countries use of considerable capital that could be put to 
productive economic use. He argues that the real advantage of the West is the legal 
infrastructure that allows the transformation of assets into capital via mortgages and 
other secured loans; this can only be done with secure formal property rights.760 
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“For decades, economists and development specialists have argued that secure 
property rights are a precondition for vibrant economic growth.”761 In classical 
economics, capital is the driving force of the market economy762 and therefore, lack 
of access to capital or an inability to capitalize resources will hamper, if not entirely 
prevent, economic development. As de Soto argues “what creates capital in the West, 
in other words, is an implicit process buried in the intricacies of its formal property 
systems.”763 
“Without clear knowledge of who owns what, it is difficult to make use of a 
resource...” Furthermore, in the absence of a legal framework of property rights 
individuals can only do business with those they trust, and an important and valuable 
source of capital is lost.764 However, if, for whatever reason, formal property rights 
are unavailable, people will seek out informal enforcement mechanisms. Although, in 
absence of formal institutions backed by law, institutions depend on trust and 
reputation i.e. personal relationships (which necessarily disadvantage outsiders and 
limit the number of potential business partners.) Anthropologists and economic 
historians report “a limitation in trade among the kin group or other small community 
until the presence of rules governing contracts can be enforced more broadly.”765 As 
Joireman argues, in absence of formal property law, private institutional innovation 
will provide some form of property rights however significant problems with informal 
systems can exist and it is very difficult, if not impossible to capitalize informal 
property.766 This is important, while there are benefits to an informal system for space 
resources as it would allow flexibility for a new industry, space resources will require 
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significant capital investment which will likely necessitate security that can only really 
be provided by a formal system. 
There is a balance between the cost of defining and enforcing property rights and the 
value of doing so. Anderson and Hill stipulate that they would only expect people to 
expend the time and energy defining and enforcing property rights over scarce 
resources.767 Ultimately it is a scale between the value of the resource and the cost of 
establishing a regime and engaging with the process. “If ownership rights to property 
are well defined and can be exchanged, the costs of negotiations decline relative to the 
costs of taking.”768 Given the potential value of space resources, and the capital 
investment that will be required, the balance is likely to be tilted in favour of formal 
property rights.  
One thing is clear, there needs to be an accepted mechanism for conflict and dispute 
resolution. Violence can be an effective way to resolve property disputes, but it also 
wastes valuable resources and can sow the seeds for further violence.769 However, the 
ability to use force (or credibility of threat to use force) is important for 
enforcement.770 Enforcement is vital because as Joireman states “property rights that 
are not enforceable do not exist”771 
However, there is a difference between power and violence. Power can be understood 
as dominion with violence being a component of power but power can also be a 
collective thing, bestowed by a group upon a leader or group of leaders.772 State 
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institutions are important, however “political institutions are powerful only because 
they have the support of the people.”773 However, 
violence, in contrast, is rooted in individual strength, and the use of weapons 
and other implements simply augments the natural strength of the individual. 
Violence can garner obedience through fear, but it does not create power. In 
fact, violence is a substitute for power- it is used because the person is 
powerless, because she has not been empowered by the group.774 
 
Clearly, a powerful state adhering to the rule of law is the best method for protecting 
and enforcing (though not necessarily defining) property rights however, “people want 
their property rights defended and will seek the means to have them enforced.”775 
Where the state is weak or absent, people will turn to ‘non-state actors who are 
specialists in violence’ to protect and enforce their property rights. Private security 
companies (PSCs) “in the contemporary era provide security for resource extraction 
conducted by state-owned companies as well as international corporations.” As 
Joireman says “natural resource extraction is guarded by private security forces in 
weak states across the globe...”776 However, this should be avoided because a reliance 
on private security, particularly in a ‘frontier’ environment like outer space, can lead 
to an uncontrollable avalanche of violence. Indeed, the histories of the various 
European East India Companies should provide ample warning of allowing ‘private 
enforcement’ in resource rich and distant arenas. 
Furthermore, there is a clear incentive to develop an effective regime as “clearly 
defined and enforced property rights promote economic development and reduce 
violence.” However, it is important to recognize that “the presence of a state does not 
mean that it is the most efficient enforcer of property rights, nor does the presence of 
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state institutions mean that non-state alternatives will disappear.”777 As Elinor Ostrom 
has argued, there are a range of solutions and which one is the most appropriate will 
depend on the situation and circumstances.778 However, there is no doubt as to the 
value of the rule of law to economic value of property rights. 
The value of the rule of law for commerce has been recognized for centuries. Indeed, 
Lord Mansfield argued that commerce needs legal certainty. Articulating that “the 
daily negotiations and property of merchants ought not to depend upon subtleties and 
niceties; but upon rules, easily learned and easily retained...”779 As well as that “in all 
mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more 
consequence that a rule should be certain...”780 Furthermore, Adam Smith recognized 
the value of strong government to economic success stipulating the need for a “well 
governed society” in The Wealth of Nations.781 Historian Gordon Wood has argued 
that despite a disposition to avoid ‘government’ early Americans soon learned, and 
came to recognize, the value of the rule of law to conduct and trade.782 
Modern commentators, scholars, lawyers are just as (if not more) adamant as their 18th 
century counterparts. Lord Bingham has written that “the successful conduct of trade, 
investment and business generally is promoted by a body of accessible legal rules 
governing commercial rights and obligations.” He went on to state that “no one would 
choose to do business, perhaps involving large sums of money in a country where the 
parties rights and obligations were vague or undecided.”783 For Todd Zywicki the 
value of the rule of law is that economic activity requires as much stability as possible 
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which the rule of law helps provide.784 Jeremy Waldron argues that the rule of law is 
desirable for business however he questions whether the rule of law protects economic 
freedom or whether it is a cultural respect from property which promotes the rule of 
law? Regardless it is clear that legal consistency and predictability is key to the rule 
of law and something to be valued.785 It is clear that that clear, adhered to ‘rules of the 
game’ ease the path to economic success and “economists have repeatedly found that 
the better the rule of law, the richer the nation.”786 However, the context matters 
because as Ryan Avent has argued “an appreciation for property rights, for instance, 
is valueless unless it is held within a community of like-minded people.”787 As 
Sitaraman has said “having a legal system is not enough for the rule of law” (emphasis 
in original).788 Sitaraman says that there is a cultural component to the rule of law 
which is based on social practices or history this view sees the rule of law as inherently 
political and therefore needs to be “linked to the political values of the particular 
society.” This is relevant because there needs to be a ‘buy in’ in order for rules to be 
effective. “Rules are meaningless if they are ignored in practice, they become mere 
words on parchment, rather than felt obligations that are followed by most of the 
population most of the time.”789 Legal rules without support or legitimacy among the 
population can only be imposed by coercion and thus undermine the stability of 
society.790 As discussed above, there is a difference between violence and power; 
power is more effective and less costly.791 
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Sitaraman says that it is best to think of the rule of law as being ‘organic’, in that it 
grows and develops based on the culture and politics of the society in question.792 And 
as Joireman argues law alone is not enough, “without enforcement, property rights are 
only constructed mythologies.”793 As she says “the fallacy of legalism occurs when 
we think that just because a state has made a law, that law is enforced.”794  
This issue can be highlighted by reference to the 19th century North American fur trade 
which exemplified the difficulty in regulating and controlling an industry that operates 
far from the ‘effective control’ of government. The US Federal government tried, for 
various reasons, to impose regulations on interactions with Native Americans (such as 
restricting the trading of alcohol) in early 19th century, but the regulations were widely 
ignored by all but the biggest trade companies and were anyway hard to enforce.795 
Similarly attempts to control the number and type of beaver harvested for conservation 
purposes were also largely unsuccessful, due largely to the impotence of the 
government to enforce them.796 The Hudson Bay Company, operating in what is today 
Canada and under licence from the British Government, had a similar experience with 
their conservation policies which were introduced as early as 1821 with regards to 
trappers not directly employed by the company (company employees proved easier to 
control). However, the exception to this was Blackfoot territory which was rich in 
beaver but the Blackfoot “repulsed any American attempts to trap these furs” choosing 
to trade with the Hudson Bay Company instead.797  The key difference was that the 
Blackfoot had the ability to ‘enforce’ their regulations, it was not enough for the US 
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Government to produce legislation. The same may prove true with regards to space 
resources, indeed enforcement issues are already cropping up, such as with the recent 
unlicensed launch by Swarm.798 
It is imperative that the state provide effective enforcement measures because “without 
a state supply of institutions for property rights enforcement, we should expect to see 
violence…”799 The propensity for violence will clearly scale with the value of the 
resources in question but it is a looming threat. This is particularly concerning for 
space resources because this will not happen within a state but rather in an area that 
‘belongs’ to the international community, therefore no single state can effectively take 
action, particularly if (or once) there are participants from multiple states engaging in 
space resource activities. 
A free for all for land and resources leads to a Hobbesian dystopia “but if rules can be 
established to define and enforce property rights and encourage peaceful trade, order 
can replace fighting and prosperity can replace hardship.”800  
However, property rights do not always evolve peacefully and the “lesson we should 
learn from the ‘not so wild, wild West’ is that secure and transferable property rights 
may not be easy to develop, but they are a necessity for supplanting conflict with 
cooperation.”801 Of course, the Outer Space Treaty does stipulate that the “use of outer 
space… shall be guided by the principle of co-operation”802 and so as to promote 
“international co-operation”803 strengthening and underpinned by the UN Charter call 
for “international co-operation in solving international problems.”804 
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7.7 Alternatives 
So far, the focus has been on ‘mainstream’ approaches to property, however it is worth 
considering some of the alternative approaches and models. First, this section will look 
at Proudhon, one of the original ‘critics’ of property. Then Ostrom and her approach 
to Common Pool Resources, particularly relevant for outer space. Finally, this section 
will consider concepts of ‘stewardship’. As was argued in the last chapter, the frontier 
is where new approaches to property are trialled, there is no reason the ‘final frontier’ 
should be any different. 
7.7.1 Proudhon 
 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was one of the more virulent critics of property, particularly 
the notion that property is a natural right. He is most famously remembered (if usually 
unattributed) for the declaration that property is theft. As is often the case his argument 
was more nuanced than that and worth exploring. Proudhon contended “that neither 
occupation nor labour nor law can create property, which is rather an effect without a 
cause.”805 He started his examination with the Roman legal definition of property 
which is commonly taken as “as the right to use and abuse a thing within the limits of 
the law.” However, Proudhon rejects the argument that ‘abuse’ in the context means 
having an absolute domain over things. He also argues that ‘abuse’ does not include a 
right to senseless and immoral ‘abuse’ saying that “in matters of property, use and 
abuse are necessarily indistinguishable.”806 
He also argues that there is a need to make a distinction between property – the right 
over a thing – and possession which is a fact not a right (the tenant farmer possesses 
the farm but he does not enjoy the right of property over the farm, that belongs to the 
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owner). This distinction leads to two types of right, right in a thing (jus in re) and right 
to a thing (jus ad rem).807 Proudhon rejects the notion that property is a natural right, 
certainly the notion that it is equal to the other rights like liberty and equality. In 
particular he argues that if property is a natural right then why is there so much 
question as to its origin? If it is really a natural right then its origin is God.808 “The 
right of occupation, or of the first occupant is the result of the actual, physical effective 
possession of a thing. I occupy a piece of land; the presumption is that I am the 
proprietor until the contrary is proved.”809 
Proudhon is critical of the notion of property as a natural right, particularly its equation 
with other natural rights like ‘life and liberty.’ He repeatedly makes the point that if 
property is vital to the happiness or even the life of man then surely everyone has an 
equal right to it? And/or that one only really has the right to that which he actually 
needs to enjoy the other rights? And especially that there is a perversion in the 
prevention of people from obtaining that which they need to live in the name of the 
protection of property (he likes to use the analogy of an islander causing shipwreck 
survivors to drown in the name of preventing their ‘trespassing’ on his property.)810 
Proudhon feels that it is right that there should be a right of property in the product of 
labour but does not see why that should give rise to a right of property over the land 
itself.811 Proudhon attacks the labour theory of origin of property rights in land, 
arguing that it is primarily only brought out after ‘occupation’ has failed as a defence. 
He also argues that why should the child of a land owner be able to inherit his father’s 
land if labour is the justification for ownership, after all the child has not laboured for 
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the land.812 Proudhon attacks the labour theory of property acquisition by using the 
analogy of the fisherman and the hunter, saying that by their labour they only gain 
property over the resources (i.e. fish and game) that they have ‘extracted’ but their 
labour does not entitle them to the land the fish and game were on at time of extraction. 
Proudhon says that this should be no different for the farmer, sure he is entitled to the 
crops he has grown but this does not give him property over the land they grew on.813 
Furthermore, Proudhon asks why if the labour theory of property is true does it still 
not apply? I.e. if I improve my farmland why do I not gain at least a share of it, why 
does my landlord who has done no labour on it still own it all?814 
For Proudhon the state is vital to property for “agriculture alone was not enough to 
establish permanent property; what was necessary was positive laws and magistrates 
to execute them. What was necessary, in a word, was the civil state.”815 Proudhon 
argues that property is something created by society, by the state, it is not God given 
or ‘natural’. This means that property can change, society has that power, because 
“society reserves the right to set the conditions of property.”816 Proudhon asks why in 
an age driven by science and reason where we are ready to change our understanding 
of the very nature of the universe itself when new discoveries are made do we so resist 
changes in our political and philosophical thinking.817 
Proudhon argues that public order and public security only require the protection of 
the rights of the possessor, the institution of property itself is not necessary for that 
goal.818 He goes on to argue that land cannot be appropriated, that it is necessary to 
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life and therefore should be held in common just like air, water and light, that its 
comparative scarcity actually makes this more not less important.819 
To sustain life man thus needs continually to appropriate all kinds of 
things. But these things do not exist in the same proportions. Some, 
such as the light of the stars, the atmosphere of the earth, and the water 
contained in the seas and oceans exist in such great quantities that men 
cannot create any perceptible increase or decrease; and each one can 
appropriate as much as he needs without detracting from the enjoyment 
of others or causing them the least harm. Things of this sort are in some 
way the common property of the human race; the only duty imposed 
upon each individual in this regard is in no way to interfere with the 
enjoyment of others.820 
 
For Proudhon property, established by law, is not a psychological fact, a natural, or 
moral right but an abstraction, a metaphor, a fiction, established without considering 
“whether it was right or wrong.”821 While the institution of property he attacked is 
certainly well entrenched it has not endured without further criticism or indeed 
alternative proposals. Some of these, particularly the notion of stewardship, may prove 
more suitable to the unique circumstances, physical and legal, of the outer space 
environment, than the traditional, terrestrial notion of property. 
7.7.2 Elinor Ostrom: Institutions for Governing the Commons 
 
Ostrom argues that traditionally there are two approaches to trying to prevent ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ situations, one a recourse to ‘Leviathan’ or a powerful central 
government exercising regulatory authority; or two, the imposition of a private 
property system as a substitution for a common property system.822 Ostrom recognized 
that while policymakers and similar actors often talk about the ‘best’ method this 
essentially fell into one of these two categories, either the government was the best 
manager or the market was the best manger. Ostrom argued that  
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We need to recognise that the governance systems that actually have 
worked in practice fit the diversity of ecological conditions that exist 
in a fishery, irrigation system or pasture, as well as the social systems. 
There is a huge diversity out there, and the range of governance systems 
that work reflects that diversity. We have found that government, 
private and community-based mechanisms all work in some settings.823 
 
Ostrom was part of the rational choice tradition, though she recognized that actors are 
not purely rational however they are “purposeful actors who respond to incentives. 
Institutions shape the incentives that people face and affect the likelihood of whether 
they will coordinate their actions successfully or whether they will engage in negative-
sum games.”824 In this context institutional meant both formal institutions such as the 
legal system and soft institutions such as cultural attitudes. The traditional view 
regarding common-pool recourses has treated them as all suffering from the same 
weakness for ‘free riding’ and that therefore they require an external body impose a 
management regime in order to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Ostrom argued 
that this is not always the case and that there are times when the resource users 
themselves are best placed to devise the management regime and that an external body 
(such as the government) can actually be the worst or at least worse option.825 
“The presumption that an external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the 
commons leads to recommendations that central governments control most natural 
resource systems.”826 Establishment of private property resources in the case of a herd, 
for example, means that a common area will be equally divided among the herders, 
however this model usually assumes that the entire area is homogeneous and static 
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which is not always the case. The private property model breaks down even more 
when discussing nonstationary resources such as fish and water, often these rights 
focus on things like types of equipment, when certain rights holders can and cannot 
extract resources or limiting them to a particular quantities. “But even when particular 
rights are unitized, quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely to be 
owned in common rather than individually.”827 
Ostrom argues that there is not a single, simple solution to managing common pool 
resources. Her focus is on institutions. 
Instead of presuming that optimal institutional solutions can be 
designed easily and imposed at low cost by external authorities, I argue 
that ‘getting the institutions right’ is a difficult, time-consuming, 
conflict-invoking process. It is a process that requires reliable 
information about time and place variables as well as a broad repertoire 
of culturally acceptable rules.828 
 
Furthermore, Ostrom argues that  
 
Institutions are rarely either private or public – ‘the market’ or ‘the 
state.’ Many successful CPR institutions are rich mixtures of ‘private-
like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions defying classification in a sterile 
dichotomy. By ‘successful,’ I mean institutions that enable individuals 
to achieve productive outcomes in situations where temptations to free-
ride and shirk are ever present. A comparative market – the epitome of 
private institutions – is itself a public good. Once a competitive market 
is provided, individuals can enter and exit freely whether or not they 
contribute to the cost of providing and maintaining the market. No 
market can exist for long without underlying public institutions to 
support it. In field settings, public and private institutions frequently 
are intermeshed and depend on one another, rather than existing in 
isolated worlds.829 
 
One alternative model Ostrom presents is where the “herders themselves can make a 
binding contract to commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves 
will work out.”830  
 
827Ibid, 12-13 
828Ibid, 14 
829Ibid, 14-15 
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Page 222 of 342 
The herders negotiate before placing any cattle on the meadow and contracts are only 
binding if unanimously agreed. This approach does not depend on the accuracy of 
information supplied by government as the unanimity requirement ensures a balance 
and all parties agree to have enforced only that which they have agreed. While a civil 
court could be used to enforce this agreement Ostrom states that in practice a private 
arbitrator is often used in real life scenarios. A private arbitrator has the additional 
advantage in that solutions are further negotiated not imposed. Further advantages of 
this approach include that the parties as users of the commons have detailed and 
relatively accurate information about the commons. Additionally, “the self-interest of 
those who negotiated the contract will lead them to monitor each other and to report 
observed infractions so that the contract is enforced.” However, this model is not 
perfect, the users of the commons may get their information wrong about the carrying 
capacity of the commons, the monitoring system may breakdown, the external 
enforcer may be less effective than desired etc.831 
Ostrom’s focuses on these ‘common pool resources’ (CPR), as these are the least well 
served by the traditional private property model. “The term ‘common-pool resource’ 
refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently larges as to make 
it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits 
from its use.” She stipulates that “it is essential to distinguish between the resource 
system and the flow of resource units produced by the system, while still recognizing 
the dependence of the one on the other.” Examples of resource systems are fishing 
grounds, groundwater basins, grazing lands, and irrigation canals. “Resource units are 
what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems.” Examples of resource 
units are fish, water withdrawn from a reservoir, fodder consumed etc. This analysis 
 
831Ibid, 16-18 
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works best with renewable resources especially when the rate of withdrawal is less 
than the rate of replenishment. It is also worth noting that access to a CPR can be 
limited to one or multiple actors. Ostrom calls the process of withdrawing resource 
units from a resource system ‘appropriation’ and those who withdraw them 
‘appropriators.’ Appropriators use or consume the units, or input them into production 
processes, or they transfer ownership to others who then use the resource unit.832 
“A resource system can be jointly provided and/or produced by more 
than one person or firm. The actual process of appropriating resource 
units from the CPR can be undertaken by multiple appropriators 
simultaneously or sequentially. The resource units, however, are not 
subject to joint use or appropriation.”833 
 
Ostrom says that CPRs can seem like public goods in many aspects, particularly the 
“relatively high costs of physically excluding” access to the resource system however, 
the ‘subtractability’ of CPRs makes for a key distinction (i.e. if you take a fish out of 
the pond I cannot use that fish whereas your use of a weather forecast does not prevent 
me from also using that weather forecast).834 Ostrom argues that  
“no appropriation of resource units can occur without a resource 
system. Without a fair, orderly, and efficient method of allocating 
resource units, local appropriators have little motivation to contribute 
to the continued provision of the resource system.”835 
 
Cooperation among appropriators leads to a higher return for all and some sort of 
regime or system is necessary.  
At the most general level, the problem facing CPR appropriators is one 
of organizing: how to change the situation from one in which 
appropriators act independently to one in which they adopt coordinated 
strategies to obtain higher joint benefits or reduce their joint harm. That 
does not necessarily mean creating an organization. Organizing is a 
process; an organization is the result of that process. An organization 
of individuals who constitute an ongoing enterprise is only one form of 
organization that can result from the process of organizing.836 
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Many of the most successful modes of commons management are so called mixed 
regimes where certain aspects are individually owned but other assets are communally 
owned and managed. “Such arrangements work particularly well where the scale of 
the resource or common-pool resource problem makes it too difficult to create purely 
individual private property rights…”837 Where there are clear boundaries but the 
population is highly mobile and diverse it is often more effective to create individual 
private property rights because this minimises the need for agreement between 
resource users. However, this approach relies on property rights being reasonably well 
defined and the existence of effective courts and dispute resolution procedures.838 
While Ostrom recognises that external, centrally imposed regulation may be the best 
solution the presumption should be against doing so. There are several reasons for this 
presumption. First, central authorities often lack specific knowledge of the 
resources/assets being regulated and the nature/values of the resource users 
themselves. Second, centrally devised regimes undermine the incentive for resource 
users to devise a set of rules for themselves. Finally, a bottom-up, ‘trial and error’ 
approach is more likely to eventually discover the most effective and efficient 
management solution than a central imposed one. “States can play a useful role if they 
facilitate development of the dispute resolution procedures and ensure legal 
recognition for the local property rights structures which are a key ingredient in 
creating incentives to overcome free-riding.”839 
7.7.3 Stewardship 
There are proposals for a shift from the existing property paradigm to one which can 
be subsumed under the general heading of stewardship. There are a few models for 
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this new type of property management system, but they all recognize that no property 
exists in isolation. Not only is this because property is a socially constructed institution 
but because property is about power; it is about power over resources, about the 
allocation of scarce resources. By its very nature it creates have and have nots. A shift 
to a stewardship model would recognize the context in which property exists. There is 
also an environmental element to this as well, and for lack of a better term, a 
sustainability element. A recognition that resources are not unlimited and therefore 
their allocation and use does have broader implications. Despite claims about the 
vastness of space resources this is as true in outer space as it is on Earth.840 Therefore 
these proposals for a new model of property should be considered, particularly as they 
have the added benefit of being more compatible with the requirements of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the body of space law than the existing traditional, terrestrial models 
of property rights. 
Martin Adams argues that one of the issues with the existing property paradigm is that 
it treats nature itself as capital. 
While it’s appropriate to compensate companies for their efforts when 
they convert some of natures gifts into material goods, why should we 
allow them to profit from the gifts that nature freely provided to all 
living beings? We mistakenly believe that a free market should allow 
people and corporations to profit from nature, yet we’ve failed to 
consider the immense cost to live that occurs whenever people are 
allowed to reap what they haven’t sown at the expense of others. While 
the privatization of capital can lead to production efficiencies that 
benefit the entire market, the same can’t be said for the privatization of 
nature: Whenever the income stream for nature is privatized, human 
beings take for themselves the gifts that would better be freely shared 
with everyone.841 
 
He argues that most of the major religions, and indigenous peoples, treat nature as a 
gift; there is a right to access, a right to use, but not a right to own. He does not argue 
 
840Elvis and Milligan ‘How much of the solar system…’ (n 107) 
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that there is no right to make a profit from the use of nature’s ‘gifts’ his argument is 
that those who do profit from the utilization of these resources need to compensate the 
community from which they receive the benefits of these resources.842 A less extreme 
version of this argument is played out with the stewardship concept. William N.R. 
Lucy and Catherine Mitchell argue 
that the notion of stewardship retains enough of the features of private 
property – in particular, it can accommodate a structure of incentives 
for stewards – such that the tragedy of the commons will be avoided. 
Furthermore, the notion can be understood to embody a fairly explicit 
regime of regulating access to resources. A notion such as this – that 
supposedly avoids the conceptual and normative snags of private 
property while avoiding those that both strong and weak versions of 
common property generate – surely deserves further attention.843 
 
While there are biblical origins to the concept of stewardship, at least in the Western 
tradition, it has been dissociated from its theological basis in recent scholarship and 
“enlarged to incorporate the notion that man’s responsibility as custodian of the natural 
environment…” is a duty “…to the wider human community, perhaps including future 
generations.” They explain that “…stewardship is a relationship between agents in 
respect of a particular scarce and material resources…” This means that “control over 
these resources be exercised with due regard to the interests that other persons, apart 
from the holder or steward, may have in the resource.”844 
The steward therefore is a duty bearer not a rights holder, however the steward is not 
without rights.”845 
…stewardship maintains that the holder, or steward, has some control 
and rights over the resource, but that control must in the main be 
exercised for the benefit of specific others. Since the steward’s control 
must in the main be exercised in favour of others, it is not the case that 
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he must be completely selfless, an island of altruism in a sea of self-
interest. Event trustees receive some reward for their stewardship.846 
 
Stewardship does not necessarily involve scrapping the notion of private property but 
a duty to recognize the societal interests in the use of a resource could potentially be 
tacked on to the concept of private property. Stewardship needs to be conceived of as 
a replacement for private property not an addition to it. While private property has no 
link with the public interest, stewardship is explicitly linked though of course the 
question is then about what interests or whose interests etc and how they are applied.847 
Property management rules could be viewed as a form of stewardship that are already 
in existence, and the natural environment, which they are intended to protect, is 
certainly one of the potential interests that stewardship could be used to further. These 
are environmental rules designed to aid natural conservation efforts. Environmental 
rules do not have to limit or restrict ownership rights, they can create positive 
obligations on the manner in which ownership rights are exercised but leave the 
property owner free to determine how these are implemented, for example allowing a 
farmer to determine whether to set aside a portion of his land as a nature reserve or to 
use it all for farming but within normative standards of good agricultural practice. This 
is not about collective property as the conservation bodies are not given use or access 
of the resource nor is it common or communal property as the public are not given 
rights to use or access the land or even consulted in how it is used.848 
“Property management rules are a paradigm of a new generation of 
property rules introduced to further the collective interest in promoting 
nature conservation. These rules are best located within a resource 
allocation model of property rights, but understanding their status and 
function as an allocative rule requires a reappraisal of property rights 
theory.”849 
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Property management rules  
 
“dictate that the state decides not by whom a resource such as land is 
used – but rather how, when and in what manner that resource is used. 
In this sense the property over which the property management rule 
applies remains ‘private’ property’.”850 
 
Property management means that, for example, before a farmer installs a new drainage 
system he has to consult with the relevant conservation body who will either suggest 
an alternative approach that is less damaging, prohibit it (uncommon in practice) or 
offer a management agreement that protects the environmental conservation of the 
land. “The law has developed entirely new legal mechanisms to apply property 
management rules and to enforce positive management prescriptions tailored to nature 
conservation.” Christopher Rodgers argues that “legal scholarship must also recognise 
the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the interaction of property 
rights with the natural environment.”851 
Property is about power. Property is about the allocation of finite resources. Property 
shapes the society that creates it, entrenching or eliminating inequality. Property law 
is a framework for society and should be attentive to the needs of present and future 
generations, the natural environment and the non-human world.852 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examinee property as a legal and political concept as well as an idea and 
institution. Following on from this theoretical discussion of the nature of property is a 
discussion of the role of the state in relation to property. The chapter finishes with a 
discussion of some alternative conceptions of property. 
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This chapter has three key, essential arguments. It makes the case that property is an 
evolving, complex concept which has historical and societal context. There is no one 
definition of ‘property’, it is not a static or fixed concept. Further, property is a product 
of society and ultimately government, even in a Lockian state. Property is intertwined 
with the existence and authority of the state, it is a political creation. Finally, property 
is ultimately about distribution of resources, it is a mechanism for controlling access 
to, and use of, various resources be it gold, land or deposits of water ice on far flung 
asteroids. 
Property is fairly central to our economic system and even our political life. That said, 
it is ill defined and understood. The basic underlying issue is whether property is a 
right or a thing. However, it does not end there, if it is agreed that property is a right, 
or a ‘bundle of rights’, the debate then shifts on to whether it is a natural right (with 
reference to John Locke et al) or whether it is a more positivist construction, a ‘right’ 
endowed, protected and conceived by society and therefore dependent upon it for its 
existence.  
The property as a ‘thing’ idea is the prevalent popular conception of how property 
work i.e. my car is my property. Most people do not think of the title or the deed to 
their car or house as being their property.  
Modern legal scholarship takes the view that property is about rights between people 
in relation to ‘things’, and therefore ‘property’ is a grouping or constellation of 
elements and rights.  
Locke argued that the Earth was given to humanity, by God, as a commons. He 
constructed the labour theory of property, which stipulated that in the state of nature 
one could acquire property over things through labour. Meaning that if you picked 
apples from a tree you had ownership over those picked apples because of your labour 
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in harvesting them. However, this only applied in the state of nature and only to a 
quantity of material that one was capable of using. Further, Locke recognized that in 
the state of nature, in the absence of any government, one was also powerless to protect 
ones property without the use of vigilance and force, so the property owner would 
have to be constantly on guard against those who would take their property by force. 
This is why humans created society or the state. This was a point he made repeatedly 
throughout his Second Treatises, that the key role or end of political or civil society 
(by which he essentially meant the state) was the protection and regulation of property 
and he even went so far as to say that without the protection of the state property has 
little value, “for I have truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from 
me, when he pleases, against my consent.”853 
Modern property scholarship however treats property as a positive right and makes 
use of some variation of the ‘bundle of rights’ approach which regards ‘property’ as 
being comprised of several ‘bundles’ of rights such as the right to use, the right to 
exclude, the right to income et al. That the right to exclude is fundamental to the 
concept of property is a widely held position among scholars of property law.  
However, modern property theory has eroded, if it ever was the case, the ‘absolute 
nature’ of property indeed as Underkuffler writes “property rights, like all individual 
rights, are rarely absolute in any society.”854 
Use, it is agreed, is also an important, intrinsic right of property. However, this is not 
an unlimited or unconstrained right. Furthermore, use is not an exclusive right of the 
owner, nor does use give rise to ownership. A right to use is certainly part of property, 
though as mentioned not an absolute right, but it also, on its own does not indicate the 
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existence of property, in this sense the right to exclude is the stronger ‘stick.’ Several 
scholars argue the case for the ‘right to income’ is an important aspect of the ‘bundle’ 
and likely to become increasingly so.855  
A regular argument made throughout this chapter is that property and the state are 
intertwined in numerous ways. Various theorists have argued that the State exists or 
came into existence in order to protect property rights. That without this protection 
property rights do not have much value.  
The western conception of property evolved starting in about 12th century England but 
not really coming into being in the manner which they are thought of today until the 
17th century. It is a legal institution, and as such is dependent upon the state and its 
enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, this is the view of the mainstream of modern legal 
scholars. Furthermore, even if Locke was right, his claims about the labour theory of 
acquisition were only valid in the state of nature, and we are no longer in the state of 
nature, even in outer space. 
As mentioned, mainstream modern legal scholars view the state as being intertwined 
with the institution of property. Kevin Gray says that “the state takes on a critical… 
role in defining the concept of ‘property’. The state itself becomes a vital factor in the 
‘property equation: all ‘property’ has a public law character. Private ‘property’ is never 
truly private.”856 Waldron has said that “there is no getting away from the fact that 
property rights are entangled in public legislation.”857 A leading textbook on land law 
in the UK declares that “property is a socially constructed concept.”858 Several 
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scholars have argued that property is inherently political although the legal system 
attempts to neutralise this political aspect by making it ‘objective’ and ‘technical’. 
However, as property is about the allocation of scarce resources it is inherently 
political.859 The state is of vital necessity to property right as without effective 
enforcement property rights are ‘worthless’.860 Only the State can truly offer effective 
enforcement of property right, particularly in a way that is economically valuable. 
Force can be used to protect ‘property’ and indeed when the State is weak people are 
often forced to turn to private or non-governmental sources of protection. However, 
force in and of itself does not provide the necessary protection, legal legitimacy is 
necessary as otherwise there is no remedy other than reciprocal violence in the event 
of a violation or seizure of ones property by a stronger other. As Locke himself 
argued.861 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was one of the more virulent critics of property, particularly 
the notion that property is a natural right. He is most famously remembered (if usually 
unattributed) for the declaration that property is theft.862 However, his critique was 
more nuanced that that. He argued that as property is something created by society, by 
the state, it is not God given or ‘natural’. This means that property can change. That 
society has that power, because “society reserves the right to set the conditions of 
property.”863 He also argued that public order and public security only require the 
protection of the rights of the possessor, the institution of property itself is not 
necessary for that goal.864 He argued that that which is necessary for life, land, air, 
 
859Cowan, et al, Great Debates in Property Law (n 734), 4, 21-22 
860Joireman, Where There is No Government (n 688), 5, 25, 153 
861Locke, Two Treatises of Government (n 660), 360-361  
862Proudhon What is Property? (n 70), 13 
863Ibid, 59 
864Ibid, 79 
Page 233 of 342 
water, light et al, cannot be appropriated and should be held in common, so that all 
could have what they need.865 
Ostrom focused on ‘common pool resources’ (which, arguably so did Proudhon, he 
just did not use that term). Ostrom argued that many of the most successful modes of 
commons management are so called mixed regimes where certain aspects are 
individually owned but other assets are communally owned and managed866  A key 
aspect of this approach is to ensure that property rights are reasonably well defined 
and there are effective courts and dispute resolution procedures.867 
While Ostrom recognises that external, centrally imposed regulation may be the best 
solution she argues that there should be a presumption against it. There are several 
reasons for this presumption. First, central authorities often lack specific knowledge 
of the resources/assets being regulated and the nature/values of the resource users 
themselves. Second, centrally devised regimes undermine the incentive for resource 
users to devise a set of rules for themselves. Finally, a bottom-up, ‘trial and error’ 
approach is more likely to eventually discover the most effective and efficient 
management solution than a central imposed one.868 
Finally, there are proposals for a shift from the existing property paradigm to one 
which can be subsumed under the general heading of stewardship. There are a few 
models for this new type of property management system, but they all recognize that 
no property exists in isolation. Not only is this because property is a socially 
constructed institution but because property is about power, it is about power over 
resources, about the allocation of scarce resources. By its very nature it creates have 
and have nots. A shift to a stewardship model would recognize the context in which 
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property exists. There is also an environmental element to this as well, and for lack of 
a better term, a sustainability element. A recognition that resources are not unlimited 
and therefore their allocation and use does have broader implications. Despite claims 
about the vastness of space resources this is as true in outer space as it is on Earth.869 
Therefore these proposals for a new model of property should be considered, 
particularly as they have the added benefit of being more compatible with the 
requirements of the Outer Space Treaty and the body of space law than the existing 
traditional, terrestrial models of property rights. 
This chapter has three key, essential arguments. It makes the case that property is an 
evolving, complex concept which has historical and societal context. There is no one 
definition of ‘property’, it is not a static or fixed concept.  Further, property is a product 
of society and ultimately government, even in a Lockean state. Property is intertwined 
with the existence and authority of the state, it is a political creation. It relies on the 
state for enforcement, and it is enforcement which gives property meaning, economic 
value. Finally, property is ultimately about distribution of resources, it is a mechanism 
for controlling access to, and use of, various resources be it gold, land or deposits of 
water ice on far flung asteroids. When contemplating property in outer space it is worth 
considering that it will need to adapt to this new environment just as it has been 
adapted to other environments and circumstances. As Proudhon asked why in an age 
driven by science and reason where we are ready to change our understanding of the 
very nature of the universe itself when new discoveries are made do we so resist 
changes in our political and philosophical thinking?870 
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The next chapter examines sovereignty and jurisdiction, which are of vital importance 
to this discussion as it determines how and where States can exercise their power. This 
impacts how property rights regimes can be created. The limitations on the exercise 
of sovereignty in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty curb the ability of the State to 
create property rights, but not to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals or their 
activities, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Sovereignty and Jurisdiction 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided a comprehensive overview of property it made three 
core arguments. Property is an evolving, complex concept which has historical and 
societal context. There is no one definition of ‘property’, it is not a static or fixed 
concept.  Further, property is a product of society and ultimately government. Property 
is intertwined with the existence and authority of the state, it is a political creation. It 
relies on the state for enforcement, and it is enforcement which gives property 
meaning, economic value. Finally, property is ultimately about distribution of 
resources, it is a mechanism for controlling access to, and use of, various resources be 
it gold, land or deposits of water ice on far flung asteroids. When contemplating 
property in outer space it is worth considering that it will need to adapt to this new 
environment just as it has been adapted to other environments and circumstances. 
This chapter will examine the concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction and how they 
apply to outer space. Sovereignty underpins the international order and jurisdiction is 
how States exercise their power and determines over whom they can do so. Therefore, 
it is imperative than an examination of the concepts be undertaken.  
The first section of this chapter examines sovereignty in its modern form. It recognizes 
that at its core sovereignty is about the exercise of power. Furthermore, sovereignty is 
inherently territorial in nature, at least in the ‘post-Westphalian’ conception, which is 
why it is generally presumed to be banned from ‘outer space.’ The following section 
examines the nature of territory, which is the basis for territorial sovereignty, however 
it highlights that there are alternative variants of the exercise of sovereignty which are 
discussed in later sections of the chapter. Th next section discusses how sovereignty 
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continues to evolve, particularly beyond the ‘Westphalian’ ‘territorial’ model. This 
has relevance because future developments may prove more amiable to the intentions 
of the Outer Space Treaty. The following section takes a step back and looks at the 
origins of sovereignty, highlighting that it is not a monolithic or static concept. As well 
as conceptions of sovereignty as being about rule over people rather than territory as 
was generally the case in the middle ages. A conception which would not conflict with 
Article II OST and indeed survives as one of the forms of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ 
in modern international law. The next section builds on the ‘origins of sovereignty 
section’ and examines developments primarily in the 17th century as European states 
began to extend their power beyond their European territorial domains. It focuses in 
particular of exercise of authority at sea which has direct analogy to outer space. The 
final section discusses jurisdiction itself with a specific focus on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as this is the version that can be exercised by states in outer space. 
However, it underlines that the key to jurisdiction beyond having the right to exercise 
authority is having the power to do so.  
8.2 Modern Sovereignty 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prevents the exercise of sovereignty from being a 
basis for national appropriation of outer space, including the moon or other celestial 
bodies. However, States are not prohibited from exercising sovereignty in outer space. 
This is vital for an international regime to govern activities of non-state actors in outer 
space because sovereignty is the basis upon which States exercise legitimate authority. 
Sovereignty is about the right to ‘rule’.871 It is important to understand the nature and 
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bounds of sovereignty in order to understand how to exercise sovereignty in outer 
space within the boundaries set by Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty.  
The modern concept of sovereignty, often called the Westphalian Model, after the 
system that was established in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which 
ended the Thirty Years War, is fundamentally tied to a territorial notion of statehood. 
It presumes that a state has supreme authority over its territory. Sovereignty and 
territory are intrinsically intertwined in international law. As one scholar has written 
in a leading textbook on international law: 
International law is based on the concept of the state. The state in its 
turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which expresses internally 
the supremacy of the governmental institutions and externally the 
supremacy of the state as a legal person. But sovereignty itself… is 
founded upon the fact of territory. Without territory, a legal person 
cannot become a state. It is undoubtedly the basic characteristic of a 
state and the one most widely accepted and understood.872 
 
Sovereignty has two dimensions to it. There is internal and external sovereignty. 
Internal sovereignty about where authority resides within a state whereas external 
sovereignty is about the independence of the state, there being no higher authority that 
the state answers to. “Sovereignty in its legal usage has a connection to rule, in the 
sense that it involves the right to rule...”873 Or put another way “sovereignty is about 
the right, and not the ability, to be sovereign.”874 Although, the ability to govern is 
important, demonstrating intention to act as a sovereign is a key aspect of the question 
of title over territory.875 As was discussed in the Eastern Greenland case “legislation 
is one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign power.”876  
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Sovereignty is about power; it is a way of describing the existence of political power. 
A way of explaining where legitimate authority within a state resides. As F.H. Hinsley 
wrote “men do not wield or submit to sovereignty. They wield or submit to authority 
or power.”877 Primary aspect of the modern understanding of the concept of 
sovereignty is the territorialisation of political power. “State rule is territorially limited 
rule.”878 The concept of sovereignty essentially means the legal competence which a 
state enjoys in respect of its territory. “This competence is a consequence of title.” 
Materials of international law use the term sovereignty to describe both title and the 
legal competence that comes from it. However sovereign rights are different from the 
concept of territorial sovereignty.879 This is important, particularly within the context 
of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which bars sovereignty serving as a basis for 
national appropriation, as a way of acquiring territory in outer space but not the 
exercise of sovereignty. Therefore, it is important to examine the concept of ‘territory.’ 
8.3 Territory 
As discussed, territorial sovereignty is central to the modern concept of sovereignty. 
The State which is the central element of the international order is conceived of as a 
territorial unit. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the acquisition of territory 
in outer space. States are keen to emphasise that they are exercising sovereign 
authority over activities not the resources themselves when they are legislating for 
space resource activities. Therefore, it is necessary to consider what is territory. This 
section examines the concept of territory in international law and how it relates to the 
exercise of state authority.  
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States require territory, although the exact boundaries and nature of that territory can 
be flexible. There is also no minimum size required for a state.880 Territory is central, 
fundamental even, to the Westphalian system of international law, which is based upon 
the sovereign, territorial state.881 The concept of sovereignty essentially means the 
legal competence which a state enjoys in respect of its territory. “This competence is 
a consequence of title.” Materials of international law use the term sovereignty to 
describe both title and the legal competence that comes from it.882 
Shaw argues that there is often confusion between jurisdiction and territory, exercise 
of jurisdiction is not necessarily territorial. However, the concepts are linked and 
inherent in the concept of territorial sovereignty is a right to exclusivity of jurisdiction 
or authority on the part of the state over its territory. Therefore, it is potentially useful 
to distinguish between imperium and dominium – nations both own their territory and 
have a right to regulate and control whatever happens on that territory.883 Although as 
Crawford argues,  
international law defines ‘territory’ not by adopting private law 
analogies of real property but by reference to the extent of 
governmental power exercised, or capable of being exercised, with 
respect to some territory and population. Territorial sovereignty is not 
ownership of but governing power with respect to territory. There is 
thus a good case for regarding government as the most important single 
criterion of statehood, since all the others depend upon it.884 
 
Once again, power and authority show to be the key. Further, international law is 
shifting away from the traditional state centric, territorial model885 though this is part 
of a slower overarching evolution of the international system.  
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However, territory remains an important part of the international order, but it cannot 
be the basis for State authority in outer space. Outer space needs a different, non-
territorial model in order to remain within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The next section will discuss developments of ‘post-modern’ sovereignty, particularly 
in the post-cold war era and the development of a more globalised world. In this 
approach there is perhaps a model for an international legal regime for the governance 
of space resource activities within the framework established by Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty.  
8.4 Post-Modern Sovereignty? 
Sovereignty, and indeed the state is an evolving concept. The territorial state remains 
the central building block of the United Nations and the international order886 but it is 
being redefined “not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. 
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and 
not vice versa.”887 This section will discuss the ongoing paradigm shift in the operation 
of sovereignty and the state in the international system. With organizations like the 
United Nations and NATO ‘shared’ sovereignty, which was once unthinkable, has 
become the norm even if within limited constraints. This section will emphasise the 
necessity of thinking of sovereignty not as a monolithic or unchanging concept but an 
evolving one. As humanity spreads into outer space it will undoubtedly evolve; if it 
wishes to continue to operate within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty the 
territorial component will need to be shed almost entirely. That does not necessarily 
mean an end to the state, however. 
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It is clear that absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer exists, if indeed it ever 
existed, and as former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote “a major 
intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty – not to 
weaken its essence, which is crucial to international security and cooperation, but to 
recognize that it may take more than one form and perform more than one function.”888 
Indeed, the evolution of sovereignty to a paradigm more suited to the modern 
international order has been developing for some time. As Weiss, Forsythe, Coate and 
Pease argue 
The process by which a territorial state’s assumed sovereignty has 
given way to shared authority and power between the state and 
international organizations is not a recent phenomenon. These changes 
accelerated with the start of the United Nations in 1945, became 
remarkable from about 1970, and became spasmodically dramatic from 
about 1991.889 
 
This however has not resulted in an abandonment of the principles of state 
sovereignty,890 nor the Westphalian or ‘Liberal’ international order.891 Further, while 
there are those who have argued that the Westphalian system is unsuitable to domains 
such as outer space,892 there are also those who argue that “Westphalian approaches 
have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such as the ocean, the 
atmosphere, outer space and Antarctica.” Adding that “such agreements are not 
challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to 
solve problems they cannot address on their own.” Furthermore, Deudney and 
Ikenberry argue that agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty “do not challenge the 
Westphalian system; they codify it. The UN, for example, enshrines the principle of 
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state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the 
notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable.”893 
Finally, as Shaw has said, there is acceptance of the idea that  
the Westphalian state concept of international relations is inadequate 
for the exploration and exploitation of areas of relative inaccessibility 
requiring highly advanced technology, the two examples being outer 
space and the sea-bed and ocean floor of the high seas. In both cases, 
the international community has declared that the territorial concept is 
invalid.894 
 
As discussed above, that does not necessarily mean an overthrow of the system as 
there are models, such as the ‘nationality principle’ which enable the operation of the 
sovereign State outside of the territorial paradigm. The next sections will discuss the 
history and origin of the concept of sovereignty and, in part, demonstrate how it has 
not always been wed to ‘territory.’ This will illuminate the ways in which States can 
exercise their sovereignty in outer space without violating Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty.  
8.5 Origins of Sovereignty 
 
This section with examine the origins of the concept of sovereignty and its fluctuating 
relationship with territory. This section will demonstrate that the concept of 
sovereignty is a complex, layered concept which has evolved over centuries of 
European political thought. Some ‘relics’ or ‘ghosts’ of these earlier conceptions 
remain in the modern conception, such as the ‘nationality principle’, which survives 
into the space age in both Articles VI and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and is a 
holdover from the feudal conception of sovereignty as a personal rather than territorial 
relationship between ruler and ruled. This section will also show that the development 
of the modern conception of sovereignty is intimately linked with the development of 
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European empires and the extension of ‘power’ and ‘jurisdiction’ to the new lands. 
While the space law community does not face issues of how to deal with ‘indigenous 
title’ there is nevertheless considerable similarity with the questions facing the likes 
of Vitoria, Grotius, Hobbes, and others. Indeed, whether directly or indirectly their 
influence is felt in space law, not least in the ‘freedom of exploration and use’ principle 
expressed in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. 
As a political concept sovereignty has been around at least since the time of Aristotle. 
For Aristotle, the civic body was sovereign and thus where sovereignty lay depended 
upon the type of constitution; in a democracy for example the people are sovereign, in 
a monarchy it resides in the crown.895 Cicero’s focus was fixed on the Roman 
constitution but his understanding of the mechanism of sovereignty was similar. For 
Cicero “a republic is the property of the public. But a public is not every kind of human 
gathering, congregating in any manner, but a numerous gathering brought together by 
legal consent and community of interest.”896 However, the ‘classical’ and ‘medieval’ 
state was radically different from the modern state. For one jurisdiction was generally 
defined as being between a ruler and his subject rather than territorially defined.897 
The development of the modern sovereign state was a lengthy process, stretching from 
the 12th to 19th centuries.898 The notion that territoriality was not merely a component 
of sovereignty but its defining, central feature is a product of the 19th century. Early 
Modern understandings of what constituted sovereignty were more flexible. This was 
partially because the application of government control was not uniform, it is better to 
think of zones, corridors, and enclaves of sovereignty rather than the uniformity 
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displayed in maps. It is also important to remember that there was a significant 
personal, portable dimension to subjecthood.899 However, it is also worth noting that 
the concept of respublica christiana undermined the concept of external sovereignty, 
until the Reformation, all Western Christian rulers, at least theoretically and formally, 
recognized the Pope as a higher authority.900 
Questions regarding the nature of the state began to emerge during the Renaissance. 
Political society was becoming associated with the territorial community by 15th 
century and need for government had gained acceptance. 901 For Grotius, the state was 
a given, it was an association of free ‘men’ created for the protection of their rights 
and interests, “his definition was philosophical rather than legal: the existences of 
States was taken for granted; the States, like the men who compose it, was 
automatically bound by the law of nations which was practically identical with the law 
of nature…”902 Vitoria’s definition, which was more legal in nature, and involved the 
concepts of effective governance and independences, however Vitoria’s definition was 
mainly concerned with who had the right to declare war.903 
Bodin was the first to combine absolute rulership with social contract, forming the 
modern notion of sovereignty.904 For Bodin, “sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual 
power of a commonwealth.”905 Sovereign power “is perpetual” and unlimited in power 
or duration.906 Bodin wrote that 
“no matter how much power they have, if they are bound to the laws, 
jurisdiction, and command of someone else, they are not sovereign. For 
the prerogatives of sovereignty have to be of such a sort that they apply 
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only to a sovereign prince. If, on the contrary, they can be shared with 
subjects, one cannot say that they are marks of sovereignty.”907 
 
However, Benton notes that “Bodin’s sixteenth-century tract of sovereignty is notable 
for its utter lack of attention, and even mention, of territory. Bodin’s definition of 
sovereignty was fundamentally juridical.”908 
Hobbes borrowed from Bodin’s conception of sovereignty, although Bodin’s 
understanding was more rooted in natural law than Hobbes. Further, Bodin viewed the 
‘people’ as a collective entity, not a grouping of individuals.909 For Hobbes, the 
‘sovereign’ was the person or institution that provides peace and security, his 
‘leviathan’.910 Hobbes also borrowed from Richard Hooker’s notions of covenant-
based rulership.  
For Hooker, moral obligation is created by the explicit or implicit 
consent of individuals. Unless the individual person, not merely that 
person’s group, consents to the law-maker, the individual is not 
properly obligated. On this point, Hobbes and Hooker were in complete 
agreement.911 
 
May argues “that Hobbes clearly disfavored divided sovereignty (at least in 
Leviathan), but… Hobbes did agree that sovereignty could and should be limited.”912 
Although May further argues that Hobbes could accept the current international ‘civil 
society’ as states stepping out of the international ‘state of nature’, that associations 
between states are possible and within the prevue of the sovereign to do whatever is 
necessary to protect his people. After all we do not have a world sovereign, the UN 
and the ICJ are voluntary associations of sovereign powers.913 
Hobbes is not a realist who advocates an amoral or immoral 
international policy. He opens the door for the kind of limited social 
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contract of States or of sovereigns that is quite a bit like what we find 
today. The best way to see this is to use the analogy between States and 
individual persons who find their way out of the state of nature by 
forming a commonwealth. Individual States could do the same, 
especially since Hobbes says that the risks of cooperation in forming a 
society among States at the international level are not as great as at the 
level of forming a society among individual persons914 
 
Writers like Grotius, Hobbes and Vitoria were trying to come to terms with the 
emergence of the modern state in the early modern period, effectively codified by the 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which promoted and entrenched the principle of 
territorial jurisdiction in Europe.915 Pre-modern polities were not as territorially 
defined, jurisdiction was generally defined as being between a ruler and his subject. 
“Law was primarily tied to persons, not places.”916 This principle survives in modern 
international law as the ‘nationality principle’ which, as mentioned, is expressed in 
Articles VI and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and provides a basis for states to 
exercise jurisdiction over space resource activities if not over the resources 
themselves. 
Additionally, early modern political theorists were trying to deal with the emergence 
of European empires in the far-flung corners of the world. This required a 
consideration of how ‘original’ title could be formed and a justification for seizing 
territory from non-European inhabitants, as well as the basis for jurisdiction over those 
areas beyond their traditional realms. Much of Vitoria’s work, for example, focuses 
on the legal (and moral) basis for Spain’s American empire.917 While space lawyers 
will not have to deal with existing inhabitants, there are similar questions facing the 
discipline regarding how exactly to exercise jurisdiction, particularly over ‘resources’ 
 
914Ibid, 244-245 
915Raustiala Does the Constitution Follow the Flag (n 897), 10-11 
916Ibid, 9-10 
917See generally, Francisco de Vitoria, Anthony Pagden (eds) Jeremy Lawrance (trans) Vitoria: 
Political Writings (CUP 1991) 
Page 248 of 342 
as faced their early modern counterparts. Furthermore, it is important recognize the 
imperial nature of much of this aspect of international law, particularly given the ‘anti-
colonial’ nature of the non-appropriation principle expressed in Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty.  
Later writers such as Rousseau regarded ‘sovereignty’ as “the supreme authority” and 
distinguished it from ‘government’; the sovereign has “the right to legislate, and in 
certain cases impose obligations on the nation or the body” whereas government “has 
the power only to execute, and can impose obligations solely on private 
individuals.”918 The French and American revolutions further helped shift conception 
of sovereignty away from that of a ruler, i.e. the King, to a more popular or national 
basis i.e. the people. Paine wrote that “for as in absolute governments the King is law, 
so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other” (emphasis 
in original.)919 
The modern concept of sovereignty is bound together with European imperialism and 
territory; ‘territorial sovereignty’ is the central focus of the modern concept.920 As 
Robert Jackson has written “sovereignty is a territorial definition of political authority. 
Territoriality became the foundation principle of sovereign statehood in the early-
modern period, and it has remained so ever since.”921 However, as will be examined 
in the next section, while territory is the foundational principle of sovereign statehood 
it is not the only aspect. Jurisdiction over activities on the ocean demonstrates that 
clearly, at the same moment as European states were territorialising their sovereignty, 
they were also expanding it to control activities on the ocean, where, while not with 
 
918Rousseau Discourse on Political Economy (n 720), 6 
919Thomas Paine, Mark Phillip (eds), Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (OUP 
1998), 34 
920Robert Jackson, Sovereignty (Polity 2007), 82 
921Ibid, 104 
Page 249 of 342 
the absolute nature expressed in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, territorial 
ownership was effectively prohibited. 
8.6 The Ocean 
 
The ocean is often used as an analogy for outer space. The ocean, like outer space, is 
part of the global commons and is free for use by all states while not being subject, 
beyond the territorial seas and EEZs, to ‘territorial’ sovereignty. The section below 
will look at the development of the understanding of sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
relation to the ocean particularly during the 17th century. Many of the arguments 
Grotius and others made about the nature of state authority at sea translate almost 
directly to outer space, even the notion of ‘control’, which while generally an 
anathema in the context of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is rearing its ugly head 
again with the rise of the ‘space forces’.  
Benton demonstrates the role that the ocean played in the development of the 
conception of the modern concept of sovereignty, particularly its relationship with 
territory. Even while the ocean was understood as a commons it was understood that 
ships were ‘sovereign territory’ and even routes on the sea could be seen as a kind of 
territory, viewed as roads, hence the term ‘sea lane’; ships made efforts to avoid 
crossing the sea lanes of other powers. Lauren Benton says that “…Europeans 
imagined law as travelling with them along sea routes… Individuals – including 
seemingly legally marginalized rouges and pirates – did not imagine themselves as cut 
off from legal authority even when very far from home and on the open seas.”922 
Ship captains had delegated legal authority and “ships played a dual role as sources of 
order in the oceans: they were islands of law with their own regulations and judicial 
personal, and they were representatives of municipal legal authorities – vectors of law 
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thrust into ocean space.”923 17th century theorists recognized that in order for an 
international law of the sea to work, the interstate order needed to be strong enough to 
restrain and control non-sate actors.924 This is directly analogous to outer space. 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty makes space objects quasi-sovereign territory, 
‘vectors of law’ thrust into outer space. Article VIII and the ‘jurisdiction and control’ 
exercised over space objects and “any personnel thereof” is the foundation for the legal 
regime for governance of activities in outer space and will have to be the foundation 
for any legal regime governing space resource activities. Further, just as with the 
international law of the sea, the interstate order in outer space will need to be strong 
enough to restrain and control non-state actors. In outer space, this rests on Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty which makes States responsible for their national’s 
(nationality principle once again) activities in outer space and requires States to 
authorise and continually supervise these activities.     
17th century theorists like Grotius separated ideas of ownership and jurisdiction. So 
the ocean was a privileged space owned by no one but subject to competing sovereign 
jurisdictions.925 “Dominium, most commonly thought of as the right to possess 
territory, and imperium, associated with sovereign jurisdiction, remained imprecisely 
defined, especially in relation to one another, for a long time”926 This was building on 
earlier thought. Medieval legal scholars followed Roman law and regarded the ocean 
as res communis which therefore could not be owned but also recognized that 
sovereign jurisdiction could be exercised over the sea, so taxes, for example could be 
levied. And others could even be excluded (Benton points out that the Venetians did 
not claim a right of navigation, they claimed a right to prevent others from navigating 
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seas they controlled.)927 “As common property, the sea could not be owned, but it 
could be controlled… This amounted to a kind of property right that was nominally 
different from dominion.”928 
This recognition of jurisdiction over acts at sea may seem to contradict 
the argument in Mare liberum that the sea cannot be possessed by any 
power. But Grotius was also careful to note the difference between the 
right of ownership over the sea, which no country could claim because 
it was impossible to complete title through occupation, and the ‘right 
over the sea to functions of protection and jurisdiction.’ Full 
sovereignty would imply both jurisdiction and ownership, and would 
be impossible…929  
 
Grotius argued that jurisdiction travelled with ships but had no lasting effect on the 
sea they travelled over. Grotius argued that it was possible to take jurisdiction and 
control over parts of the sea without taking ownership.930 While jurisdiction over 
activities in outer space is clearly possible, even required, ‘control’ over outer space 
or a celestial body would be hard to square with the Outer Space Treaty, particularly 
Articles I and II. This marks a clear difference with the oceans, however given the 
impact of the work of the likes of Grotius this may not matter as great power 
competition expands into outer space; especially if strategic resources (and water is 
the ultimate strategic resource in space) are up for competition. 
This section has looked at the process of extending sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
the oceans primarily in relation to the thinking promulgated in the 17th century. It 
demonstrated a clear link between exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
activities at sea with the exercise of jurisdiction in outer space. Once again showing 
that the territorial ‘absolute’ approach to sovereignty, while the predominant aspect to 
the prevailing paradigm is not the exclusive one. Further, it discussed the issue of 
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‘control.’ The next section will discuss jurisdiction in international law which is 
crucial for the establishment of a legal order governing space resources. It will discuss 
the relationship between jurisdiction and territory as well as examining the ways that 
jurisdiction can be exercised outside of a State’s territory. 
8.7 Jurisdiction in International Law 
 
Jurisdiction is essential to the functioning of a legal regime. This section discusses the 
nature of jurisdiction, which while rooted in a territorial basis is not exclusively 
territorial. It examines how States exercise their jurisdiction beyond or outside of a 
territorial basis which is vital to the establishment of legal regime governing space 
resource activities in outer space. It will make the case that States are able to exercise 
jurisdiction over persons (legal or natural) without making an appropriative claim 
which would violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.   
Jurisdiction has a range of meanings from simply the authority to exercise judicial 
power to being essentially synonymous with sovereignty931 however these meanings 
are overlapping as the authority to exercise power is a key component of 
sovereignty.932 While it is clear that jurisdiction is an important aspect of international 
law there exists a surprising lack of monographs dedicated to the subject, at least 
‘recently’. Furthermore as, Staker reports, there is a different approach to the issue of 
jurisdiction in Anglophone scholarship and ‘Continental’ (i.e. European) scholarship. 
English language texts tend to devote an entire chapter to jurisdiction as a specific 
issue, whereas Continental texts tend to treat is as an aspect of an issue like statehood 
or territory.933 
 
931Gabriella Catalano Sgrosso, ‘Legal Status, Rights and Obligations of the Crew in Space’ (1998) 26 
J. Space L. 163, 179 
932Csabafi The Concept of State Jurisdiction in International Space Law (n 366), 51 
933Christopher Staker ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm D. Evans eds., International Law (4th edn. OUP 2014), 
311  
Page 253 of 342 
Shaw regards jurisdiction as “a central feature of state sovereignty, for it is an exercise 
of authority which may alter or create or terminate legal relationships and 
obligations.”934 And describes jurisdiction as concerning “the power of the state under 
international law to regulate or otherwise impact upon people, property and 
circumstances and reflects the basic principles of state sovereignty, equality of states 
and non-interference in domestic affairs.”935 
Csabafi says that: 
The concept of State jurisdiction may be defined as follows: State 
jurisdiction in public international law means the right of a State to 
regulate or affect by legislative, executive or judicial measures the 
rights of persons, property, acts or events with respect to matters not 
exclusively of domestic concern. The notion of jurisdiction finds its 
origin in the concept of territory, the principle of sovereignty equality 
and non-interference with the domestic affairs of States.936 
 
Territoriality and jurisdiction are so closely linked that they are often taken to be one 
in the same without much examination.937 Klabbers says that “the fons et origo [source 
and origin] of jurisdiction of states is the principle of territoriality, signifying that 
sovereignty and territory go hand in hand.”938 Indeed a territorial justification for 
jurisdiction is a natural outcome of the principle of territorial sovereignty.939 However, 
as Shaw notes, “while jurisdiction is closely linked with territory it is not exclusively 
so tied.”940 
There are circumstances in which a State can exercise jurisdiction outside of its 
territory. The most relevant to regulation of activities in outer space is known as the 
nationality principle. As Aust stipulates that “a State can legislate to regulate activities 
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of its nationals abroad” is a well-established principle.941 Indeed, Shaw argues that 
nationality is also a logical basis for jurisdiction in an international regime so 
concerned with sovereignty942 Staker would presumably agree having written that “the 
territorial principle is a corollary of the sovereignty of a State over its territory.”943 
The nationality principle is older than the territoriality principle, however the 
centrality of territory to the modern (Westphalian) State give pre-eminence to the 
territoriality principle.944  And in that line it is worth noting that most States have a 
general presumption that their legislation only applies within their territory unless 
specifically specified otherwise.945 Furthermore, “State practice is consistently based 
upon the premise that it is for the State asserting some novel extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to prove that it is entitled to do so.”946 
This seeming limitation on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary as: 
 
Even if the characterization of international law as fundamentally 
consensual is accepted it does not follow that a sovereign State is free 
to do what it wishes. The sovereign equality of States is a fundamental 
principle of international law. Claims by one State to prescribe rules 
for persons in another State encroach upon the right of the State where 
those persons are based to exercise jurisdiction itself over those persons 
within its territory. 947 
 
The prevailing theory, which Staker argues is supported by State practice, is that there 
needs to be a link between the State and the activity it seeks to regulate.948 This can be 
by virtue of having an effect on the State in question or the nationality principle as 
outlined above or some other basis. Aust says that “international law leaves a fair 
 
941Anthony Aust Handbook of International Law (2nd edn CUP 2010), 43 
942Shaw International Law (n 872), 479 
943Staker ‘Jurisdiction’ (n 933), 316 
944Ibid, 318-319 
945Ibid, 316-317 
946Ibid, 315 
947Ibid, 315 
948Ibid, 315 
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measure of jurisdictional discretion to States which can assert jurisdiction if this can 
be justified by a rule of international law which is generally permissive.”949 
This is not so much of an issue regarding outer space. There are two, potentially three, 
avenues for creating a link between States and the activities they seek to regulate. First 
is Article VI OST which stipulates that States “bear international responsibility” for 
the activities of their nationals in outer space (jurisdiction via the nationality principle), 
they are also required to authorise and continually supervise those activities. Second, 
is via Article VIII OST which stipulates that the State “on whose registry an object 
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such 
object, and over any personnel thereof…” Which, as discussed above is analogous to 
ocean going ships and makes them ‘vectors of law’ thrust into outer space.950 There is 
a third, albeit more minor basis for a link as according to Article VII the State “that 
launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space…” and or from where 
the object is launch, “is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the 
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such an object or its component parts…” 
However, an assertion of the right to jurisdiction does not, by itself, necessarily 
amount to much. Jurisdiction is about power and “power is the capacity to structure 
the possible fields of action of others.”951 It is more than just a right to do something 
but the ability to do something. A State can assert jurisdiction all it wants but if it does 
not have the power, the capacity, the ability, to enforce that jurisdiction then it does 
not mean anything. To paraphrase Joireman regarding property rights, without 
effective enforcement claims of jurisdiction are worthless.952 Weaver provides an 
illustrative example from the early days of British rule in Southern Africa 
 
949Aust Handbook of International Law (n 941), 42  
950Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (n 899), 112 
951Weaver The Great Land Rush (n 619), 178 
952Joireman, Where There is No Government (n 688), 5, 25, 153 
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The Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act, 1836, declared that British 
subjects who left the colony in pursuit of outside land remained subject 
to British law. Sovereignty without effective control over a territory 
proved ridiculous, as the boers so capably demonstrated by their 
occupation of the highveld.953 
 
While British law declared that the Boers were subject to British law regardless of 
where they resided, as they lacked the ability to enforce British law beyond the Cape 
Colony the Boers were able to effectively escape British jurisdiction. Similar issues 
plagued US attempts to regulate activities in the Western United States. While the land 
may have officially been subject to the sovereignty of the United States of America, 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government did not amount to much as the US 
was unable to enforce it.954 
As Crawford writes  
 
international law defines ‘territory’ not by adopting private law 
analogies of real property but by reference to the extent of 
governmental power exercised, or capable of being exercised, with 
respect to some territory and population. Territorial sovereignty is not 
ownership of but governing power with respect to territory. There is 
thus a good case for regarding government as the most important single 
criterion of statehood, since all the others depend upon it.955 
 
Staker argues that the principles of international law regarding jurisdiction  
“are truly principles, and not rules. The difficulties of applying the 
principles rigidly have been noted, and are implicit in the nature of 
jurisdiction. It is not possible to devise strict rules that would divide 
jurisdiction between sovereign States in any practical manner. The 
solution to jurisdictional problems has to be found by increasing the 
sensitivity of States to the constraints imposed by international law, and 
also to the fact that the interests of other States demand respect… If 
States wish to do more than they are able to do within the limits of the 
jurisdiction allowed to them, they must first seek to the agreement and 
cooperation of other States.” 956 
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This is a significant problem for governance of activities in outer space, especially 
ongoing activities far beyond any location where non-governmental activities have 
been previously conducted. The ability to ‘continually supervise’ activities in outer 
space needs to be developed, further, what ‘continually supervise’ means in practice 
needs to be elaborated by the international community. As argued, having the right to 
exercise jurisdiction (or more accurately with regards to the Outer Space Treaty, the 
obligation) does not mean much if the State is unable to effectively do so.  
8.8 The Guano Islands Act 
 
A potentially useful historical analogy for space resources is the US’ Guano Islands 
Act.957 The Guano Islands Act was passed in 1856. It was intended to provide 
protections for US ‘guano miners’ similar to the intentions of the 2015 space resource 
law. However, the Guano Islands Act, unencumbered by Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty did ‘annex’ these islands.  
In the 19th century farming was in desperate need of nitrogen rich fertilizer; this was 
found in the form of ‘guano’ or bird droppings. The best sources of guano were small 
uninhabitable islands in the Caribbean, the Atlantic and the Pacific.958 Guano had been 
used as a fertilizer by the indigenous peoples of modern Peru possibly for thousands 
of years.959 Initially Peru had a monopoly on the Guano trade but that was not to last, 
as other sources were located. 
The commercial exploitation of the guano islands in the 19th century was the first stage 
of a fertilizer boom that enabled massive growth of agricultural production and the 
human population.960 Guano was hailed as a potential agricultural miracle, but it was 
 
95748 USC Ch. 8: Guano Islands 
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959Gregory T. Cushman Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World: A Global Ecological History 
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expensive as Peru had a monopoly on the source.961 Though it was recognized that 
there were probably other sources of Guano and indeed the guano trade started with 
whalers and other seafarers extracting it from rocks and small islands. They often 
attempted to keep the knowledge of these islands secret to protect their endeavours,962 
but they had set off a ‘gold rush’ to find more of these islands and “during the 1850s, 
American entrepreneurs began combing the earth’s oceans for guano islands so they 
could bypass the Peruvian monopoly.”963 
The US even attempted in 1852 to seize the Lobos Islands off the coast of Peru but 
backed off in the face of British and Peruvian objections however “the Lobos affair 
nonetheless set of an international race to claim small oceanic islands.”964 The US was 
not the only country to attempt to seize the Peruvian guano islands.965 However, in the 
United States most of the efforts to secure sources of guano, were private, 
entrepreneurial efforts but  “the United States found itself embroiled in several 
diplomatic disputes involving guano islands that had been claimed by enterprising 
American ‘discoverers’ unwilling to wait for government action.”966 
The Guano Islands Act was prompted by an incident in 1854 where competing mining 
operations between British, Americans, and Venezuelans resulted in a significant 
diplomatic incident and the forceable expulsion of the Americans by the Venezuelan 
armed forces. When the Americans returned to the US, they petitioned Congress for a 
law protecting the interest of guano ‘miners’ having concluded that it was the lack of 
backing from the U.S. government that was essentially the cause of their failure. Their 
 
961Christina Duffy Burnett ‘The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano 
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proposed bill laid the ground work for the Guano Islands Act but its language was 
watered down from the provision that sovereignty would be automatically extended to 
any unclaimed guano island which was discovered and occupied unless the President 
or Congress said otherwise.967 Another parallel with the US space resources 
legislation. 
The Guano Island Act declares that: 
Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano 
on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any 
other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other 
government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the 
same, such island, rock or key may, at the discretion of the President, 
be considered as appertaining to the United States.968 
 
The discoverer, provided they are citizens of the United States, provided Congress 
allows, may enjoy exclusive access to the island for the purpose of obtaining guano.969 
US criminal jurisdiction applies.970 The President is permitted to use military force to 
protect the rights of the discoverer to these islands.971 And the Act stipulates that 
nothing in the Act “shall be construed as obliging the United States to retain possession 
of the islands, rocks or keys, after the guano shall have been removed…”972 The aim 
of the act was to provide the US with sources of guano so as to make it affordable.973 
“All told, the United States laid claim to 66 islands around the world under the Guano 
Act, nine of which are still official possessions.”974 However, while the US certainly 
used the Act to project American power and acquire territory the US government 
denied that “such places had become part of the ‘territorial domain’ of the United 
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States.”975 Indeed, “early drafts contained references to the United States’ 
‘sovereignty,’ ‘territory,’ and ‘territorial domain,’ but these words would disappear 
from the final version. The word ‘appertaining,’ however, survived.”976 The discoverer 
of the guano island would get property rights in the guano and ‘appertaining’ the Island 
to the US was seen as way to protect the property rights during the extraction process. 
However, there were disagreements over whether the Guano Islands Act was 
necessary. Some argued that the Law of Nations ‘protected’ discoveries of citizens 
already, but the defenders of the Act argued that the act was needed “not to authorize 
American control of guano islands, but rather to limit the circumstances in which the 
United States would exert such control.”977 
Essentially the idea was that the islands would only ‘appertain’ to the US so long as 
the guano deposit lasted.978 Though it was not clear what exactly ‘appertain’ to the US 
meant. 
An opinion provided by the US Attorney General “pointedly omitted any mention of 
U.S. ‘sovereignty’ over the islands.”979 However, later in Jones v United States the 
Supreme Court held that despite being ‘temporary possessions’ Guano Islands were 
indeed part of the United States although they did not provide any clarity as to what 
‘appertain’ means.980 However the notion that something could ‘belong’ to the United 
States yet not be part of the United States would remain.981 Though this was merely 
an internal distinction. 
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Regarding interpretation of the Guano Islands Act a State Department report from the 
Office of the Legal Advisor drafted in 1932 concludes that “the only conclusion which 
can fairly be drawn… is that no one knew what the Guano Act really did mean.”982 
The report also notes that beyond statements from US government officials regarding 
the status of these guano islands it is important to note that the US exercised 
jurisdiction and control over some of these islands under the Act such as in 1858 the 
use of an armed vessel to protect Americans removing guano from Navassa Island.983 
Meaning that there is State practice indicating that the US considers these territories, 
at least from a perspective of international relations, to be part of the United States and 
has exercised sovereign powers over them. Additionally the report states that 
“although the primary purpose of the guano legislation was to enable American 
citizens to obtain guano, and not territory, nevertheless, it is clear that the United States 
has the power to acquire territorial sovereignty over islands occupied under the Guano 
Act.”984 (Underlining in original) 
Guano and the Guano Islands Act are a potential analogy for the space mining 
industry. The guano industry was capital intensive and risky, indeed many of the 
islands claimed under the Guano Islands Act contained the ‘wrong kind’ of guano 
which was essentially worthless as a fertilizer.985 And guano was hailed as a potential 
miracle product which would boost the world’s food supply helping to propel the 
industrial revolution and inaugurate “an epoch of peace and prosperity.”986 Similar 
things can and are said about the space resources industry. The ventures proposed are 
 
982United States Department of State – Office of the Legal Adviser The Sovereignty of Islands Claimed 
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capital intensive and risky as has been seen with the demise of the pioneering firms 
Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources.987 As with the guano islands there is 
a lack of information about the nature of potential targets which could cause problems 
for the industry.988 There has even been a proposal for a ‘Guano Islands Act for the 
Twenty First Century’.989 Indeed, it is possible to see the ghost of the Guano Islands 
Act in the US legislation regarding space resources. Like the Guano Islands Act the 
current US law was preceded by a bill worded slightly but not insignificantly 
differently from the law enacted. The ASTERODS Act (HR 5063)990 was the 
unsuccessful predecessor of the Space Resource Utilization Act of 2015 and explicitly 
stated that “any resources obtained in outer space from an asteroid are the property of 
the entity that obtained” them.991 Which contrasts with the Space Resource Utilization 
Act which states that US citizens “shall be entitled to any asteroid or space resource 
obtained…”992 and includes a ‘disclaimer of extraterritorial sovereignty.’993 However, 
unlike the Guano Islands Act, the Space Resource Utilization Act focuses on activity 
and makes no claim over territory, temporary or ‘appertaining’, in line with the 
provisions of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. In the 19th century ‘scramble for 
resources’ the United States felt that in order to effectively exercise jurisdiction it had 
to annex territory, in the 21st century it will likely find that it needs international 
cooperation if it is to avoid violating Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
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8.9 Conclusion 
 
Sovereignty and jurisdiction underpinned the international order of States, it is the 
foundation upon which the system is built. Therefore, the concepts needed to be 
examined particularly with regards to how they apply to outer space. This chapter 
examined sovereignty in various eras and forms. It is an evolving concept, however in 
its current form it is dominated by the territorial variant. This is problematic for outer 
space as territorial sovereignty is prohibited by virtue of Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. However, as discussed in this chapter, there is ‘personal’ sovereignty, which 
has its roots in an older conception of political power as being based on personal 
relationships between ruler and ruled but which nevertheless survives into the modern 
era as one of the forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is how States exercise 
control over their subjects at sea and in outer space. However, it has limitations, most 
notably that it means States have jurisdiction over their nationals but do not have 
jurisdiction over people who are not their nationals. Further, as discussed in this 
chapter, jurisdiction is only as effective as the ability of the state to actually ‘control’ 
those under its jurisdiction. This provides further support for an ‘international’ 
approach to space resource governance. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Space Resource Activities and Space Law 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction. It 
examined sovereignty as an evolving concept although one that is predominantly 
rooted in its modern territorial variant. However, it also examined the older, ‘personal’ 
conception of sovereignty, which nevertheless survives into the modern era as one of 
the forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is how States exercise control over their 
subjects at sea and in outer space. However, it has limitations, most notably that it 
means States have jurisdiction over their nationals but do not have jurisdiction over 
people who are not their nationals. Further, it dealt with the fact that jurisdiction is 
only as effective as the ability of the state to actually ‘control’ those under its 
jurisdiction. 
The role of this chapter is to discuss the ongoing developments relating to space 
resources. It examines the legal and policy frameworks in the United States and 
Luxembourg, as well as the ongoing discussions at the UN and The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group. This is important, 
international law is not static. The actions and views of states push the development 
of international law, and as this chapter demonstrates, the views of states on the legal 
issues around space resources are development. 
The first section of this chapter examines the relationship between international and 
national law. This provides and important context. It addresses the fact that states are 
not able to use their national legislation as an excuse for violating international law. It 
also addresses the fact that legislation can help drive development of international law 
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lending importance to the US and Luxembourg space resources legislation beyond its 
role within those two states.  
The next section examines US law and policy on space resources. It takes a look at the 
failed ASTEROIDS Act which preceded the 2015 law, and had noticeable differences. 
Then it looks at the 2015 law, examining its provisions and considering its role in the 
light of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. The section looks ahead to legislation 
under consideration by Congress as a way of examining potential future developments. 
Then the section looks at Space Force and the Trump administrations space policy. 
This is relevant not only because it highlights the potential future direction for US 
space law and policy but also because Space Force highlights one of the potential 
dangers for the future of space resources, that it could prove to be a source of conflict 
or at least instability. This enhances the case for an international approach to space 
resource governance. Finally, the section looks at how international law interacts with 
the US legal system, this is important because it is likely to be US Courts who 
determine how exactly to interpret the interaction of the 2015 law and Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
The next section examines the Luxembourg law on space resources. Luxembourg’s 
law is more comprehensive and was published with an explanatory document, so their 
intentions are clearer. The next section also looks as how international law works in 
Luxembourg, which is quite a different situation from the United States and more in 
line with The Netherlands.  
The next section discusses, in detail, the debates that have happened at UNCOPUOS 
since the enactment of the US law in 2015. It is important that this is undertaken, 
particularly in this level of detail to demonstrate the development of international 
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opinion over these recent years. This is, in essence, the evidence for the claim in this 
work that the status of space resources in international law has, or at least is, changing. 
Finally, this section looks at the work of The Hague Space Resources Governance 
Working Group an independent international forum comprised of academics, 
governments and other stakeholders. They have produced a set of Building Blocks for 
the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities. This 
process has been influential in driving discussion at UNCOPOUS and is likely to 
continue to influence it for some time to come. While it is unlikely that the Building 
Blocks will be adopted in full, they are still worthwhile examining as this chapter does. 
9.2 Relationship between International and National Law 
 
There are two primary competing theories for the relationship between international 
law and national law. These are known as monism and dualism. Monism presents law 
as a single order with international law at the apex of this system. The theory behind 
monism is that “law is a hierarchical system” which creates a single system of norms 
which all emanate from a higher norm. Dualism, by contrast, stipulates that 
international and national legal systems are separate and one does not overrule the 
other.994 
Neither monism or dualism offer “an adequate account of the practice of international 
and national courts”, furthermore the systems do not come into conflict rather it is 
generally  
a conflict of obligations, an inability of the state on the domestic plane 
to act in the manner required by international law in some respect: the 
consequence of this will not be the invalidity of state law but the 
responsibility of the state on the international plane.995 
 
Furthermore, legal systems are, in reality, relatively autonomous.  
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The only theory which can adequately account for that fact is some 
form of pluralism. Each legal system has almost by definition, its own 
approach to the others (though in practice there is much borrowing.) 
To talk of ‘national law’ is to generalize; but as soon as one asks what 
approach a given system (international law, English law, French 
law…) takes to another, the mist clears: it is possible to state the 
position with clarity and to understand that each system reserves to 
itself the authority to determine for the time being the extent and terms 
of interpretation of laws and related issues of the separation of 
powers.996 
 
A state cannot use its national law or lack of national law as an excuse for breaching 
its international legal obligations. This has been consistently endorsed by international 
courts and tribunals.997 Generally speaking states are obliged to bring their national 
laws into line with their obligations under international law. Failure to do so is not by 
itself a breach of international law, that only arises when the state “fails to observe its 
obligations on a specific occasion.”998 National courts need to determine whether and 
how to bring international law into consideration regarding the issue before them.  This 
is usually a constitutional question and can be different for customary international 
law and treaty law.999 
the role of internal legal rules is vital to the workings of the 
international legal machine. One of the ways that it is possible to 
understand and discover a state’s legal position on a variety of topics 
important to international law is by examining municipal laws. A 
country will express its opinion… 
 
on vital international matters “…through the medium of its domestic law-
making. Thus, it is quite often that in the course of deciding a case before it, 
an international court will feel the necessity to make a study of relevant pieces 
of municipal legislation.” 1000 
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Furthermore, legislation can fall under the ‘subsequent practice’ category under VCLT 
and “specifically address points of interpretations”.1001 Therefore, it is vital to examine 
national legislation as it can have consequences for the interpretation of treaties. So 
the US and Luxembourg space resource activities laws are helping to develop the 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty. 
9.3 US Law and Policy 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the United States is a leader in space law and policy and within 
the field of space resources this has proven to be no different. This section will explore 
the US law and policy relating to space mining, starting with 2014’s failed bill through 
to Space Force and some of the current legislative proposals. It will also look at how 
international law works in the US legal system. 
9.3.1 ASTEROIDS ACT 
The American Space Technology for Exploring Resources Opportunities in Deep 
Space Act (ASTEROIDS Act), or HR 50631002, was introduced into the US House of 
Representatives in 2014. It was the first major attempt to provide a legal process for 
the acquisition of property rights over extracted space resources in US law. The bill 
failed, but was resurrected, albeit after some alteration, in 2015 as part of the wider 
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act.1003 The bill was intended to 
promote the development of the US commercial asteroid mining industry, and provide 
and protect property rights over extracted resources to American companies who 
extracted them. It also would have provided a mechanism for foreign companies to 
obtain similar rights by voluntarily submitting “to the subject matter and personal 
 
1001Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 257 
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jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”1004 It also states that this should be 
done in accordance with the international obligations of the United States.1005 
9.3.2 Title IV CSLCA 
The ASTEROIDS Act was resurrected, at least in part, in Title IV of the US 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act which became law in November 
2015. The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act covers a range of space 
related topics, but Title IV or the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 
2015, is focused specifically on space mining. This is the first distinction between Title 
IV and the ASTEROIDS Act which had a specific focus on asteroid resources. There 
is some retention of this in the definition section which has both asteroid resource and 
space resource. However, by the definitions in Title IV, asteroid resources are space 
resources and there is no distinction between the two made elsewhere in the 
legislation. Beyond that Title IV drops the mechanism for foreign companies to obtain 
property rights over space or asteroid resources by voluntarily submitting “to the 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the courts of the United States” found in 
the ASTEROIDS Act. Only United States Citizens and companies can benefit directly 
from Title IV. Title IV also includes a disclaimer explicitly stating that it does not 
constitute an assertion of “sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the 
ownership of, any celestial body.”1006 This was included to deflect any claims that it 
violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 or Title IV of the 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 was enacted to enable the 
US to develop a framework for regulating space resource activities, and should be seen 
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as part of the US’ understanding of its obligations to ‘authorise and supervise’ the 
activities of their nationals in outer space as stipulated under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty. This piece of legislation has provoked considerable controversy as it 
seemingly conflicts with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which prohibits national 
appropriation of outer space, the Moon, and any other celestial body by means of 
sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means. The argument essentially goes that 
under the Act as the US grants itself the right to grant property rights over space 
resources to US companies the Act could be seen as US trying to claim jurisdiction 
over space resources, and by extension, the bodies they are found in.1007 
The Act does require the “accordance with the international obligations of the United 
States”1008 and make the disclaimer that “the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, 
any celestial body.”1009 However, some such as Fabio Tronchetti, are sceptical of the 
value of such assurances: 
references to ‘consistency with international obligations’ are vaguely 
phrased and such a consistency is to be evaluated from a national, US, 
perspective, which may not be shared, or agreed to, by other States 
Parties to the UN space treaties.1010 
 
There is also the additional issue regarding enforcement of the Act. The Act clearly 
only applies to citizens of the United States or US companies, and clarifies that the 
Act is not intended to extend US jurisdiction to any celestial body.1011 Therefore, 
enforcement of the property rights protections supposedly provided by this Act will 
potentially be problematic to action against foreign nationals or corporations, 
especially if such States were to take the view that the Act is an illegitimate act of US 
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unilateralism in space, a view which has been expressed at UNCOPUOS. This would 
reduce the effectiveness of the act considerably. This is further complicated by the 
lack of any dispute resolution mechanisms in the Outer Space Treaty, and the 
‘inadequacy’ of existing international dispute resolution mechanisms. As will be 
discussed in further detail below, enforcement is key to the effectiveness of a property 
rights regime, so this may be a particular problem, especially if the ‘national’ approach 
is the dominant model take to regulating space resource activities. 
However, national legislation is necessary, as part of the Article VI obligation to 
‘authorise and supervise’, and therefore these inadequacies are not an attack on 
national legislation in and of itself but rather an argument for embedding national 
legislation in some sort of international framework to ensure, at the very least, mutual 
recognition, facilitate cooperation and the avoidance of ‘harmful interference.’ 
Furthermore, the development of national legislation allows for experimentation in the 
regulation of space resource activities and the development of a property rights regime, 
which is important given the novelty of space resource activities, it is premature to 
expect too much uniformity. While the second national legislation on space resource 
activities is in principle similar to that of the United States, Luxembourg has 
nevertheless provided the world with a second ‘model’ for space resource legislation.  
9.3.3 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act 
In 2018 the US House of Representatives (hereinafter US House) passed the American 
Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act (H.R. 2809)1012 however it was not voted on by 
US Senate. In July 2019 it was reintroduced into the US House1013 as H.R. 3610 
 
1012American Space Commerce Free Entrepirse Act, HR 2809, 115th Congress  
1013Marcia Smith, ‘Babin Reintroduces Commercial Space Bill’ (SpacePolicyOnline.com, 3 July 2019) 
<https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/babin-reintroduces-commercial-space-
bill/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Spacepolicy
online+%28SpacePolicyOnline+News%29&fbclid=IwAR1IkatuBmaMcDLs1Hay54GaEpZe
m5xZX54S52ebD8C2nOPjJ38Y6KnJ-cY> accessed 10 January 2020 
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although the text (as of 13 July 2019) remains unchanged.1014 The US Senate has its 
own ‘competing’ bill, the Space Frontier Act. Most of the political fight is surrounding 
whether the US Department of Commerce or the Federal Aviation Administration 
should have primary responsibility for the supervision of commercial space activities. 
However, for the purposes of this work the key difference is that the American Space 
Commerce Free Enterprise Act contains provisions on space resource activities 
whereas neither version of the Space Frontier Act contain any such provisions. 
Section 2(b) stipulates that US citizens are free to utilize space resources without 
condition or limitation except as required by the national security of the United States 
and the international obligations of the US under the Outer Space Treaty. However, 
the US government shall interpret these obligations so as to “minimize regulations and 
limitations on the freedom of United States non-governmental entities…”1015 
Furthermore, the bill stipulates that the President shall protect US entities engaged in 
the exploitation of space resources “from acts of foreign aggression and foreign 
harmful interference”1016 as well as protect the “ownership rights” of US entities which 
have “obtained space resources.”1017 Also, the bill, if passed into law, would explicitly 
reject the notion that outer space is a global commons.1018 
9.3.4 Space Force and President Trump’s Space Policy 
President Trump has had a rather vocal space policy. His primary focus has been on 
space security, specifically his efforts to create a ‘Space Force’ as separate branch of 
the United States armed forces, though as evidenced by the statements made by key 
members of his administration this is not his only focus. Considering the positions of 
 
1014American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2019, HR 3610, 116th Congress  
1015American Space Commerce Free Entreprise Act (n 1012) Sec. 2(b)(3)  
1016Ibid, §80111(1) 
1017Ibid, §80111(2) 
1018Ibid, §80308 
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the Trump administration are worthwhile for several reasons. The United States is one 
of, if not the leading ‘space powers’ and therefore the policy direction of the United 
States will have a significant influence on the development of international norms. 
Furthermore, as discussed, the statements made by government officials, particularly 
elected representatives like the President and Vice-President, as well as official policy 
documents like the US’ National Space Strategy can be statements of opinio juris 
and/or evidence of state practice which can help to drive the development of customary 
international law. 
President Trump’s space policy, like most of his polices, are framed through ‘America 
First’ narrative that is so central to his presidency. A key theme of his ‘America First’ 
space policy is that the United States needs to be ‘dominant’ in outer space just as it is 
on earth,1019 economically as well as militarily. Vice President Pence has said that the 
Trump administration 
will promote regulatory, technological, and educational reforms to 
expand opportunities for American citizens and ensure that the U.S. is 
at the forefront of economic development in outer space. In the years 
to come, American industry must be the first to maintain a constant 
commercial human presence in low-Earth orbit, to expand the sphere 
of the economy beyond this blue marble.1020 
 
A key aspect of this is an effort to, in their words, update out of date regulations1021 
and remove unnecessary regulations.1022 While space resource activities have not, as 
 
1019Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fourth Meeting of the National Space Council (23 October 
2018) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-fourth-meeting-
national-space-council/; President Donald J. Trump is Unveiling an America First National 
Space Strategy (23 March 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-unveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/; Remarks by Vice President 
Pence at the Satellite 2019 Conference (6 May 2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-satellite-2019-conference/ 
1020America Will Return to the Moon—and Go Beyond (4 October 2019) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will-return-moon-go-beyond/ 
1021Remarks by Vice President Pence (n 1019); Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fifth Meeting 
of the National Space Council (26 March 2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-fifth-meeting-national-space-council-huntsville-al/ 
1022Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Satellite 2019 Conference (n 1019) 
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yet, been a key feature of the Trump administration’s space policy, it has been 
discussed by both the President and the Vice President. A statement released by the 
White House stipulated that in addition to being vital to national security, 
space is also invaluable to American private industry, which is 
developing revolutionary technologies that will utilize space for 
exploration, resource extraction, and tourism.1023 
 
Lunar mining has been discussed by Vice President Pence as part of plans for a return 
to the Moon. At the 5th meeting of the National Space Council he said that, 
we’re going back to the Moon with new ambitions, not just to travel 
there, not just to develop technologies there, but also to mine oxygen 
from lunar rocks that will refuel our ships; to use nuclear power to 
extract water from the permanently shadowed craters of the South 
Pole.1024 
 
This is often presented as part of the ‘frontier narrative’ of the history and destiny of 
the United States, at an early meeting of the National Space Council Vice-President 
Pence said that 
Not long ago, no one would have dreamt of landing a vehicle on an 
asteroid to mine its minerals… But today, these are all emerging 
businesses.  And like the railroads that opened up the American West 
to explorers and entrepreneurs, these technologies will extend the range 
of American action and values into new worlds, and usher in a new era 
of job creation and innovation driven by space.1025 
 
The Trump administration recognizes the strategic potential of space resources, as well 
as their economic and scientific value.1026 Which is part of the interest in creating the 
Space Force, to protect American interests in space. As Vice-President Pence has said 
Well, what it means… is that we’re going to protect American interests 
in space… But also, what the President’s vision is, is that we stand up 
a Space Force that very much — similar to the way that the Air Force 
 
1023President Donald J. Trump is Building the United States Space Force for a 21st Century Military (9 
August 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
building-united-states-space-force-21st-century-military/ 
1024Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fifth Meeting of the National Space Council (n 1021) 
1025Remarks by Vice President Pence at Second Meeting of the National Space Council (21 February 
2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-
second-meeting-national-space-council/ 
1026Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fifth Meeting of the National Space Council (n 1021) 
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was launched after World War II — will evolve into ensuring that 
America remains as dominant in outer space militarily as we are here 
on Earth. And that will be the project of the Space Force going 
forward.1027 
 
Furthermore, the administration has repeatedly stated that they view space as a 
“warfighting domain” no different from land, air and sea. They argue that the United 
States will be and needs to be dominant in space ‘just as it is on Earth’.1028 While the 
Trump administration states they do not see a need to amend the Outer Space 
Treaty1029 in order to accomplish their aims they do stipulate that “the rules and values 
of space, like every great frontier, will be written by those who have the courage to 
get there first and the commitment to stay.”1030 
9.3.5 International Law and the US Legal System 
 
The US Constitution stipulates that treaties made under the “Authority of the United 
States” shall be regarded as being the supreme Law of the Land on par with the ‘Laws 
of the United States’1031 This means that “unless treaties are contrary to the 
constitution, they are equal in status to congressional legislation.”1032 The US 
President has the power to make treaties although the approval of two-thirds of the 
Senate is required for ratification.1033 The US Congress has the power to enact all 
 
1027‘Interview of Vice President Pence by Robert Costa at the Washington Post’s Space Summit 
‘Transformers: Space” (23 October 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/interview-vice-president-pence-robert-costa-washington-posts-space-summit-
transformers-space/ 
1028‘President Donald J. Trump is Establishing America’s Space Force’ (19 February 2019) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trump-establishing-americas-
space-force/; Remarks by Vice President Pence (n 1019); President Donald J. Trump is 
Unveiling an America First National Space Strategy (n 1019); Remarks by Vice President 
Pence at the Satellite 2019 Conference (1019); ‘President Donald J. Trump Is Launching 
America’s Space Force’ (23 October 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-launching-americas-space-force/ 
1029‘Interview of Vice President Pence’ (n 1027)  
1030Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fifth Meeting of the National Space Council (n 1021); 
Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Satellite 2019 Conference (n 1019) 
1031The Constitution of the United States of America, Article VI, para 2 
1032John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th edn, West 2010), 124 
1033US Constitution (n 1031), Article II, Section 2, Para 2 
Page 276 of 342 
legislation that is necessary to implement and enforce treaties,1034 this is known as the 
‘necessary and proper clause’.1035 
While treaties are regarded as being on par with the ‘laws of the United States’ as 
enacted by Congress the US Supreme Court distinguishes between ‘self-executing’ 
and ‘non-self-executing’ treaty provisions. It does so on a provision-by-provision 
basis. “If a treaty provision is non-self-executing, it will not be given effect by U.S. 
courts unless and until it is implemented by Congress.”1036 Additionally, “if a treaty 
regulates a matter falling within an area of exclusive congressional authority, it will 
be treated as non-self-executing.”1037 
US courts follow a canon of statutory interpretation known as the Charming Betsy 
Canon named after the 1804 Supreme Court case Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy. This essentially stipulates that Acts of Congress are to be interpreted, where 
possible, so as to not violate international law.1038 For customary international law 
Bradley argues that this only applies where a statute is ambiguous; it is for treaties 
where Congress “must evidence a clear intent to abrogate…”1039 Furthermore, Bradley 
says that  
there is some question about whether and to what extent the Charmin 
Betsy canon should apply when the statutory interpretation in question 
is being advocated by the executive branch. The canon is designed, at 
least in part, to ensure that the United States does not breach 
international law without the political branches having expressly made 
the decision to do so.1040 
 
 
1034Ibid, Article I, Section 8, Para 18 
1035Nowak and Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (n 1032), 123 
1036Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (n 160), 41 
1037Ibid, 49  
1038Ibid, 15-16 
1039Ibid, 16-17 
1040Ibid, 17 
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US courts apply the ‘last-in-time rule’ which stipulates that an Act of Congress 
overrides a preceding treaty, it is also possible for a treaty to override a preceding Act 
of Congress although this has been rare in practice.1041 
Acts of Congress passed after the date of the treaty, the court held, 
control over the treaty terms. Similarly, a self-executing treaty is valid 
as domestic law and takes precedence over a federal law enacted 
earlier. In short, the last expression of the sovereign will control.1042 
 
Though, of course, this rule  
 
does not relieve the United States of responsibility under international law for 
complying with a treaty. As a result, if a court applies a statute to override an 
earlier treaty, the United States may be placed in breach of its international 
obligations.1043 
 
Which is why courts will try to interpret Acts of Congress in conformity with 
international law when possible. Furthermore, when interpreting treaties, U.S. courts 
taking into account that treaties, unlike legislation, involve commitments to other 
nations. Therefore, they attempt to take into consideration the “shared expectations” 
of the parties to the treaty. The courts also give consideration to the understanding that 
the Senate and the President had of the meaning of the treaty at time of ratification.1044 
Bradley argues that customary international law cannot be regarded as ‘self-executing’ 
federal law, it is not accorded the same status as ‘treaty law’ from the perspective of 
the constitution but has been applied by courts as part of the ‘common law’. Though 
he grants that CIL can be used as an aid to interpret ambiguities.1045 
However, Jens David Ohlin takes issue with this view. Ohlin argues that the ‘New 
realists’ (of which he places Bradley as a leader) argue that Federal courts are not 
empowered to make ‘common law’ and that without a ‘sovereign source’ such as 
 
1041Ibid, 52-54 
1042Nowak and Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (n 1032), 127  
1043Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (n 160), 54-55 
1044Ibid, 66-69 
1045Ibid, 140-167 
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Congress acting, customary international law therefore cannot be considered part of 
US Federal Law. However Ohlin argues that while generally Federal common law 
‘doesn’t exist’, it does with regards to things like customary international law because 
foreign relations are part of the powers of the Federal Government and if each state 
was able to develop its own interpretation of common law then it would become 
impossible for the US to effectively conduct international relations.1046 
Finally, US statutory interpretation takes a presumption against extraterritorial 
application acts of Congress.1047  
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a ‘long standing principle 
of American law’ that ‘serves to protect against unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord.’1048 
 
However, as Bradley notes, “it has long been accepted that nations have broad 
authority to regulate the conduct of their own nationals around the world.”1049 
9.4 Luxembourg 
 
Luxembourg is the second country to have enacted space resources legislation. This 
section looks at that law and then the role of international law in the Luxembourg legal 
system. 
9.4.1 Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources 
 
Luxembourg’s Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources came into effect 
on 1 August 2017. They first published a draft version of this law in November 2016. 
Luxemburg has embraced space resource activities in a big way, as in addition to this 
law they have also invested over 200 million Euros in the industry.1050  
 
1046Ohlin The Assault on International Law (n 311), 15-30 
1047Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (n 160), 179-181 
1048Ibid, 181 
1049Ibid, 189 
1050Scoles 'Luxembourg's Bid to Become the Silicon Valley of Space Mining' (n 75); Morris 
'Luxembourg to Invest $227…” (n 75) 
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Article I declares that “space resources are capable of being appropriated.” Although 
it is notable that unlike the US law it does not provide a definition of space resources, 
however the explanatory document published with the initial draft of the law took the 
definition found in the US law to be the ‘common definition.’ This definition is that a 
space resource is an abiotic resource that can be found in situ in outer space including 
water and minerals. It is worth noting that this is the definition adopted by the Hague 
Space Resources Governance Working Group in their Building Blocks for an 
International Framework on Space Resources.1051 The US law also provides the term 
asteroid resource, but the definition of that, as yet, is no different from space resource 
except for the fact that an asteroid resource is found in an asteroid. 
The licence itself can only be granted to legal persons (i.e. companies) having its 
registered office in Luxembourg. A licence is non-transferable and needs to be used 
within 36 months of being granted (presumable this just means operations need to have 
started within 36 months). Furthermore, in order to obtain a licence, the applicant must 
demonstrate, among other things, a “robust scheme of financial, technical, and 
statutory procedures…” and plans for the exploration, utilization and 
commercialization phases of operations. Key sections of the Luxembourg law are 
backed up by criminal penalties, which range from fines of varying degrees and can 
include a prison term of between eight days and five years depending on which 
sections of the law have been infringed. 
The government of Luxembourg published an explanatory statement alongside their 
draft law which is worth considering. First, they articulated that the object of the law 
is to develop “a legal and regulatory framework providing for legal certainty as to the 
ownership of minerals and other valuable space resources identified in particular on 
 
1051The Hague Working Group Building Blocks on Space Resource Activities (n 61) 
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asteroids.”1052 They state that they hope that this will give rise to a new industry which 
will stimulate economic growth and offer new horizons in space.1053 
Regarding the provisions of the law itself they also made a point of stipulating that the 
“relevant legal framework shall be put in place in strict compliance with the 
international obligations of Luxembourg.”1054 Though it is worth noting that the 
wording of Article I changed from the draft law published on 11 November 2016 to 
the approved law of 20 July 2017. In the 2016 draft, Article 1 said that “space resources 
are capable of being appropriated in accordance with international law.”1055 In the 
2017 law, Article 1 merely says “space resources are capable of being appropriated.” 
Although Article 2(3) does stipulate that activities can only be carried out in 
accordance with “the international obligations of Luxembourg.”1056 
Articles 1 and 2 are where the explanation of the justification for the law is laid out. 
Luxembourg argues that the basis for property rights over space resources can be 
found in the Civil Code which originated in 1804 and is inspired by 18th century 
French legal thinking. The analogy is made with the high seas. “Space resources are 
appropriable, in the same way as fish and shellfish are, but celestial bodies and 
asteroids are not, just like the high sea is not.”1057 The argument is that the approach 
is in accordance with the “basic principles of French-inspired property law” as well as 
being consistent with international law.1058 The argument advanced is that the Outer 
Space Treaty is silent on the question of resources and Luxembourg’s law only 
 
1052Luxembourg Ministry of the Economy ‘Draft Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources 
– Explanatory Statement’ (11 November 2016) <https://gouvernement.lu/dam-
assets/fr/actualites/communiques/2016/11-novembre/11-presentation-spaceresources/Draft-
law-space_press.pdf>, 1 
1053Ibid, 2  
1054Ibid, 1 
1055Ibid, 13 
1056Luxembourg Space Resources Law (n 74)  
1057Explanatory Statement (n 1052), 3-4 
1058Ibid, 4 
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addresses resources, there is no attempt to allow, permit or even suggest the 
appropriation of celestial bodies or the extension of sovereignty or territory. “Only 
space resources and the appropriation of such resources are addressed here.”1059 
Additionally, the freedom of use in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty allows for the 
appropriation of space resources under the scope of the term ‘use’.1060 As the 
explanatory note states  
the analogy with the high sea and mining advocates in favour of the 
appropriation of resources, and Article 1 is furthermore perfectly in line 
with the principle of the non-appropriation of outer space and celestial 
bodies as set out in Article II of the Treaty.1061 
 
Adding that  
 
The concept of appropriation includes all of the classic attributes of the 
right of ownership and in particular the right to possess, transport, use 
or sell resources in accordance with the provisions of this draft law and 
those of the international texts that are applicable here.1062 
 
Luxembourg also recognizes that as a consequence of Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty any space resource activity carried out by a ‘non-governmental entity’ requires 
authorisation and supervision and therefore Article 2 requires Luxembourg based 
entities to obtain authorisation.1063 
9.4.2 International Law in Luxembourg 
 
The relationship between domestic law and international law in Luxembourg is more 
straightforward than in the United States. As Jörg Gerkrath has argued this may be 
because  “Luxembourg’s Constitution has never been based on a conception of 
absolute sovereignty…” indeed “One of the particular characteristics of 
Luxembourg’s domestic legal order lies in the fact that its very existence results from 
 
1059Ibid, 4 
1060Ibid, 4-5 
1061Ibid, 5 
1062Ibid, 6 
1063Ibid, 6 
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international law.” International law is recognized as being central to Luxembourg’s 
existence as a state and Luxembourg’s courts have had no issue granting international 
law pre-eminence.1064 While the constitution itself does not contain any provision 
granting international law primacy, “well settled” case law, academic position and the 
position of the Conseil d’État holds that “self-executing international treaties enjoy 
full primacy with regard to the provisions of internal law, including the Constitution 
itself.”1065 In the event that an international treaty conflicts with the provisions of a 
subsequent law, international law prevails, there is not an equivalent to the United 
States’ ‘last-in-time’ rule.1066 “Once approved, the respective international norms 
enjoy, in the pure monistic tradition, full primacy over rules of domestic law, even of 
constitutional value.”1067 Treaties are operative once they have been approved and 
formally published. The constitution makes no reference to international customary 
law.1068 Similarly, The Netherlands constitution also makes no mention of the effect 
of custom on domestic law, and Luxembourg has been “strongly influenced” by the 
constitutional traditions of The Netherlands.1069 In The Netherlands international 
customary law does not in principle, prevail over domestic legislation, the Constitution 
or the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom. Though it has been incorporated on a sui generis 
basis where the norm in question is considered self-executing and the courts have 
taken it into account when relevant.1070 
 
 
 
1064Jorg Gerkrath ‘The Constitution of Luxembourg in the Context of EU and International Law as 
‘Higher Law” in Albi A., Bardutzky S. (eds) National Constitutions in European and Global 
Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2019), 1.3.2 para 1-2  
1065Ibid, 1.3.1 para 2 
1066Ibid, 1.3.1 para 4-5 
1067Ibid, 1.3.1 para 7 
1068Ibid, 3.1.1 para 3-4 
1069Ibid, 1.1.1 para 4 
1070Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 159), 92-93 
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9.5 UNCOPUOS 
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) 
is the leading international forum for space governance. It has two subcommittees a 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and Legal Subcommittee. The Legal 
Subcommittee has been responsible for developing the five ‘UN space law treaties’ as 
well as a host of declarations and General Assembly Resolutions on space governance 
issues. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the passage of the US space resources legislation 
in November 2015 the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee began discussing the issue 
of space resources. Over four sessions from April 2016 to April 2019 the international 
conversation has developed significantly and will be discussed. 
At the session of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS in 2016, initial opposition 
was raised to Title IV of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. The 
Russian delegation was the first to express disapproval, stating that UNCOPUOS is 
the main forum for the creation and discussion of space law. They further stated that 
the unilateral adoption of national legislation is unacceptable as the views of all states 
need to be accounted for, something than can only happen via UNCOPUOS.1071 Russia 
further declared that UNCOPUOS should look to the Moon Agreement for a 
mechanism for dealing with the question of space resources, and stipulated that space 
mining poses significant risks for all of humanity and therefore it is necessary to be 
discussed at UNCOPUOS. To that end Russia proposed creating a space resources 
working group within the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS.1072 It is worth putting 
some context to the Russian use of the word ‘unilateral’ as the Russian government’s 
 
1071Russian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 4 April 2016 1052-1055 (based on authors 
notes from participating as part of delegation for permanent observer the Space Generation 
Advisory Council, all times in GMT – digital recordings are available - 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/audio/v2/meetings.jsp?lng=en) 
1072Russian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1104-1114 
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post-Soviet self-image is as the protector of international law against a unilateralist 
and hegemonic United States, therefore there is potentially more to Russia’s 
description of the US space resources legislation than meets the eye.1073 
The Belgian delegation also expressed concerns about the new US law. They 
stipulated that outer space natural resources cannot be appropriated by the unilateral 
extension of national jurisdiction.1074 Further expressing that they do not view natural 
resources and celestial bodies as being separable, appropriation of natural resources is 
therefore appropriation of the celestial body.1075 Mexico did not speak directly in 
opposition to the US law but they did express concern that the first come first served 
approach would be applied to space resource activities as this ill-serves developing 
states. They also urged the ratification of the Moon Agreement as well as the other 
four space law treaties.1076 
A few other delegations made comments in the 2016 session as well at the United 
States. Luxembourg stated that they were considering a space resource activities law 
and would take into consideration the views expressed during this session of the Legal 
Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS.1077 The Netherlands delegation stated that they would 
introduce the work of The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group, who 
at that time had yet to have their first formal meeting as a Working Group.1078 The 
Italian delegation expressed their confidence that the United States would apply the 
space resources legislation in accordance with their obligations under international 
law.1079 
 
1073Lauri Mӓlksoo Russian Approaches to International Law (OUP 2017), 148-149 
1074Belgian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1006-1008  
1075Belgian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1028-1029  
1076Mexican Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1133-1136 
1077Luxembourg Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1042-1045 
1078Netherlands Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1120-1121 
1079Italian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1452-1453 
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The US delegation stated that there had been an inaccurate characterization by Russia 
of the US Space Resources Act. They further stated that the law has been general 
misunderstood. The law authorises space activities, it does not claim sovereignty over 
space or celestial bodies and is consistent with US obligations under international 
law.1080 Furthermore, the US stipulated that the Act operates within the framework of 
the Outer Space Treaty and will be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
international law.1081 Which as was discussed above is the presumption taken in US 
statutory interpretation anyway1082, as well as being stipulated in the Act itself.1083 The 
US delegation also asserted that the US has always been a strong supporter of the non-
appropriation principle and that this law does not change the US position. Finally, they 
stated that the implementation of the Act had to be a ‘unilateral action’ as there is no 
multilateral mechanism for space resource management and implementation of 
national legislation is by its very nature a unilateral action.1084 
There was a general sense that more information and discussion regarding space 
resource activities was necessary, as expressed in the final report from the 2016 
session. While there was some opposition to the ‘unilateral’ approach taken by the 
United States there was no real opposition to the concept of space resource utilization. 
Furthermore, there was a general acceptance of the necessity of giving reassurance or 
certainty to non-governmental entities that they would be able to obtain property rights 
in some form or another over their extracted resources. The main points of discussion 
where the mechanism for doing this and how to implement it. Broad support for a 
multilateral approach was expressed even among those delegations who accepted that 
 
1080US Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 4 April 2016 1047-1051 
1081US Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1116-1123 
1082Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (n 160), 15-16  
1083CSLCA (n 48), Title IV, §51303 Sec. 403 
1084US Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1116-1123 
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national legislation prior to the implementation of a multilateral approach was 
legitimate. References were made to the international fishing regime as well as that 
for seabed mining. Developing states also expressed concerns that they would be ‘left 
behind’ particularly if a ‘first come first served’ approach was adopted.1085 
At the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee in 2017 the topic of space resources featured 
on the agenda under item 14 “general exchange of views on potential legal models for 
activities in exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources.”1086 Space 
resource activities was also the topic of choice for the joint European Centre for Space 
Law (ECSL) and International Institute of Space Law (IISL) symposium traditionally 
held during the Monday afternoon of the first week of the Legal Subcommittee 
(although it is, of course, not formally part of the proceedings). 
Belgium repeated and expanded upon their concerns and criticisms from 2016. They 
stated concern about the unilateral nature of the US space resources legislation of 
2015. They also said that the economics of space resource activities need to be 
considered and the ‘first come first served’ model needs to be avoided.1087 Belgium 
also expressed  concern about the potential for space resources to bring about 
diverging interpretations of the space law treaties. Therefore, there needs to be an 
multilateral international framework for space resources. Belgium considers the Moon 
Agreement a good basis for such a framework but would not be opposed to a new 
treaty if it were to garner wider acceptance than the Moon Agreement. Belgium also 
stated that they consider UNCOPUOS to be the competent body for addressing this 
topic and wants it to be kept on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee. Belgium also 
stated that there is a need to avoid the historical pattern of terrestrial resource conflicts 
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from spreading into outer space and that this should be part of the objective of the 
multilateral framework.1088 
The Russians also repeated their concerns from the previous year. They also called for 
the Legal Subcommittee to protect its place as the central forum for space law. They 
also expressed concern about ‘spill over’ of space law to other UN bodies, stipulating 
that space law should remain focused on UNCOPUOS. Russia also warned against 
letting ‘unilateral’ interests taking dominance in space law, warning that to do so 
would invite chaos. Furthermore, they expressed concern about allowing commercial 
‘specific interests’ to garner too much attention. They also criticized all states 
considering space resource activities laws expressing concern over allowing a ‘flags 
of convenience’ situation to develop. They also expressed concern about diluting the 
space law regime, going on to say that the ‘unilateral’ approach is unacceptable the 
prerogative for new space law rests with UNCOPUOS as only UNCOPUOS can take 
into consideration international concerns.1089 Russia also complained about the lack of 
discussion about the phrases ‘province of all mankind’ and ‘Common Heritage of 
Mankind’ although they also stipulated that UNCOPUOS needs to avoid getting 
overly concerned with theory saying that UNCOPUOS should instead focus on 
practical issues like space debris mitigation.1090 However, they also stated that there 
needs to be greater clarity regarding interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty in order 
to avoid a clash of differing interpretations, divergent regime and event conflict. They 
further stated that a space resources regime should be tailored to outer space and not 
a copy of a terrestrial regime.1091 
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The Chinese delegation said that space resource activities raise many questions, 
especially in the commercial context. They stipulated that there is a need to protect the 
freedom of all countries to access and use space and that the interests of all of humanity 
need to be taking into consideration especially the interests of developing countries. 
China accepts that the freedom of use and exploration of space includes space resource 
activities which extends to private entities, but this use and exploration must be in line 
with the space law treaties. They also stipulated that too exclusive an approach to space 
resource activities would be a violation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The 
Chinese delegation stated that while there is a duty of sharing the benefits of space 
activities and space resources, equitable does not mean equal and there is a need to 
balance international and national interests as well as bear in mind the needs of 
developing countries and intergenerational equity. Further, they stipulated that 
protecting the space environment also needs to be considered stating that ignoring and 
destroying the space environment is an abuse of rights and violates space law. China 
stated that a widely supported multilateral mechanism is needed which takes the Outer 
Space Treaty as its foundation.1092 
The German delegation stated that the unilateral approach to space resource activity 
regulation needs to be avoided and that there needs to be a multilateral international 
space resources regime in order to avoid conflict. This regime would bring certainty 
which would be of benefit to industry and investors. The Germany delegation 
stipulated that they think the ITU regime is a good model to follow for regulation of 
space resource activities. Germany stated that in their view Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty limits the freedom of use and exploration which also needs to be for the 
benefit and in the interests of everyone which is one of the reasons an multilateral 
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regime is needed in order to ensure that. Further, Germany stipulated that space 
resource activities go beyond the traditional understanding of ‘use’ and ‘exploration’ 
and therefore is not covered under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. Germany 
further states that States can only licence space resource extraction if those States have 
ownership over those resources, which of course would be a violation of Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty.1093 
Brazil expressed concern over the trend for unilateral approaches to regulating space 
resource activities. They said that this would lead to diverging interpretations of space 
law which could lead to conflict. Brazil says that they see the view that the space 
treaties do not authorise space mining as being the stronger view. They also said that 
while they are able to see the possible benefits of space resources and they do not wish 
to stop it they also cannot dismiss the legal issues. Brazil also stated that the 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee needs to act now in order to mitigate the risk of 
conflict.1094 Responding to other States who had said that UNCOPUOS does not have 
a mandate for treaty interpretation, Brazil said that that was too narrow a view of the 
UNCOPUOS mandate. Brazil argued UNCOPUOS is the place to discuss space law 
and that if UNCOPUOS does not provide answers someone else will.1095 
France also expressed support for a multilateral approach to space resource activities 
rooted in UNCOPUOS. They also stated that discussion needs to happen before space 
resource activities are initiated and expressed support for the work of The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group articulating the view that 
it could serve as the basis for the future work of UNCOPUOS.1096 
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Luxembourg took the opportunity to discuss their draft space resources legislation 
which was at the time under consideration by their parliament. Luxembourg stipulated 
that they will monitor the sustainability of their space resource activities and their 
environmental impact. They also reassured UNCOPUOS that their activities are 
purely peaceful and there is no intent to appropriate. All space resource activities will 
be duly authorised and supervised by Luxembourg and respect Earth and outer space. 
Luxembourg also said that it is the role of States to encourage development and 
provide a regulatory framework for new space activities such as space resources. They 
also said that cooperation in the field of space resource activities is essential.1097 
The United States reaffirmed the consistency of US regulation of private actors in 
outer space with its international obligations and stipulated that it will continue to be 
guided by the four ‘core’ space law treaties.1098 The US made a point of stipulating 
that neither the ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ principle nor the phrase ‘global 
commons’ can be found in the Outer Space Treaty. The US questioned the relevance 
of the Moon Agreement to discussions of space resources given that treaty’s low 
number of ratifications. The US also pointed out that space resources activities have 
not yet happened and that the US space resources law is subject to the US’ 
international obligations and any activity authorised by the United States will be 
conducted in accordance with international law including the Outer Space Treaty. 
Further, the US stated that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty could have prohibited 
space resource activities but did not do so. The US declared that it is firm in its 
assessment that Article I of the Outer Space Treaty allows extraction of resources and 
that Article II does not constitute a prohibition. The US also said that the solution to 
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concerns over interests of all humanity not being taken into consideration by the space 
resources industry is not to kill off the industry but to join it.1099 The US also reiterated 
that they do not view their activities as ‘unilateral’ or incompatible with international 
law, arguing that the international community has already taken action in the form of 
the Outer Space Treaty which provides a legal regime for space resource activities.1100 
The US supported the continuation of space resources as an agenda item but did not 
think a working group was appropriate at that time. The US also stated that the 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee does not have a mandate to discuss treaty term 
definitions which is for States Parties either individually or in a conference of the 
parties to the treaty.1101  
Several other countries also made interjections into the debate which. The Iranians 
stated that they view outer space and the celestial bodies as part of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind.1102 Sudan said that outer space is universal natural heritage and 
belongs to everyone. They also argued that developing states should be able to profit 
from space even if they are not able to launch into space themselves.1103 Morocco 
expressed the view that national legislation is insufficient to regulate space resource 
activities. They also said that an international regime would be better able to address 
the issues and concerns of developing states.1104 Chile said that the five UN space law 
treaties need to be ‘updated’ so as to be able to address the topic of space resources.1105 
Cuba said that use of space resources must not exacerbate global inequality.1106 
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Discussions on space resource activities at the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee in 
2018 continued with greater participation. In 2018 space resources appeared under 
agenda item 15 ‘general exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in 
exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources.’1107 
The Russian delegation continued in much the same vein as in previous years. They 
said that while the work of The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group 
is interesting it should not prejudge the work of UNCOPUOS. The Russians stated 
that it is for the Legal Subcommittee to consider legal models for important issues like 
space resources not outside entities. The Russian delegation also stated that it is 
unacceptable for matters which fall under the purview of the Legal Subcommittee to 
be put up for discussion at ‘side events. Further, the Russian delegation questioned the 
motives of those ‘avoiding’ the creation of new legally binding space law instruments 
and called for all states to stick to using UNCOPUOS as the main forum for 
international space law discussions and to remain within the framework of the United 
Nations.1108 
Luxembourg said that it makes sense for them to work within the existing international 
framework as it is accepted and respected by the vast majority of states.1109 Their space 
resources law came into force the previous August and they viewed this as being 
necessary in order to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. 
They also articulated the view that cooperation is essential for space resource activities 
and to that end Luxembourg has entered and is seeking to enter into more bilateral 
arrangements.1110 
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The United States also said that it was within the clear national interest of the United 
States to work within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty and the 3 other ‘core’ 
space law treaties. The US said that it will continue to abide by and be guided by the 
‘four core’ space law treaties and that it is under those treaties and the legal regime 
created by them that the use of space and space commerce has grown and 
flourished.1111 The US also, again, points out that no actual space resource activities 
have happened yet. They also reaffirmed their view that space resource activities are 
fully consistent with the space law treaties. The US said that there is considerable 
confusion about the topic of space resources which is clear in the writing of several 
States. They also expressed confusion by the positions of some of the parties to the 
Moon Agreement and questioned how much the opposition to the US space resources 
law is based on political motives.1112 
Two groupings of developing states made statements, first the Group of Latin 
American Countries (GRULAC) made a statement via the delegation of Argentina. 
GRULAC expressed the view that it is vital that any space resources governance 
regime uphold the space law treaties. They also said that the freedom to exploit space 
resources is not an absolute freedom but one which is tempered by the provisions of 
the space treaties such as the obligation to carry out activities for peaceful purposes 
and in the interests and for the benefits of all countries. They also stated that 
UNCOPUOS needs to undertake a good faith review of the space law treaties and 
development models for the legal regulation of space resource activities.1113 Nigeria 
then spoke on behalf of the Group of 77 and China and said that the Group was of the 
view that an international framework for space resource activities is necessary and 
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could play an important role. They also said that there is a need for a broad debate 
which includes developing countries and considers their needs and rights. This 
discussion is urgent given that countries have implemented and are developing 
national legislation.1114 
Germany said that the international space law regime needs to be developed in order 
to facilitate space resource activities. They said that an international framework is 
important, and it needs to balance the needs and interests of all countries as well as the 
needs and interests of investors and operators. They also said that unilateral 
approaches are likely to give rise to uncertainty and that space resource governance 
and regulation needs to be conducted at the international level. They also said that 
there needs to be discussion and understanding of the common thinking on space 
resources such as what the definition of ‘exploitation’ of space resources means and 
the differences between commercial missions and scientific activities. They also said 
that there is a need to discuss the boundary between the freedom of use and exploration 
and the prohibition of national appropriation. Further they said that UNCOUPOS 
should consider Article 11 of the Moon Agreement or something similar as a basis for 
an international framework. Though they also suggested that something like the ITU 
frequency management regime might work.1115 
Austria said that while the Outer Space Treaty provides a basic framework further 
developments and discussion are needed.1116 Austria said that given that national 
legislation on space resources now exist it is therefore pertinent that UNCOPUOS 
discuss an international legal framework on space resource activities. They also said 
that it still needs to be discussed whether non-renewable space resources can be 
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subjected to ownership given Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Austria suggested 
the legal regime of the deep seabed as a model to follow. They said that space resource 
activities need to be coordinated at an international level in order to avoid conflict. 
Arguing that the best way to do this is via Article 11 of the Moon Agreement but even 
those States which are not party to the Moon Agreement should adopted a multilateral 
approach to space resource activity regulation.1117 
Belgium stated that they recognize that space resource activities are no longer a 
theoretical issue but a real issue that will have long term ramifications and therefore it 
is vital that this issue is addressed by UNCOPUOS. Belgium also notes the work of 
several non-governmental bodies on space resources but stated that they take issue 
with work being done outside of UNCOPUOS and that those groups do not include 
all the member states of UNCOUPOS.1118 This prompted a response from The 
Netherlands. The delegation from The Netherlands stated that the work of The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group is perfectly legitimate and 
that the Working Group has no intention of interpreting the space law treaties, which 
is the purview of the parties to the treaty. The Netherlands warned that a limited 
number of states engaging in an activity can and has given rise to customary 
international law, so it would therefore be prudent for UNCOPUOS to work on 
developing an international framework on space resource activities before that 
happens. Furthermore, they stated that there is no intention of the Draft Building 
Blocks being developed by the Working Group becoming binding or creating 
customary international law they are intended as a starting point for discussion by 
states.1119 
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The United Arab Emirates said that both a top down international approach and a 
national ‘bottom up’ approach is necessary. However, there needs to be a recognition 
that these will move at different speeds. They also said that the long-term sustainability 
of space activities requires a responsive international framework. To that end it is 
important for there to be a way for states to share details of their space resource 
activities.1120 
Mexico said that recognizing that they would not be able to prevent space resource 
activities from occurring it makes sense and is necessary to consider an international 
legal framework. This should be undertaken by UNCOPUOS however they said that 
every country has a right to develop national laws regarding any treaty to which they 
are a party.1121 
China said that multilateralism should be upheld with regards to any international 
space resource activities legal regime and that there needs to be a mechanism to ensure 
the benefits and interests of all countries and people are given their due consideration. 
Further there should be an intergovernmental process for such discussion and that 
UNCOPOUS is the place for that discussion. China also stipulated that there needs to 
be an international legal framework in order to ensure that space resource activities 
are carried out in conformity with international law.1122 
At the 2019 session of UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee the Group of Latin 
American Countries (GRULAC) was the first to address the space resources topic. The 
statement was made by the delegation from Costa Rica who said that Article I OST 
freedoms are not absolute but are restricted by the second paragraph of Article I OST. 
GRULAC expressed concern about the generality of the existing national legislation 
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on space resources. They said that UNCOPUOS needs to take action which could 
include drafting model clauses for use in national legislation.1123 
Germany said that commercial space resource extraction requires an international 
regime in order to comply with the space treaties especially Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty. They also said that developing a regime as envisioned by Article 11 of 
the Moon Agreement is the best route for ensuring conformity with the space treaties 
and providing stability and security which will allow the space resources industry to 
flourish. They also pointed out that it is not required to be a party to the Moon 
Agreement in order to be part of such a regime.1124 
One of the key points of discussion in the 2019 session was the working paper 
introduced by Greece and Belgium on the creation of a Working Group within the 
Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS on space resources.1125 Belgium argued that 
while the ‘general exchange of views’ on space resources in the 2019 and previous 
Legal Subcommittee sessions had been a useful process they expressed the view that 
the Legal Subcommittee needs to try to move forward. They argued that establishing 
a working group on space resources is one potential way to do that. Belgium also said 
that tit was never their view that the UN or UNCOUOS has to be the exclusive forum 
for discussion of space resources, they recognize that the inclusion of academia and 
private actors is important but stressed that the interpretation of treaties is only for 
States and therefore treaty interpretation should only be conducted at forums like 
UNCOPUOS.1126 
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The Greek delegation framed the need for an international framework on space 
resources as being necessary for the success of industry as it would provide the ‘legal 
certainty’ that would enable the space resources industry to source the intensive capital 
investments that will be necessary. The Greek delegation also voiced concern over the 
danger of divergent regulatory regimes (i.e. between those who are party to the Moon 
Agreement and those who are just party to the Outer Space Treaty.) They said that any 
UNCOPUOS working group on space resources needs to address this issue.1127 
In relation to the Greek and Belgian working paper The Netherlands said that it is 
premature to identify an ‘exclusive’ forum for discussion space resources regulation. 
They also took the opportunity to state that the best mandate for a space resource 
governance framework comes from Article 11 of the Moon Agreement not Article I 
of the Outer Space Treaty. The Netherlands further stated that they believe that 
regulation and cooperation is essential for space resource activities but that they also 
believe that such regulation needs to be inclusive and involve industry and civil 
society.1128 
China said that discussions on space resources should take place within the UN system 
specifically UNCOPUOS. They also supported setting up a dedicated working group 
within the Legal Subcommittee and expressed support for the Greek and Belgian 
working paper describing it as ‘well-balanced’. China also said that an international 
regime needs to consider benefits sharing and long term sustainability. It also needs to 
be a multilateral process which ensures that space resources benefit all countries with 
particular regard given to the needs and interests of developing countries. China stated 
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that the Legal Subcommittee needs to be proactive in order to ensure the orderly and 
sustainable use of space resources.1129 
The French delegation said that France is deeply committed to an international, 
multilateral approach to space resource activity governance and that there is more at 
stake than the interests of private sector actors or individual States. They also stated 
that they are not calling into question the legitimacy of any of the existing national 
legislation. They also raised the issues of access and the outer space environment, 
saying that there is a need to strike a balance between all actors concerned.1130 
The Russian delegation continued in the same vein as most previous years. They said 
that if States are going to keep referencing the work of The Hague International Space 
Resources Governance Working Group then UNCOPUOS needs to be better informed 
of the work stating that references is national statements are not sufficient. However, 
they also said that they agreed with Belgium that no group, no matter how 
distinguished, has the capacity to interpret treaties in the place of UNCOPUOS. Russia 
also declared that UNCOPUOS may need to take a fresh view of the Moon Agreement 
and perhaps go so far as to call on States to accede to the Moon Agreement.1131 On the 
question of a working group Russia stated that such a group would need to consider 
drafting a binding legal instrument creating a specific framework for the regulation of 
space resources. They further stated that they feel there are still many questions to 
answer and a working group would need a sufficiently broad mandate in order to be 
able to address those questions.1132 
Luxembourg stated that it is taking a phased approach to the development of a national 
framework. They are also discussing and working on developing an international 
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framework in multiple forums. Luxembourg said that they recognize the value of an 
international legal framework which would provide a solid bedrock for the space 
resources industry and help to provide legal certainty. Luxembourg said that they 
recognize the dangers of divergent regimes, saying that such an outcome is not in the 
interests of the space resources industry as it would undermine legal certainty. They 
also said that it is not in the interests of the international community which is why 
Luxembourg is promoting the development of an international framework.1133 
Australia expressed the view that a non-binding framework should be considered. 
Australia stated that the Outer Space Treaty does not create any obligation to adopt a 
binding framework. They also stated that the 18 Moon Agreement States need to 
consider their obligations under the Moon Agreement. Australia said that it has not 
considered its obligations under the Moon Agreement but noted that this is for those 
states which are party to the Moon Agreement to do when it is deemed necessary.1134 
Japan stated their view that it is important that all stakeholders cooperate with each 
other in order to ensure that activities develop in accordance with international law 
and in an appropriate manner.1135 Colombia said that there needs to be a clearer 
definition of exploitation and exploration, saying that commercial exploitation goes 
above and beyond exploration and use. Colombia also said that UNCOPUOS is the 
place to discuss space resources as it allows the broadest range of States to participate. 
Colombia also expressed concern that space resources are only accessible by a small 
number of states and that to adopt a ‘first come, first served’ approach would 
undermine the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty.1136 The Egyptian delegation said that 
there needs to be a decision as to whether the resources of the Moon are different from 
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resources found elsewhere in outer space and whether they need to be regulated as 
such.1137 
Austria said that it still needs to be discussed whether non-renewable resources in 
space can be subject to private appropriation but also said that UNCOPUOS could 
look at the Law of the Sea as a possible way forward. Austria also said that while it 
may be some time before activities happen or at least before they become profitable 
as there is already national legislation it is imperative that the international community 
discuss the issue now. Austria also said that even if there is agreement that space 
resources can be appropriated there are still many questions to answer about how such 
activities can be carried out in line with the principles set out in the space treaties. 
Austria also said that a multilateral approach is necessary as activities need to be 
coordinated at the international level in order to ensure safety, sustainability, and 
equity. Once again Austria says, as a party to the Moon Agreement, that it views the 
Moon Agreement as the best way forward and encourages other States to sign up to 
the Moon Agreement.1138 
The United States said that UNCOPUOS needs to tread carefully with regards to 
developing new binding space law so as to not unduly burden new and emerging 
industries.1139 The US reaffirmed their view that space resource activities are in line 
with the ‘four core’ UN treaties. The US also stipulated that they do not see a need for 
an international regime at this stage. The US stated that UNCOPUOS needs to keep 
in mind the reality that the space resources industry is still in a very early stage of 
development and no activities have, as yet, occurred. The US said that any space 
resources working group should be time limited and given a clear mandate. However, 
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they stressed that the US is of the view that the existing legal framework is sufficient 
to regulate existing and currently proposed space activities and cautioned against 
moving too fast.1140 
9.6 The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group 
The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group is an independent 
international forum comprised of academics, governments and other stakeholders. 
They have produced a set of building blocks for the development of an international 
framework on space resource activities.1141 The purpose of these building blocks is to 
“lay the ground work for international discussions on the potential development of an 
international framework…1142” As an early group with a broad international makeup 
it is worth considering the provisions of the ‘Building Blocks’. This will be discussed 
below. 
The definition of space resource is seemingly now agreed upon. The US Title IV, the 
Luxembourg Space Resources law and the Hague Building Blocks all use some 
variation of “an extractable abiotic resource in situ in outer space.”1143 This is a new 
definition for space law as it does not appear in any of the five space treaties, not even 
the Moon Agreement. However, it is similar to the definition of ‘resources’ found in 
UNCLOS1144 and this definition brooked little opposition at the several sessions of 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee since the enactment of the US Title IV.1145 
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1144UNCLOS (n 57), 133(a); Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (n 57), 180 
1145UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Fifty-eight Session, held in Vienna from 1 
to 12 April 2019’ (18 April 2019) UN Doc A/AC.105/1203 paras 239-267; A/AC.105/1177 (n 
76), paras 229-265; A/AC.105/1122 (n 76), paras 34, 50 and 221-250; A/AC.105/1113 (n 76) 
paras 74-83 
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However, it would be premature to discuss customary international law status as there 
is no indication of opinio juris at least at this stage. 
The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group Draft Building 
Blocks also define ‘Utilization of Space Resources’.1146 The Outer Space Treaty uses 
use not utilization1147, the Moon Agreement uses use or exploitation1148, the US Title 
IV uses ‘commercial recovery’1149 and the Luxembourg law uses the phrase 
‘exploration and use’. The Hague Working Group defines utilization of space 
resources as “the recovery of space resources and the extraction of raw materials or 
volatile materials therefrom.” This is therefore the process of mining and refining raw 
materials.  
The Hague Working Group also uses the broader term of ‘space resource activity’ 
which includes the exploration phase of mining operations and also encompasses the 
construction phase for any necessary equipment to conduct utilization of space 
resources.1150 The Building Blocks use the standard definition for space object1151 but 
introduce a new term ‘space-made product’ which is defined as a “product made in 
outer space wholly or partially from space resources.”1152 And ‘operator’ which is 
defined as “a governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entity 
conducting space resource activities.”1153  
The Building Blocks, having introduced the new term of ‘space-made product’ 
recognize that there needs to be international responsibility for these objects and 
essentially proposes extending the ‘space object’ regime to ‘space-made products’ 
 
1146The Hague Working Group Building Blocks (n 61), Building Block 2.2 
1147OST (n 1), Article I 
1148Moon Agreement (n 2), Article 2, Article 11 (5) 
1149CSLCA (n 48), Title IV, §51302(a), §51303 
1150The Hague Working Group Building Blocks (n 61), Building Block 2.3  
1151Ibid, Building Block 2.4 
1152Ibid, Building Block 2.5 
1153Ibid, Building Block 2.6 
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while maintaining a distinction between those objects launched into outer space and 
those made from space resources.1154 
The Building Blocks also call for the attribution of ‘priority rights’ which are limited 
in duration and area of application but international recognized so as to allow an 
operator the ability to search and/or recover space resources without undue 
interference.1155 The Building blocks also stipulate that the international framework  
should ensure that resources rights over raw mineral and volatile 
materials extracted from space resources, as well as products derived 
therefrom, can lawfully be acquired through domestic legislation, 
bilateral agreements and/or multilateral agreements.1156 
 
Interestingly the Building Blocks do not provide a definition of resource rights. The 
term seems to be mainly used by Non-governmental organizations focusing on 
indigenous rights and/or sustainable development. The World Resources Institute 
stipulate that resource rights are about helping rural people in developing countries 
secure the benefits of their land and natural resources in the face of insecure property 
rights.1157 Global Forest Watch stipulate that the phrase ‘resource rights’ 
refers to areas over which indigenous peoples or local communities 
enjoy rights to certain resources and a limited right to access the land, 
whether legally recognized or not, in order to exercise their resource 
rights. The exact nature of these resource rights varies among tenure 
type and country.1158 
 
Similarly, the Center for International Environmental Law regards resource rights as 
being part of the efforts to securing ‘communities’ rights to their land and resources 
in the face of insecure property rights and attempts by governments and private actors 
 
1154Ibid, Building Block 6 
1155Ibid, Building Blocks 7 and 14(a) 
1156Ibid, Building Block 8.1 
1157World Resources Institute ‘Land and Resource Rights’ <https://www.wri.org/our-
work/project/land-and-resource-rights>   
1158Global Forest Watch ‘Resource Rights’ 
<https://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/165e621a0b4245f2b10df4ed8aabf271_0> 
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to acquire their land.1159 Trócaire also place ‘social and economic justice’ at the centre 
of their definition of ‘resource rights’.1160 However, it is reasonably clear from the way 
that the term is used in the Hague Working Groups draft Building Blocks that this was 
not what was intended by the use of this phrase. The use of the phrase in the Building 
Bocks more closely aligns with the term ‘mineral rights’1161 Although again the term 
as used in the building blocks doe not exactly align with the general use of the term 
which is generally about the right to extract resources (and so in the formulation of the 
Building Blocks would be ‘priority rights’).1162 The term as used in the Building 
Blocks seems to be an attempt to grant ‘property rights’ over extracted resources 
without using the phrase ‘property rights’ which does not appear anywhere in the 
building blocks. The aversion to using the phrase ‘property rights’ is understandable 
given the issues that could arise. 
The Building Blocks also provide for a ‘claims register’ for the registration of priority 
rights1163 as well as an international database for providing notifications of space 
resource activities.1164 The Building Blocks also call for the development of Area-
based safety measures although recognizing the limitations of Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty stipulates that “such safety measures shall not impede the free access… 
to any area…”1165 Highlighting the necessity of international cooperation and 
coordination of space activities, whether they are engaged in the ‘use’ of space 
resources or not. 
 
1159Center for International Environmental Law ‘Land and Resource Rights’ 
<https://www.ciel.org/issue/land-resource-rights/> 
1160Trocaire Natural Resource Rights Framework: A Practical Guide for Programme Design (2014) 
https://www.climatelearningplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/national-resource-
rights-framework.pdf 
1161‘Mineral Rights’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mineral_rights> 
1162Timothy Fitzgerald ‘Understanding Mineral Rights’ (Montana State University 2017) 
<http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT201207AG.pdf> 
1163The Hague Working Group Building Blocks (n 61), Building Blocks 14(a), 18(a)  
1164Ibid, Building Block 18(b)(i) 
1165Ibid, Building Blocks 11.3, 14(b), 18(b)(i) 
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Indeed this is a key and common point of the building blocks that there is the need for 
there to be international or at least mutual recognition of the 
mineral/access/priority/property rights of operators as well as cooperation and 
coordination of efforts to regulate the associated activities. This is indeed key, 
especially as space resource activities are likely to be international ventures, but also 
given the potential for operators from multiple potentially ‘less than friendly’ states 
proactive steps need to be taken in order to safeguard the peaceful nature of space, 
something which all States party to the Outer Space Treaty have an obligation to 
ensure not just of their own actions but also the actions of their nationals in outer space. 
However, there does need to be caution as mineral/access/priority/property rights can 
quite easily turn into ‘national appropriation by means of use, occupation or any other 
means.’ 
9.7 Conclusion 
The role of this chapter has been to discuss the ongoing developments relating to space 
resources. It examined the legal and policy frameworks in the United States and 
Luxembourg, as well as the ongoing discussions at the UN and The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group. This is important, 
international law is not static. The actions and views of states push the development 
of international law, and as this chapter demonstrates, the views of states on the legal 
issues around space resources are development. 
The first section of this chapter examined the relationship between international and 
national law. This provides and important context. The next section examined US law 
and policy on space resources. From the first attempt to produce national legislation 
known as the ASTEROIDS Act, to the ultimately successful law of 2015 then ahead 
to legislation under consideration by Congress as a way of examining potential future 
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developments. Then the section looks at Space Force and the Trump administrations 
space policy. This is relevant not only because it highlights the potential future 
direction for US space law and policy but also because Space Force highlights one of 
the potential dangers for the future of space resources, that it could prove to be a source 
of conflict or at least instability. This enhances the case for an international approach 
to space resource governance. Finally, the section looks at how international law 
interacts with the US legal system, this is important because it is likely to be US Courts 
who determine how exactly to interpret the interaction of the 2015 law and Article II 
of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The next section examines the Luxembourg law on space resources. Luxembourg’s 
law is more comprehensive and was published with an explanatory document, so their 
intentions are clearer. It also looked at how international law works in Luxembourg, 
which is quite a different situation from the United States and more in line with The 
Netherlands.  
Then an in-depth examination of the debates that have happened at UNCOPUOS since 
the enactment of the US law in 2015. It is important that this is undertaken, particularly 
in this level of detail to demonstrate the development of international opinion over 
these recent years. This is, in essence, the evidence for the claim in this work that the 
status of space resources in international law has, or at least is, changing. 
Finally, this section looks at the work of The Hague Space Resources Governance 
Working Group an independent international forum comprised of academics, 
governments and other stakeholders. They have produced a set of Building Blocks for 
the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities. This 
process has been influential in driving discussion at UNCOPOUS and is likely to 
continue to influence it for some time to come. 
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The next chapter, the conclusion of this work will provide a final summary of the work 
and it will provide answers for the research questions, a proposed solution, and identify 
scope for further work. 
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Chapter Ten: 
Conclusion 
 
10.1 Overview 
The purpose of this study has been to critically evaluate the governance framework of 
outer space in order to establish whether space resource activities are permitted and, 
if they is, what will the legal regime look like. The driver of this is the ambiguity in 
Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. States are free to ‘use’ outer space but not 
to ‘appropriate’ it. This study has clarified what these provisions mean and how they 
apply to the question of space resources activities. Demonstrating that they are 
permitted by international space law albeit not without restriction. Further, 
international cooperation is necessary in order to properly govern space resource 
activities and ensure the certainty that industry requires in order to generate the 
necessary investment. 
This is the biggest potential impact of this study; it underscores the practical need for 
an international framework on space resources. The international community is 
currently in the process of debating this through UNCOPUOS and this study could 
influence minds, particularly as The Hague Space Resources Governance Working 
Group has proposed just such a framework. Indeed, as this author has been a member 
of that Working Group the work undertaken in service of this study has already had 
an impact on the debate, though there is still more to do. 
An additional potential impact of this study is regarding the question of defining 
‘celestial bodies.’ There have been, and are, proposals to create ‘categories’ of celestial 
bodies and potentially even exclude certain size bodies from the ‘non-appropriation 
principle’ altogether, this work takes an in-depth look at the definition of celestial 
bodies as used in the Outer Space Treaty, and should warn against such notions. The 
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Outer Space Treaty does not contain a definition of this term, which has not received 
as much attention as the definition of ‘outer space.’ Indeed, beyond this work, only 
Fasan1166 and Pop1167 have examined the term in any great detail. 
This work began in chapter two with an overview of space resource activities and 
some of the proposals that have been put forward. As was shown, space resource 
activities are economically and technically feasible. Furthermore, States are taking this 
prospect seriously and have introduced legislation to regulate it. Therefore, space 
resource activities and the legal issues presented by it need to be taken seriously. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that the actual, physical distribution of resources is taken 
into consideration when devising any property rights regime or governance framework 
for space resource activities. Effective resource management is key for sustainability, 
which is necessary because while there is a considerable quantity of material available 
it is not infinite. Sustainability is, or should be, a key aspect of any property rights 
regime. 
Chapter three addressed the framework of public international law within which the 
space governance regime sits. It examined space law’s status as a ‘special regime’ of 
international law and the concept of ‘gaps’ although as argued in this work, within a 
positivist conception of international law it is more appropriate to talk of ‘silence’ as 
‘gap’ assumes a natural completeness. Further, this chapter argued that the structure 
of the Outer Space Treaty leaves it open to future developments and an evolutionary 
approach to interpretation. Although the primary method for treaty interpretation must 
be the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ approach as outlined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. The chapter also presented Customary International Law as an 
 
1166Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies’ (n 4) 
1167Pop, 'A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body...'  (n 5) 
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important piece of the puzzle which provides a process for the evolution of 
international law. The case was made that soft law provides a potentially useful avenue 
to creating a coordinating international framework which while not as robust as a ‘hard 
law’ approach would provide flexibility which given the embryotic nature of space 
resource activities is desirable. 
Chapter four examined the body of space law with a particular focus on the Outer 
Space Treaty as the core, foundational treaty of space law. The key objective of this 
chapter was to examine the definition of ‘use’ in Article I OST. This chapter makes 
the argument that, as indicated by the preamble, part of the ‘object and purpose of the 
Outer Space Treaty is to facilitate the use and development of outer space. This when 
combined with a ‘plain ordinary’ reading of ‘use’ in Article I OST supports a broad 
interpretation of the ‘term’ use, which would fit space resource activities within it. 
This is further supported by the travaux preparatoires as argued in this chapter. 
Therefore this chapter argues that space resource activities fall within the scope of the 
freedom of use as enumerated by Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, however this is 
subject to a few limitations such as the non-appropriation principle codified in Article 
II of the Outer Space Treaty.  
Article II is a fundamental aspect of space law and enjoys broad support. As this 
chapter argues it applies to non-governmental actors by virtue of Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty, although the obligation to ensure compliance rests on the state 
responsible for that non-governmental actor. Regarding the meaning of ‘national 
appropriation’, this article makes the case that national appropriation should be 
interpreted to mean ‘the acquisition, in whole or in part, of outer space, the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, for the exclusive use of the State or its nationals. ‘This chapter 
also makes the argument, that the application of Article II to space resources has 
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developed, even if non-appropriation did apply to extracted resources there is growing 
acceptance, albeit not yet sufficiently crystallised to be described as a customary norm, 
that resources once removed from the celestial body are appropriable. This is further 
supported by the object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty, which as argued above 
is to facilitate the use and development of outer space. Resources are needed for that. 
Finally, the debates during the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty clearly indicated 
that the intention was Article II ensures that activities do not give rise to sovereign 
rights over territory not that the article should prohibit activity. Chapter four also 
looked at Article VI and VIII OST as mechanisms for the exercise of jurisdiction, as 
well as Article 11 of the Moon Agreement and the resource provisions of UNCLOS. 
Chapter five critically examined the definition of ‘celestial body’ a term left undefined 
by the Outer Space Treaty that is vital to its scope of application. The finding from 
examining the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘celestial body’ is that it is a broad 
term that applies to all naturally occurring bodies in the solar system regardless of their 
size or the ability to be moved by human intervention. Though, as it is sometimes 
appropriate to consider specialist or scientific definitions of terms, this chapter took a 
further examination of the scientific definition of the term celestial body. This was 
particularly useful, even in light of the ‘plain ordinary meaning’ definition as it could 
be possible for space law to create a new definition or even to categorize celestial 
bodies in a future space resources framework. However, the findings of this chapter 
would suggest that this would not be a prudent course of action. 
Chapter six examined the history of property in the Western tradition. It examined the 
development of the concept from Roman law to the development under the English 
common law and then the property ‘revolution’ of the 17th century when the modern 
concept of property began to emerge as well as the further development that were 
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undertaken as the Western conception (specifically the Anglo-American) conception 
of property pushed into and beyond the frontiers of European settlement. It 
demonstrated that property is not a static concept but one that has developed and 
evolved as societal changes have pushed it. Further, it demonstrated that property is a 
product of the state and law and can therefore be shaped by it. 
Chapter seven examined property as a legal and political concept as well as an idea 
and institution. Following on from this theoretical discussion of the nature of property 
was a discussion of the role of the state in relation to property. The chapter finished 
with a discussion of some alternative conceptions of property. This chapter had three 
key, essential arguments. It made the case that property is an evolving, complex 
concept which has historical and societal context. There is no one definition of 
‘property’, it is not a static or fixed concept. Further, property is a product of society 
and ultimately government, even in a Lockean framework. Property is intertwined 
with the existence and authority of the state, it is a political creation. Finally, property 
is ultimately about distribution of resources, it is a mechanism for controlling access 
to, and use of, various resources be it gold, land or deposits of water ice on far flung 
asteroids. 
Chapter eight examined the concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction which underpin 
the international order of States. This chapter examined sovereignty in various eras 
and forms. It is an evolving concept, however in its current form it is dominated by 
the territorial variant. This is problematic for outer space as territorial sovereignty is 
prohibited by virtue of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. However, there is 
‘personal’ sovereignty or the ‘nationality principle’ which enables States to exercise 
jurisdiction over their nationals regardless of where they are. This is how States 
exercise control over their subjects at sea and in outer space. However, it has 
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limitations, most notably that it means States have jurisdiction over their nationals but 
do not have jurisdiction over people who are not their nationals. Further, as discussed 
in this chapter, jurisdiction is only as effective as the ability of the state to actually 
‘control’ those under its jurisdiction. This provides further support for an 
‘international’ approach to space resource governance. 
Chapter nine provides an overview of the developments since 2014 in the field of 
space law relating to space resources. It examines the relationship between 
international and national law providing a necessary context. The section then 
examines in detail the US law and policy development since the first attempt to enact 
a national law on space resources in 2014. This is followed by an examination of the 
Luxemburg space resources law. An in depth examination of the ongoing discussions 
as UNCOPUOS was then undertaken, this is important particularly as a key claim of 
this work is that the international consensus on space resources is developing and 
UNCOPUOS is a primary vehicle for that development. Finally, the chapter examines 
the work of The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group.  
Having provided a comprehensive overview of the structure of this work, the specific 
research questions will now be addressed. 
10.2 Research Questions 
 
The research questions of this work focus on the core issues relating to the ‘legality’ 
of space resource activities. Property rights are important, they provide security and a 
necessary degree of certainty. Entrepreneurs and businesses want and need a 
favourable legal framework,1168 if for no other reason than “to be assured that the 
security of the return on investment afforded by ‘terrestrial property law’ will be 
 
1168Danilenko, ‘Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process’ (n 53), 218 
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available for investments in space.”1169 However, there has been a general 
presumption that the non-appropriation principle articulated in Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty prevents States from granting property rights to their nationals (and even 
from nationals ‘obtaining’ property rights without State intervention). Whether this 
applies to resources has been the big unanswered question, even from the existing 
scholarly work. The United States and Luxembourg assert that resources are 
appropriable once extracted from celestial bodies and that their national legislation 
conforms with the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty. The overarching research 
question of this work could be simplified as asking whether that is true? However, 
there is of course more to it than that as evidenced by the breadth and depth of this 
work. 
 
10.2.1 Does a national space resources property rights regime constitute national 
appropriation by means of sovereignty or any other means as found in 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty? 
 
Modern legal scholarship takes the view that property is about rights between people 
in relation to ‘things’, and therefore ‘property’ is a grouping or constellation of 
elements or rights.  Property is both an institution and an idea and one that is different 
from other rights like freedom of speech as “property involves allocation: with regard 
to property, the giving to one person necessarily denies or takes from another.”  The 
protection of rights like freedom of speech are ‘cheap’ to society as protecting one 
person’s freedom of speech does not take anything away from another person. The 
protection of property is different, however. “If the enjoyment of a particular good by 
one person is protected, then the enjoyment of that same good by others is denied. The 
extension of property protection to one person necessarily and inevitably denies the 
 
1169Lyall and Larsen, Space Law (n 18), 567 
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same right to others” (emphasis in original).1170 Property “is, in its essence, the 
resolution of conflicting claims” (emphasis in original). Therefore, the state takes an 
active role by denying claims and allocating rights to specific persons. Therefore “the 
state cannot simply be the ‘watchman’ for this right. It cannot protect without 
intervening. Property rights are, by nature, positive rights, allocative rights” (emphasis 
in original).1171 
Property is the state sanctioned allocation of resources. Therefore, if a State grants 
property rights over resources in situ in a celestial body then that States has 
appropriated part of that celestial body. This would be a violation of Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty. It is clear that both the United States and Luxembourg recognize 
this danger, their legislation focuses on regulating activity, not granting property 
rights. Whether granting or recognizing property rights over space resources once they 
have been separated from the celestial body constitutes ‘national appropriation’ of 
‘Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies’ is a key question. Since 
the enactment of the US space resources legislation in 2015 and the subsequent 
discussions during several sessions of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS a view 
among the international community has, at least, begun to emerge that resources are 
capable of being appropriated once they have been extracted from a celestial body. 
Granted there is still not an international consensus about who has the authority to 
authorise such activities (i.e. whether an individual State can ‘unilaterally’ authorise 
such appropriation or whether it needs to be done by an international regime or body 
a la the International Seabed Authority) but that resources are separable from their 
celestial body and become appropriable thereafter is generally accepted by States and 
 
1170Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, ‘Property: A Special Right’ (n 736), 1038-1039 
1171Ibid, 1042 
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is in the process of ‘crystallising’. It is also important to recall, as argued, that a key 
aspect of Article II OST is that is prevents use or occupation from being used as a 
basis for establishing ownership, not that it is meant to prevent use or occupation. 
Therefore, a national property rights regime is certainly capable of ‘appropriating’ the 
Moon or a celestial body if poorly structured. However, if national property rights 
regime protects property acquired after it has been extracted from a celestial body then 
it does not constitute ‘national appropriation’. That said, it is impossible for a State to 
protect resources in situ, ‘mining claims’ or other area based ‘property rights’, at least 
not from space resource operators from other States. To claim a right to protect 
resources, ‘mining claims’ or other area based ‘property rights’ in or on a celestial 
body would constitute national appropriation. Therefore, if States desire protection for 
the space resource activities of their nationals beyond protecting the ownership rights 
over extracted materials they need to develop an international framework such as that 
proposed by The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group. This would 
enable the coordination of the authorising of activities and the mutual recognition of 
‘mining claims’ and ‘priority rights’ without necessitating the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction (which would constitute national appropriation) over the area in question. 
All States involved in such an international regime would be exercising their personal 
jurisdiction over their nationals. 
10.2.2 What is the legal definition of a celestial body and are asteroids celestial 
bodies? 
 
The phrase ‘celestial body’ is used throughout the Outer Space Treaty and the broader 
body of space law. It is usually used in association with ‘outer space’ and/or ‘the 
Moon’ as in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty which declares that the freedom of 
exploration and use applies to “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
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bodies.” However, there is no definition for the term provided in the Outer Space 
Treaty or any other instrument of space law. 
According to the VCLT a treaty needs to be interpreted in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the terms within the context of its object and purpose. If the 
meaning remains unclear recourse can be made to the preparatory work of the treaty. 
However, all of this need to be done with regard to the treaty as a whole, not just that 
specific term or article, and it needs to consider the context, and the object and purpose 
of the treaty.  Recourse can be made to dictionaries to find the ‘ordinary meaning’, 
even specialist dictionaries, and indeed the courts have done so.1172 Finally and on that 
note it is important to note that Article 31(4) VCLT states that ‘a special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.’1173 Richard Gardiner 
says that “the most obvious evidence of such an intention is inclusion of a definition 
article.”1174 
The term celestial body does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary, requiring 
an examination of its component parts. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
defines ‘celestial’ as something “positioned in or relating to the sky or outer space”1175, 
with ‘space’ being defined as the area beyond the Earth’s atmosphere containing all 
of the planets, stars, galaxies, in short the rest of the universe.1176 The term ‘body’ is 
defined by Oxford as “the main or central part of something, a mass or a 
collection”1177. From this it is reasonable to regard the ‘dictionary definition’ of the 
term ‘celestial body’ as ‘the main or central part of a naturally occurring mass that is 
located beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.’  
 
1172Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 186-189 
1173VCLT (n 157), Article 31(4) 
1174Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 183 
1175Concise OED (n 58), 228 
1176Ibid, 1381 
1177Ibid, 154 
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The scientific community categorizes natural objects in the solar system into three 
broad categories (ignoring the Sun). These are planets, moons and small solar system 
objects.  
Planets and moons are reasonably well defined by the scientific community, the 
controversy over Pluto, notwithstanding. However, the third category of ‘small solar 
system objects’ is more of an ‘everything else’ categorization with some hazy 
definitions. 
Although planetary scientists have come to realize that the boundaries 
are somewhat blurred, these ‘junk’ objects can be divided into three 
broad classes: asteroids, trans-Neptunian objects, and comets.1178 
 
An asteroid can be defined as “one of the small planetary bodies (also known as minor 
planets or planetoids) that mainly, but not exclusively, populate the region of the solar 
system between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter.”1179 
A comet is a ‘small solar system body’ with a highly eccentric orbit, that goes from 
periods close to the sun to often far out into the reaches of the solar system. The 
comet’s core is generally just a chunk of dusty ice only a few kilometres across.1180 
Beyond Neptune, small icy bodies become common, these object form what is known 
as the ‘Kuiper Belt.’ Together with ‘Scattered Disk’ objects these make up the ‘trans-
Neptunian objects’ (TNOs) which have a mass “200 times that of the asteroid belt 
(one-fifth of an Earth-mass), and in total there may be nearly 100,000 bodies more 
than 100 kilometres in size.” Pluto and Eris are both ‘Dwarf Planets’ and Trans-
Neptunian objects.1181 
 
1178Rothery Planets (n 503), 13 
1179The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 303 
1180Rothery Planets (n 503), 15  
1181Ibid, 14-15  
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Astronomical terms themselves are vague and “any small sized body orbiting the Sun 
could be defined as an asteroid.”1182 Furthermore, the core or nuclei of a comet may 
over time become what would be classified as an asteroid as it is baked and stripped 
of its icy exterior by the Sun.1183 Indeed, “some near-Earth objects are probably 
defunct comets with remnant water-ice surviving beneath their dusty surfaces.”1184 
“Asteroids range downwards in size from 950 kilometres across (the diameter of 
Ceres, the largest example), with no lower limit.”1185  
Determining asteroid’s size, mass and density, is hard and does not provide a firm 
enough basis for legal system of classification1186 Spectrometric observations not 
reliable to commercial standard, for example, Mikael Granvick et al state that M-class 
asteroids were thought to be primarily Iron (Fe) and Nickel (Ni) but it turns out that 
they have much more silicate content that was thought.1187 Therefore science does not 
provide a solid foundation for creation of legal categories.  
The ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term celestial bodies as gleaned from dictionary 
definitions is a broad meaning which encompasses all natural objects in outer space.  
A reasonable ‘ordinary meaning’ definition is ‘the main or central part of a naturally 
occurring mass that is located beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.’ Furthermore, the 
scientific term ‘small solar system body’ is a broad term which includes a variety of 
objects in the solar system, essentially anything which has mass but is not a planet or 
a moon (or the Sun), and there is no lower limit on the size of an asteroid.1188 
Additionally, there is no evidence in the treaty or the preparatory material to support 
 
1182The Asteroid Hazard (n 81), 72 
1183Lewis Asteroid Mining 101 (n 83), 32; Rothery Planets (n 503), 15 
1184Rothery Planets (n 503), 108 
1185Ibid, 13 
1186Kaasalainen and Durech, ‘What’s Out There?’ (n 544), 131-150; Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid 
Resources’ (n 82), 81-129, 87-88 
1187Granvick et al, ‘Earth’s Temporarily-Captured Natural Satellites’ (n 545), 151 
1188Rothery Planets (n 503), 13 
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the notion that any naturally occurring object in space escapes the ‘celestial body’ 
category. It is important to recall that the Outer Space Treaty applies to ‘outer space’ 
broadly and as a blanket term, the Moon and celestial bodies are included in that scope 
not additions to it. Further, ‘celestial bodies’ are not included as part of a list but used 
as a general catchall term, there is no reason to exclude any bodies, the drafters could 
have provided a more extensive list, such as planets, moons, etc but they did not. It is 
important to recall that Article 31(4) VCLT states that ‘a special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.’1189 Richard Gardiner 
says that “the most obvious evidence of such an intention is inclusion of a definition 
article.”1190 The lack of a clear intention to impart a specialist meaning to the phrase 
celestial bodies provides certainty that it should be used in a broad all-encompassing 
manner as indicated by the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term. 
Therefore, while there is no ‘legal definition’ of celestial bodies per se it is clear that 
the term should be defined as covering any naturally occurring mass in outer space 
with no lower or upper size limit. The non-appropriation principle applies equally to 
all these objects, which absolutely includes asteroids of all sizes. 
 
10.2.3 Does the distinction between personal and territorial 
jurisdiction/sovereignty allow for the development of a legal regime to 
govern space resource activities? 
 
Jurisdiction is a central feature of state sovereignty. While it is predominantly 
territorial in nature, particularly in modern international law. However, there are 
circumstances in which a State can exercise jurisdiction outside of its territory. The 
most relevant to regulation of activities in outer space is known as the nationality 
principle. That “a State can legislate to regulate activities of its nationals abroad” is a 
 
1189VCLT (n 157), Article 31(4) 
1190Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (n 26), 183 
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well-established principle.1191 Indeed, nationality is a logical basis for jurisdiction in 
a regime so concerned with sovereignty.1192 The nationality principle is older than the 
territoriality principle, however the centrality of territory to the modern (Westphalian) 
State give pre-eminence to the territoriality principle.1193   
However, in order for state to exercise jurisdictional authority beyond its territorial 
limits there needs to be a link between the State and the activity it seeks to regulate.1194 
This can be by virtue of having an effect on the State in question, the nationality 
principle, or some other basis. International law leaves states a fair margin of 
discretion here1195 and with regards to outer space the OST provides at least two 
foundations, via Article VI and Article VIII.  
Owing to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty a territorial basis for the exercise of 
jurisdiction can be ruled out, as in order to exercise jurisdiction over territory the state 
would have to acquire it and therefore violate the non-appropriation principle. 
Personal jurisdiction or the nationality principle is the approach that States need to 
take with regards to outer space  
Jurisdiction is vital indeed, Csabafi states that the exploitation and use of outer space 
is “unimaginable without the extension of state authority or jurisdiction to the areas or 
spatial zones affected.”1196 However, it needs to be done in such a manner as to be 
consistent with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and the other obligations in the 
law of outer space and international law more broadly. 
States can regulate the activities of their nationals in outer space using personal 
jurisdiction as the basis for the exercise of this authority without violating Article II 
 
1191Aust Handbook of International Law (n 941), 43 
1192Shaw International Law (n 872), 479 
1193Staker ‘Jurisdiction’ (n 933), 318-319 
1194Staker ‘Jurisdiction’ (n 933), 315 
1195Aust Handbook of International Law (n 941), 42  
1196Csabafi The Concept of State Jurisdiction in International Space Law (n 366), 130 
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of the Outer Space Treaty. The exercise of personal jurisdiction is claiming authority 
over a person or legal entity not territory and therefore does not constitute ‘national 
appropriation’. Indeed, under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty States have an 
obligation to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals (natural or legal) in order to 
fulfil their obligation to ‘authorise and supervise’ their activities in outer space or on 
the Moon or any other celestial bodies. Authorisation and regulation of activities is 
not only within the sphere of a States powers over its national in outer space it is an 
obligation under international law. This includes regulation of their property in outer 
space. Where issues arise under international law is the ‘granting’ or ‘protecting’ of 
property rights over resources in situ or while they remain part of a celestial body. As 
discussed the international community has accepted that resources can be separated 
from their celestial body and are appropriable once this has occurred but to claim 
ownership before this process would be appropriation and a violation of Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty. Of course, one of the consequences of utilizing personal 
jurisdiction as the basis of authority for regulating space resource activities is that it 
only applies to the nationals of an individual State. Therefore, the United States can 
only regulate the activities of those under the jurisdiction of the United States (which 
in this context means corporations, citizens, and permanent residents). It also means 
they can only protect the ‘mining claims’ of US nationals and entities from other US 
national and entities by refusing to grant licences to conduct activities within 
overlapping operating areas. Therefore it would be prudent, if not necessary, for those 
States pursuing space resource activities to develop some sort of international 
framework, such as that proposed by The Hague International Space Resources 
Governance Working Group, to ensure mutual recognition of claims, operating areas, 
and property rights. 
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10.3 Solution 
 
There is a natural inclination to propose a new treaty, to suggest the necessity of 
creating an ‘International Seabed Authority’ for outer space, and such a proposal 
would solve a number of problems. However, beyond the political impossibility of 
drafting and ratifying such a treaty, it is not necessarily the best approach, at least at 
this time. As has been argued, informal property rights and management systems can 
operate successful, particularly where the value of investment is high, the community 
is small, and there is considerable incentive to cooperate. This was seen the gold fields 
of California and the American West in the 19th century, it is likely to be repeatable in 
outer space.  
Furthermore, while it is true that formal property rights do facilitate investment, it is 
important not to get too obsessed with the vehicle but consider the destination. 
Property rights are about protecting interests, they are about ensuring that Space 
Mining Company Ltd. can protect the investment they have made in extracting 
resources from Asteroid X. That they do not have to worry about ‘claim jumping’ or 
overlapping operational areas. This does not necessarily require a formal property 
rights regime, particularly while the industry remains embryotic. Further, prematurely 
establishing a formal, hard law regime will undoubtedly result in unwanted outcomes; 
it is economically more efficient to allow experimentation, to allow evolution and then 
codify what has developed when the time is right. 
However, this is absolutely not something that an individual state can do alone. While 
Luxembourg (or the United States) can authorise space resource activities and they 
can prevent overlapping operational areas between companies they exercise 
jurisdiction over, they have limited recourse for foreign companies. Granted, the Outer 
Space Treaty does require the ‘avoidance of harmful interference’ with the activities 
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of other States, but an established mechanism for coordinating such avoidance would 
facilitate the process. Therefore, an endorsement of The Hague International Space 
Resources Governance Working Group Building Blocks for the Development of an 
International Framework on Space Resource Activities is a logical conclusion of this 
work. They are not perfect, however the conception of ‘priority rights’1197 and the 
‘registry’1198, among others, solve a number of problems. Further they endorse an 
evolutionary approach, recognizing the limitation of knowledge about space resources 
and the process necessary for extracting and utilizing which is why the Building 
Blocks utilize the notion of ‘adaptive governance’.1199 It is recommended to adopt the 
Building Blocks as a ‘soft law’ instrument, and it is regarded as somewhat irrelevant 
whether it is adopted by States or as some sort of ‘industry association’ by the space 
resources sector. Eventually a formal institution akin to the International Seabed 
Authority will likely want to be considered but it is premature to discuss such steps. 
10.4 Further Work 
The debate is moving on, as argued, international law is changing, and this is likely to 
be one of the last anticipatory work on space resource property rights. The question of 
whether space resource activities are legal is being settled, its days as an academic 
question are limited. That said, there is still a lot of work to be done. Several aspects 
that have been identified are a clear need for work on the distribution of space 
resources and the equity of access and use. This is particularly important given the 
‘interests and benefits’ provision of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. However, this 
work requires a better understanding of the composition of the small solar system 
bodies to be provided by planetary science. 
 
1197The Hague Working Group Building Blocks (n 61), Building Block 7  
1198Ibid, Building Block 14  
1199Ibid, Building Block 4.2(a) 
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Further, and in line with the notions of stewardship that were explored within this 
work are questions of ‘environmental protection’, granted this perhaps applies more 
to planetary environments than asteroids and comets but there it is worthwhile 
exploring the legal basis for protecting areas of scientific interest and natural beauty 
(there are further questions, such as how to ensure compliance with things like the 
non-binding planetary protection guidelines, particularly as sources of water in space 
are key targets both for the resource community but also the astrobiology community.) 
Similarly, there is need for consideration of ‘unique environments’ like the so-called 
‘peaks of eternal light’ in places like the lunar south polar region. These areas are 
resources by themselves in addition to the resources contained there. It may be 
necessary to treat them as special areas and establish a specific regime for them as has 
been done with the Geostationary Orbit. Of course, the Moon itself could be 
considered a ‘unique environment’ and be considered worthy of special protection. 
Finally, a future work should, and will undoubtably, focus on actual mechanisms for 
creating an international regime for space resources. Given this works endorsement of 
The Hague Group’s work it would be the hope that they would serve as a framework 
for such an enquiry but also further examination of the UNCLOS regime, as well as 
the ITU framework and other similar systems would be prudent. 
10.5 Concluding Remarks: 
Space resource activities are permitted under international law. Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty is a broad and permissive freedom of use of outer space and one of those 
uses is the extraction and utilization of resources found in and on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies. This is true for both States and non-governmental actors. However, 
States are required to ‘authorise and supervise’ the activities of their nationals and are 
responsible, under international law, for those activities. These activities cannot be 
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conducted without restriction. The most notable restriction on the ‘freedom of use’ of 
outer space is the non-appropriation principle codified in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. However, there are other restrictions such as the provision calling for the 
avoidance of ‘harmful interference found in Article IX. Ultimately the Outer Space 
Treaty is intended to facilitate not thwart the future of humanity in outer space. 
However, it also desires to ensure that that future is better than the human past. Wars 
over resources plague our history, and with the rise of various space forces and the 
growing fragility of the international order we look in danger of spreading that plague 
to outer space. We can choose not to, we can choose cooperation and coordination, 
rather than competition and confrontation. The Outer Space Treaty is a product of the 
Cold War, it is true, but that means that two ideological enemies in the heat of deadly 
competition were able to get together and produce a framework for peaceful 
coexistence in outer space that has lasted over fifty years. It is worth preserving. 
However, that does not mean fossilizing. Law evolves, institutions evolve. As has been 
demonstrated, property, sovereignty, and the State are concepts and institutions which 
have developed and evolved over hundreds, even thousands of years. They have 
adapted and changed to meet new developments and new environments. This in 
particular has been true on the ‘frontier.’ Innovations such as the approach to water 
rights and the development of Torrens titles changed the nature of property and spread 
throughout the world. English property law encountered a radically different set of 
circumstances from that in which it had developed and changed as a result. 
Sovereignty has evolved from being synonymous with the power of the king to being 
a multifaceted complex concept in the twenty-first century. Therefore, it should be 
expected that property and sovereignty will evolve in the unique and challenging 
environment of outer space. 
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It is important that this evolution and development occurs with the input and 
ownership from a variety of stakeholders. A key aspect of securing the legitimacy of 
these development is recognizing that industry is not the only stakeholder. This should 
be particularly clear and important given the evidence of the growth at all costs 
approach that has devastated the terrestrial environment. Sustainability should be the 
watchword of space development and space law. The use of space is the province of 
all humanity and should be conducted in the interests and for the benefit of all. That 
has to mean something. This cannot be yet another plunder conducted by the wealthy 
and power States. It is imperative that the use of these resources is well managed. As 
Elvis and Mullins have indicated it is possible that humanity could exhaust the 
resources of the solar system faster than anticipated. Once these resources have been 
exhausted there are no real options for replacing them. The resources of the solar 
system offer immense possibilities for the future of humanity, therefore there is an 
obligation to create a regime that ensures the fulfilment of that possibility which must 
ensure fair and equitable use of the available resources in a peaceful and sustainable 
manner. These things will not just happen, but they need to be brought about by law 
and policy, and ultimately political will. 
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